John West wrote:

And where is our glorious Frenchman? I've studied under French professors, so I have an idea of the kind of rubbish you probably have to deal with whenever philosophy comes up. (Anglos have to contend with lots of naturalists, but at least they're still objectively-minded. The French have to contend with rampant postmodernism.) How does someone surrounded by all that get to Thomism?

It's a bit out of place, and maybe too much personal, but I'm curious: on what circumstances did you study under French professors?
Apart from that, even if I'm not sctricto sensu from France, only a francophone, I wouldn't say that they got a big problem with postmodernism: maybe the academics aren't very much "analytics", but on public matters, I would say that the USA are ahead on this level.

Even if I agree with you, I think that's probably because of the billard balls model of actions which is pretty intuitive. If we take immaterial substance as some  ghostly balls, then immaterial-material interactions are surely unintelligibles.

Honestly, I'm not too sure why you would even have differents intuitions in your two different readings. Notwithstanding, I was encompassing both of them in my mind.

I'm not sure that free will would be an instance of E4, because it's an essential part of a moral agent to have at some time the possibility to do evil, and also because there's inherent good to have freedom to have morally significant action. Netherless, I have some reservations about my last part, given that it seems deeply implausible to say that it was good for Hitler to have the possibility to implement the Final Solution, at least good enough to justify the Holocaust.

If I read you well, it seems that your last sentence imply the possibility of gratuitous evil. Would you say that it's possible for God to say to someone who was tortured "Well, there wasn't a particular reason for this, but the global situation is good enough isn't it?" ?

I've already heared about this idea of bias for the prophecy of temple destruction, but do you have some source for it? It doesn't have to be an explicit attack on the mere idea of foreseeing events though.

And thank you for all those names, I will look them.

Do you have some books/papers/whatever readings for the "bulverism problem" in social sciences? Do some of them directly treat this?
Or, on the methodological assumptions of psychology, for example.

That's more or less questions for people who have enough interest for the methodology of social sciences.

The social sciences are decidedly not my cup of tea. The more I try to read about them, the more I am skeptic about either their methodology, their ontological assumptions, or both. So, here some questions that I'd like to ask:

1) It seems to me that social scientist don't merely assume methodological naturalism, but clearly accept ontological naturalism. It's particulary problematic for sociology of religion/psychology of religion/ whatever humanities of religion, for how could you clearly study the reasons for someone's belief if you don't first show that his belief is true and if he had or not some perception or evidence for it?
Take for example the rural peoples' belief about the little people: personally, I'm agnostic about their existence. But is it the case for the sociologist/anthropologist? Wouldn't he basically explain with maybe a cultural pression, the sake of preserving their culture? Or a tendancy to see intelligence and finality when there is none?

Isn't there here a tendancy to bulverism?
At best, I think that we could only have conditionnal knowledge.

2) Doesn't social scientist assume mechanistic philosophy? It's like the intentionality and beliefs are not explanatory relevant, or that they can simply be reducted to structure that are causally determined by evolution in fine.

3) Does they undermine justification of belief in general? If you can explain by psycholocial means why someone belief X, does X is not to be believed anymore? Or does those methods can't exhaust justification?