Calhoun, 

Well I would have been willing to say that you do successfully show that this argument is inadequate but ..For what purpose have God created us? you say its having union with God  or personal relationship with God ..but (even granting that you can make sense of it) its still far from clear ..Exactly What one would find so satisfying about it to peruse this particular propose.

Well first off, if our interest is to defeat the argument of the paper and make room for theistic interpretations of meaning then it isn't necessary for me to show that a particular theistic interpretation is actual, I only need to show that it is possible. If argument one was the only argument they offered against theistic interpretations of meaning, the mere possibility of separating God's purpose from our own purposes is enough to defeat it and make room for theism. 

That said, talking about mere possibilities can be unsatisfying, so I accept your question. Why should we think that union with God is a satisfying purpose of dedicating one's life to?... I think with any suggestion of ultimate purpose there is the possibility of someone asking "what's so special about that?" Having a close positive relationship with the ground of being, the supreme creator, and Goodness itself seems to me prima facie meaningful. In fact, it seems so meaningful that I almost feel guilty that I am offered it. I don't deserve something so good. Why should we expect to find it satisfying? Again... I just don't see how it couldn't be, but if you are unconvinced I could point out the many instances testimony to the fact that it is (like the section I quoted from Augustine's confessions). 

How does one know that this particular purpose is only objective purpose? What if one doesn't enjoy this purpose or find it particularly meaningful?

I haven't claimed that it is the only objective purpose. Actually, I said the opp

Calhoun,

Thanks for the great response! I am having fun!

Here its unclear what you mean by having loving union with God , is it some event or state of affairs that obtain? Is it some experience ? Does it have some qualitative content?  

I don’t have a thorough description. Union with God is not unlike union with persons in its essential characteristics: 2nd personal connection, shared attention, self-revelation of important needs or desires, responsiveness etc. As for love, I think Aquinas gives the best definition: desire for the good of the beloved, and desire of union with the beloved.  This isn’t something I know very much about, but I can refer you to literature if you want to know more.

what is it that gets missing when one doesn't choose this elusive ...thing?

What is missing if one doesn’t choose to have a close relationship with anybody? You lose out on getting to have close relationship with God. Speaking for myself, I like having close relationships, in fact, I consider close relationships to be among the greatest goods one can experience. From what I have heard, a close relationship with God is particularly fulfilling. Consider the words of St. Augustine: “You [God] have made us for yourself, and our hearts are restless until they rest in you.”

Now here you seem to be doing a different thing , rather than talking about our ultimate purpose being union with God here you seem to be making something like a Sceptical theistic move regarding the realms of meaning and value,here you seem to suggest that meaning in a theistic world and an atheistic world would be the same but in a theistic world their might be something extra special about our lives, some extra positive feature that is entailed by existence of God ,here referred only as Whatever it is..
I wasn’t flip-flopping on my view of meaning, I was just switching between writing from a general theists point of view and my own view. I should have been more cle

Calhoun, 

Yeah, my bad. I read your op a long time ago (the night you first posted it) then started mulling over the paper. I forgot that you mentioned you specifically want to discuss those four particular arguments. I don't think those four arguments are the real crux of their case, but I am happy to discuss them nonetheless. 

Let me just say something quickly about the my "free will argument." I accept the characterization so long as we clarify it is a type of free will defense. It isn't the same as the free will defense. I am aware that the free will theodicy is controversial, in fact, I don't accept it. What I am doing here is stealing a single maneuver used in that argument and applying it to this issue. My argument will succeed or fail on its own merits. 

What difference does(or would) God of Classical Theism make in the world? Why would one want him to exist? (it important for theist that God's existence actually does make a difference in the world because then he might be able to offer pragmatic reasons for inferring God's existence where for example a premise of a Cosmological argument is dubious, or generally its the very point of accepting theism..) 

Okay, fair enough. That isn't my preferred way of arguing theism, but pragmatic arguments are useful regardless, and I do think there are pragmatic reasons to accept theism, including ones that have to do with the meaning of life. 

First off, it seems obvious to me that one doesn't need to hold a strictly theistic account of the meaning of life to affirm that the existence of God adds something valuable to one's account. For example, in the account I offered, one could have a meaningful life even if God doesn't exist so long as one lives for a purpose that has intrinsic value. However, if God exists then we have reason to believe we were made for an ultimate purpose (whatever it is). Such a purpose would be extremely valuable and affirming to our intrinsi

Calhoun,

Let me then offer some examples of the efficacy of my distinction in breaking down their arguments:

On page 4, they offer their second argument for the premise (2) if the God of classical theism exists, then no lives lack meaning. Their argument is, given God's perfect goodness and that meaningful life is preferable to meaningless ones, God would actualize a world in which life has meaning. But with my distinctions of the word "meaning" this argument obviously fails for the reasons I mentioned in the last post: if the purpose and ultimate condition of flourishing of mankind is union with God then God could only actualize a world in which we have the freedom to make union with him the purpose for which we live. If we have the power to make this choice then we also have the power to choose otherwise and spend our lives on meaningless purposes. 

On page 5 they argue for (2) on the grounds that if God created lives that lack meaning, then creating us would be meaningless, ie. there would be no reason for God to create us in the first place. This is true so long as what they mean by "meaning" is what I call "purpose." So long as God has a purpose for us when he made us, he has reason to make us. If we reject to pursue that purpose our lives might lack some measure of meaning, but God is not responsible for that. 

Now Megill and Linford foresee something like this objection. In the next paragraph, they point out that someone might object that all God need do is create lives that have the possibility of meaning. They attempt to counter it by writing: "if some lives lack meaning, then the suffering that those  with meaningless lives endure is gratuitous, and gratuitous suffering is inconsistent with the existence of God." I just don't see how this follows. Gratuitous suffering is suffering without purpose. But as I said above, every life has a purpose, even if they fail to realize it. The suffering from a meaningless life is suffering we choose for o