mnels123 wrote:

Another question, if I may, that I found in an old discussion thread

5. Can an essentially-ordered series be grounded in an accidentally ordered series? If so, then perhaps what is supposedly essential is actually made up of accidental ordered series' and thus there is no essential, necessary first cause.

A.  Would this be like saying that a hand, pushing a stick, pushing a stone (essential series) is only possible because of an accidental series, like a father gave birth to a son, who then used his own power to pick up a stick and push the stone?

But I think that even if we admit that that there are lots of little essential series (essential series = hierarchical causal chain, right?) that may themselves rest on accidental ones, at bottom is a single, all-encompasing series that terminates in the first cause. But I'm curious how you all would respond to this.
 

 
On the contrary, as Scotus argued, every accidental series is grounded in an essentially ordered one. Essentially ordered are, pun very intended, more essential than accidental ones; perhaps a case could even be made for the idea that the only kind of causation there is is that of essentially ordered series. So, actually, every accidental series depends on an essentially ordered one.

I'll leave the details as an exercise to you. But think about it - in the father son series, for example, how is it that each member continues to exist long enough so as to generate another member?

So it's not really a good evasive.

I don't really bother much with essentially x accidentally ordered series though, since my favorite argument is the leibnizian one. Even if there were an infinity of contingent causes, this could never be sufficient to bring themselves into existence. The existence of the totality of contingent causes would remain unexplained and in need of a cause - whic

John West wrote:

Miguel wrote:

Statistical/indeterministic in case we're not talking about God, but only of some necessary ground of existence. I reject that as I don't think it makes much sense and I think theism follows, but hey, the discussion is about PSR, so maybe a defender could appeal to statistical processes if they think it works.

It isn't the modal collapse objection, but presumably the issue is that there can be no reason why w rather than v. Roughly the same answers could be given here in the context of a free choice (or a statistical explanation); "no entailment", or self-explanatory contingent facts.

Maybe a theist can appeal to aesthetic considerations here, too.

Honestly, your reply suggests that you misunderstand what I mean when I say that the worlds are indiscernible, i.e. qualitatively identical and only numerically distinct. (I'm thinking especially of your comment about aesthetic considerations.)

 
Oh. I reread it, I think you're right. I didn't catch that; I take that back then. but there's still the free will response. But also, I am not sure I agree we can have such a situation of "qualitatively identical and only numerically distinct". I find it somewhat suspect.

Calhoun wrote:

John West wrote:

 I think there are arguments for some kinds of brute facts. I made one of them in a post to UGADawg right after I got back a few months ago.

This one?

Suppose there are two possible worlds, w and v. Further suppose w is exactly the same as v except for one perfectly resembling trope or nominalist blob or indiscernible universal. What possible reason could God have to create w over v?

Can you explain how this is supposed to count against psr or show that brute facts exist? Because to me, all this seems to be showing is that we don't know a particular reason there could be for actualization of one world over the other.

 
I think it's better to just reject the idea that an explanans must entail its explanandum (if this is rejected, there can be an explanation for why w instead of v without entailment of w over v, which would seem to be where the puzzle comes from), or, alternatively, to propose self-explanatory contingent facts. Each option is sufficient. The first could then be used to argue that the explanation is either an indeterministic, statistical one (based on indifference? I reject this idea, but in the context of PSR it would be an open possibility for objections like these), or a libertarian free choice (like Daniel's reply, which is standard today, I believe). The second option I think only free choices would be a good candidate.

John West wrote:

Miguel wrote:

"The second (implicit in some of your comments) was based on the not insignificant dispute over its status in epistemology."

What do you mean by that?

I mean that there is a dispute over the validity of self-evidence in epistemology. It was, historically, taken very seriously by the Rationalists. I think nowadays most epistemologists consider it to be in rough shape, though. You should check it out some day if you have the time and desire.

 
Oh. I somehow thought you were talking about the role of PSR in epistemology, since that was part of the argument.

Well, I consider myself a rationalist. (At one point before thomism I even used to believe in monads and innate ideas. But anyway...)

"The second (implicit in some of your comments) was based on the not insignificant dispute over its status in epistemology."

What do you mean by that?