@seigneur 

Yes, every man (as in social and political animal) is created by God, but some are called to be Christians.  Should the church (the sum total of Christians) govern the political and social life of all men or just of Christians? Is there a distinction at all between some average dude and a Christian, according to you? What is the distinction? Is Christian a churchgoer, but otherwise an ordinary social and political animal - in fact going to church also to satisfy his social and political instincts?
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Please do provide your scriptural argument for the proposition that the Church is merely a sum total of all Christians. 
And, also, the part where "some" are called to be Christians, rather than all? The Great Comission is called great for a reason. Or are some people somehow not part of "all creation"? Are societies not creatures of God, aren't states? Where in Scripture can you find a divine law banning Christians from the government and civil service, or even reminding those who are not banned of their duty?

St. Ambrose, for example, certainly wasn't aware of any of it. He knew, however, of his duty to remind Christians of their duty, even if they are Emperors. He excommunicated Theodosius and made him do penance for months. What for? A massacre.
He somehow forgot to remind the Emperor of his duty to abdicate and name a pagan his successor. Or to do penance for Christianising law and persecuting opponents of Nicene orthodoxy or pagans.
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Does this somehow imply that the Caesar should kiss the feet of the Pope and the Pope may depose him?
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If you really want to fulfill your invoked obligation, you can start by re-reading my reply addressing this pet peeve of yours. You can start justifying your rejections. But here's a hint: if any feet are to be kissed at all (you're welcome to scripturally prove this act as illicit), should these not be the feet of a man, who is primate of all those who teach from the chair of Peter? I realis

Concerning the point about what Christ's saying about His kingdom made by Jeremy Taylor above, here's what some of the Fathers write about it (with a bow of gratitude to St. Thomas and his Catena Aurea):

St. John Chrysostom: 
John 18:36

My Kingdom is not of this world.
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He leads upwards Pilate who was not a very wicked man, nor after their fashion, and desires to show that He is not a mere man, but God and the Son of God. And what says He?

If My Kingdom were of this world, then would My servants fight, that I should not be delivered to the Jews.
He undoes that which Pilate for a while had feared, namely, the suspicion of seizing kingly power, Is then His kingdom not of this world also? Certainly it is. How then says He it 'is not'? Not because He does not rule here, but because He has his empire from above, and because it is not human, but far greater than this and more splendid. If then it be greater, how was He made captive by the other? By consenting, and giving Himself up. But He does not at present reveal this, but what says He? If I had been of this world, 'My servants would fight, that I should not be delivered.' Here He shows the weakness of kingship among us, that its strength lies in servants; but that which is above is sufficient for itself, needing nothing. From this the heretics taking occasion say, that He is different from the Creator. What then, when it says, He came to His own? John 1:11 What, when Himself says, They are not of this world, as I am not of this world? John 17:14 So also He says that His kingdom is not from hence, not depriving the world of His providence and superintendence, but showing, as I said, that His power was not human or perishable.

http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/240183.htm

I don't think I'm talking about a anything of peculiar importance to the 'Neo-platonic' argument, as noted  before. What is of importance here, is that parts are -in potency- to the whole.

But let's try something else. We have a candidate for primemovership. In your scenario, it's existence is pure act. In other words, it doesn't have a potential for existence, rather, it's purely actual in this respect to begin with. You then suppose that its actualisation of per se causal series is an accident, a potency actualised, and ask whether this - an other potentials of it - is at all possible.

Let's consider a potential that is irrelevant for the actualisation of potentials in a per se causal series. Suppose a potential of "considering whether or not to specially assist GeorgiusMancz in explaining the argument to RomanJoe" (replace it with whatever you like). Suppose it then actualises this potential.

What you're missing here, perhaps, is that upon this actualisation the prime mover candidate now actually considers the question. But wouldn't it then be true that it now actually -exists- as considering whether or not to give this special assistance?

