Chit-Chat » Who are your three biggest philosophical influences? » 7/05/2018 8:52 am |
John West wrote:
And where is our glorious Frenchman? I've studied under French professors, so I have an idea of the kind of rubbish you probably have to deal with whenever philosophy comes up. (Anglos have to contend with lots of naturalists, but at least they're still objectively-minded. The French have to contend with rampant postmodernism.) How does someone surrounded by all that get to Thomism?
It's a bit out of place, and maybe too much personal, but I'm curious: on what circumstances did you study under French professors?
Apart from that, even if I'm not sctricto sensu from France, only a francophone, I wouldn't say that they got a big problem with postmodernism: maybe the academics aren't very much "analytics", but on public matters, I would say that the USA are ahead on this level.
Theoretical Philosophy » What are the best responses to Kant's transcendental idealism? » 7/01/2018 10:51 am |
Hello everyone.
A big problem I've got with Edward Feser, and modern philosophy of religion in general, is that there isn't direct response to kantian affirmations about the nature of metaphysical claims. Now, you're going to say me that someone doesn't have to address every philosophical systems that existed to get a point, but that answer have two problems:
1) It's question begging, exactly as when Feser is saying that to doesn't adress what thomists actually say is question begging.
2) Many arguments for substantial thesis misses the point for a transcendental idealist. Take thoses argument for the truth of the PSR: induction from experience, retorsion argument, no-probability argument and Della Roca's. Kant could, and does, accept each of them in a sense: yet, he could still argue that it isn't a proof for a metaphysical use of the principle.
It seems clear to me that an empiricist position isn't tenable: the examples I gave are good for showing that. But that's not the end of it.
Therefore, let me end on my original question: what are the best responses to Kant's transcendental idealist?
Theoretical Philosophy » Dissolving the Interaction Problem » 6/26/2018 10:34 am |
Even if I agree with you, I think that's probably because of the billard balls model of actions which is pretty intuitive. If we take immaterial substance as some ghostly balls, then immaterial-material interactions are surely unintelligibles.
Theoretical Philosophy » "Objections to St Thomas Aquinas' First Way (The Unmoved Mover)" » 6/25/2018 7:18 am |
Noble_monkey wrote:
Hey, I wrote a comprehensive and detailed refutation of this video here while defending the argument here.
If somebody can post it to youtube, that would be great and appreciated.
Well, you certainly were motivated. That made me think that it would be great to have an argument map for every major, and even minor, theistic argument.
It seems to me that, with it, it would be clear that the so-called "definite objections" were, in fact, already answered.
Theoretical Philosophy » Can God creates a world where some evil is necessary yet... » 6/11/2018 7:55 am |
Honestly, I'm not too sure why you would even have differents intuitions in your two different readings. Notwithstanding, I was encompassing both of them in my mind.
I'm not sure that free will would be an instance of E4, because it's an essential part of a moral agent to have at some time the possibility to do evil, and also because there's inherent good to have freedom to have morally significant action. Netherless, I have some reservations about my last part, given that it seems deeply implausible to say that it was good for Hitler to have the possibility to implement the Final Solution, at least good enough to justify the Holocaust.
If I read you well, it seems that your last sentence imply the possibility of gratuitous evil. Would you say that it's possible for God to say to someone who was tortured "Well, there wasn't a particular reason for this, but the global situation is good enough isn't it?" ?
Theoretical Philosophy » Can God creates a world where some evil is necessary yet... » 6/11/2018 7:05 am |
not counterbalanced by a greater good?
Let's divide evil in four ways:
E1 := Evil that happens necessarily from a situation, and that isn't compensanted by a greater good.
E2 := Evil that happens necessarily from a situation, and that is compensanted by a greater good.
E3 := Evil that happens contingently from a situation, and that is compensanted by a greater good.
E4 := Evil that happens contingently from a situation, and that isn't compensanted by a greater good.
If theism is true, and I encompass both classical theism and theistic personalism, what of those type are possible?
Intuitively, I would say that E4 is impossible, and E2 and E3 possible. I'm not sure for E1, hence my first question
Practical Philosophy » Social sciences and supernatural » 6/11/2018 6:31 am |
I've already heared about this idea of bias for the prophecy of temple destruction, but do you have some source for it? It doesn't have to be an explicit attack on the mere idea of foreseeing events though.
And thank you for all those names, I will look them.
Do you have some books/papers/whatever readings for the "bulverism problem" in social sciences? Do some of them directly treat this?
Or, on the methodological assumptions of psychology, for example.
Practical Philosophy » Social sciences and supernatural » 6/04/2018 4:47 pm |
What psychologists, anthropologists, sociologists and historians are doing.
Practical Philosophy » Social sciences and supernatural » 6/04/2018 4:10 pm |
That's more or less questions for people who have enough interest for the methodology of social sciences.
The social sciences are decidedly not my cup of tea. The more I try to read about them, the more I am skeptic about either their methodology, their ontological assumptions, or both. So, here some questions that I'd like to ask:
1) It seems to me that social scientist don't merely assume methodological naturalism, but clearly accept ontological naturalism. It's particulary problematic for sociology of religion/psychology of religion/ whatever humanities of religion, for how could you clearly study the reasons for someone's belief if you don't first show that his belief is true and if he had or not some perception or evidence for it?
Take for example the rural peoples' belief about the little people: personally, I'm agnostic about their existence. But is it the case for the sociologist/anthropologist? Wouldn't he basically explain with maybe a cultural pression, the sake of preserving their culture? Or a tendancy to see intelligence and finality when there is none?
Isn't there here a tendancy to bulverism?
At best, I think that we could only have conditionnal knowledge.
2) Doesn't social scientist assume mechanistic philosophy? It's like the intentionality and beliefs are not explanatory relevant, or that they can simply be reducted to structure that are causally determined by evolution in fine.
3) Does they undermine justification of belief in general? If you can explain by psycholocial means why someone belief X, does X is not to be believed anymore? Or does those methods can't exhaust justification?
Theoretical Philosophy » Criteria of demarcation » 5/23/2018 10:51 am |
Is there some "aristotelian consensus" on what is the difference beetween science and not-science? If not, what do you all think about this "problem"?
Maybe something along the line of "the knowledge of empirical quantities and structures only"?
Also, ther's this tendancy to call "pseudo-science" pretty much everything a skeptic doesn't like. So, would you say, if you don't believe in it of course, that things like homeopathy are pseudo-science or just false on a scientific view?