Thanks for the responses gentlemen. I'm liking the discussion here. Please give me a while to assimilate everything that's been said. I hope to give you a further response in the near future.

Scott wrote:

I apologize in advance for what will inevitably be delayed responses.

Thanks, I understand.

truthseeker wrote:

Could you give me an example of an x satisfying the following propositions?

Scott wrote:

Not without a better sense of what you mean by "metaphysically possible..."

By 'metaphysically possible' I understand 'does not contradict the combination of the principles of metaphysics, the axioms of logic and the definitions of terms.' I should define some other kinds of possibility for the ensuing discussion. By 'logically possible' in the narrow sense I understand 'does not contradict the axioms of logic.' By 'logically possible' in the broad sense I understand 'does not contradict the combination of the axioms of logic and the definitions of terms.' By 'nomologically possible' I understand 'does not contradict the combination of the laws of nature, the principles of metaphysics, the axioms of logic and the definitions of terms.' By 'practically possible relative to some circumstance C,' I understand 'does not contradict the combination of the principles of metaphysics, the axioms of logic, the definitions of terms, the laws of nature, and circumstance C.'

John West wrote:

...[Consider] an ice cube on some planet no living entity will ever go near. The ice cube has the potentiality to be melted, but it's declared by divine fiat that the ice cube will never be melted – space is dead, and cold, so the ice cube will never be in circumstances where it would melt. So, it's impossible for the ice cube to be melted even though it has the potentiality to be melted.

I would say that it's practically impossible for the ice cube to be melted relative to the circumstances, but metaphysically possible for the ice cube to be melted.

John West wrote:

1. It is metaphysically possible for [ice] to be [cold].
2. [Ice] has no potency for being [cold] (because it's actually cold).

Then I understand 'x has a

Let's start with act and potency. I understand these concepts as equivalent to actuality and possibility. So 'the ball is blue in actu' is equivalent to 'the ball is blue,' and 'the ball is blue in potentia' is equivalent to 'it is possibly the case that the ball is blue' (with 'possibly' being used in the metaphysical sense rather than, say, the epistemic sense). Furthermore, 'the man is in actu' is equivalent to 'the man exists,' and 'the man is in potentia' is equivalent to 'it is possibly the case that the man exists.' Am I making any error?

Greetings. I have an interest in Feser's philosophical writings, but I don't understand his arguments well enough to evalutate them. I hope that I can get some clarification on these forums.