When I decided to reply to you, I began actualising "GeorgiusMancz replying to RomanJoe". I had the active power to do so, the actualisation of which requires a certain potency in me, and now it is in act. But now I do -exist- as "GeorgiusMancz replying to RomanJoe". I moved, a real potential that -I- had had before was actualised. If this is what you posit in the prime mover, the latter is no more a prime mover than I am. 

You may reply that, unlike myself, the prime mover's existence is pure act. The reason I talk about parts is because I see no way to even begin such an argument without distinguishing parts in the prime mover. One is moved to do that because act and potency are really distinct. But to suggest that one simple pure act (inc. that of existence) is also potency for something else (for some 'futher specifi

Yes, it's a crime against thought. But you have not shown how I am begging the question. From my point of view, it's actually you doing it, insofar as you assume the following

- Catholics are Christians
- Christians must obey the Pope rather than the scriptures
- Capital Punishment, insofar as in accordance with natural law, is a Christian thing
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You seem (perhaps it's just me) to be under the impression that fitting your personal nominal defition of a Christian is a rational concern for anybody, and I think it's evidently false, at least as it regards people not already that devoted to you. What I think -is- a rational concern happens to be fitting the real definition of a Christian that can be discovered upon historical investigation of the revelation claim and believed on that basis.

The question I suspect of being begged here, of course, is the opposition between the Magisterium and the Scriptures, the petitionary nature of which I've already touched upon. I eagerly await seeing your preferred procedure of going about the real concern specified above without presupposing Sola (Primo?) Scriptura and/or some other arbitrary and irrational standard. 
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Hart's review challenges these points. Feser is not actually arguing for these points, but he certainly takes them for granted, more or less silently.
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I'll concede this as probable if you qualify your statement with "indirectly" and perhaps "unwittingly". His review seems to presuppose the truth of the first proposion against which you assert I'm begging the question.
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The idea is not to exclude natural law, but to determine the place of natural law in the order of things. Naturally, everybody is under natural law, Christians and gentiles alike. But Christians are also under Christian command and they are supposed to put aside their old worldly selves, so natural law is a thing to overcome, not a thing to follow. Is this not so? It's not a matter of if it's practical or feasible or easy to do i

A long time ago I participated in a discussion at Dr. Feser's blog. Although this discussion was chiefly distinguished by a presentation of my clearly brilliant but, alas, sadly neglected solution to the Orcish Souls Problem (OSP), the "Ainur-Latin Averroist Hypothesis" (clearly applicable also to respective problems concerning trolls and giant spiders), at some point we exchanged comments with --the- Daniel concerning the drive towards transcendence, which I agree is (arguendo, at least as a result of some examinations) recognisably present in many cultures, the Christian response that suggests itself immediately - that the Holy Spirit breatheth where he will - not being deemed quite satisfying by the non-Christian party of the conversation. I believe what follows can be of some interest to him and perhaps others, though as a Trinitarian I do not mean to present this as a substitution of any kind, and will hopefully even raise the plausibility of the Faith.

In an ethics (moral philosophy) manual written by a middle-20th century German Benedictine (which I do not happen to have at hand, unfortunately, and thus it is to remain unnamed at least for a time) I discovered something which stroke me as odd: a discussion of natural happiness. Not that this is not a common item in Thomistic works. The remarkable feature that had previously escaped my attention was that posited a distinction between imperfect (attainable while alilve) and perfect natural happiness (reserved for the dead). Given that the same theme is elaborated in greater detail in the work of Fr. Matthias Scheeben called "Nature and Grace" (Natur und Gnade, Matthias Joseph Scheeben, Gesammelte Schriften, Band 1, 1941, Freiburg im Breisgau Herder & Co. G.m.b.h.) that I have at hand, I will be relying on it for a general exposition.

The object of the book is to carefully and consequently distinguish between the orders of grace and nature and to crown the effort with an exposition of the true doctrine