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Theoretical Philosophy » A Little Help with Evil » 8/20/2015 9:43 am

seigneur
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AKG wrote:

Did Hume really criticise Aquinas's version or a strawman that looks like Payley's?

Payley's. Here's a thorough analysis of what Hume criticised and how https://www.uwgb.edu/dutchs/PSEUDOSC/Hume.htm

Hume wrote literary dialogues and he added remarks that make it unclear what his own position was. The analysis concludes, "Philo wins because Hume writes it that way. We might just as well say that Moby Dick proves whales are evil... Hume makes Demea (the defender of the design argument) a simpleton instead of having a foil on a par with, say, Thomas Aquinas or Augustine." 

Practical Philosophy » Best Arguments Against Same-Sex Marriage » 8/20/2015 6:48 am

seigneur
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Jeremy Taylor wrote:

I think there is some ambiquity in what you are saying. Whilst at times you seem to be referring to separare existence of society as witnessed in its effects on the members of society, at other times you seem to, as Matthew points out, confuse the metaphorical with the literal. Society does not have a literal corporeal body.

 Now th​ere are intriquing questions about what the apparent fact that society is more than the sum of its individual, corporeal members means about its ontological status. Does it posses some kind of essential nature, and how would any such nature be related to man's nature? Perhaps society, or perhaps the nation, even has some sort of being in its own right that does interact with its corporeal instantiation. But I can see how it can be said that society has a corporeal body or being in the same sense we do.

The ambiguity is only theoretical. You seem to be more interested in determining what kind of ontological status society has when we speak about it in objective terms, whereas I am more interested in observing how society operates regardless how we speak about it.

It's true that society does not have a literal corporeal body, but it's equally true that society can condemn you or celebrate you, make you feel appreciated or rejected, you may live in harmony with society or rebel against it, etc. Just like individual personality in one sense is identical to individual behaviour (i.e. we are to others precisely how we behave), while in another sense our personality is how we would like to behave, all the subjective good intentions we have when doing this or that, and, ontologically, there's no way to separate these two aspects, similarly, society in one sense is the sum of the individuals that make it up and you may be tempted to say it's "nothing but the sum", but in another sense, insofar as society is clearly structured, having leadership and different institutions with distinct rights, powers, an

Practical Philosophy » Best Arguments Against Same-Sex Marriage » 8/20/2015 4:17 am

seigneur
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Jeremy Taylor wrote:

I have heard certain Platonists, Hermeticists, and the like argue that human collectivities often bring into being psychic or subtle entities that represent these communities, but I doubt this is what you mean. So you will have to explain your meaning more fully.

This is pretty close to what I in fact mean. I can imagine myself saying "Society is the sum of individuals" but when I say it, I mean it in the total sense, i.e. that society is analysable like a macroindividual whose constitution has more to it than what directly meets the eye.

Like in case of an ordinary individual, society has its history and future, life and death, body and mind. Society has its head (leadership), arms (civil servants and law enforcement) and the rest of the organs that make up its body. It has its ideals upon which it builds its future. If the ideals lose their significance or are crushed by some force, society will become as if ill, it will lose its hopes for the future and may die. 

In individual human beings, there is a psychological function called subconsciousness. Similarly, members of society share a collective mental ballast. Some aspects of the ballast help the individuals thrive, when they rely on it for self-identity and for living in collective harmony. Other aspects of it may cause some individuals rebel, when they feel traditional or habitual manners either too limiting or meaningless.

In my view, both the disputes over marriage (the nature of the disputes is definitional, i.e. people can't agree what the word means, and even whether it has a meaning at all) and the practice of marriage in the Occident (close to half, in some countries more than half, of children are born out of wedlock) demonstrate that the meaning of marriage has been lost. Marriage has become a burden rather than a blessing. So many people find the institution meaningless that it has become possible for subgroups to attack it and demolish it.

In my view, the point

Theoretical Philosophy » Dealing with a Scientistic Naturalist » 8/20/2015 1:06 am

seigneur
Replies: 47

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John West wrote:

The immaterialist position can be defended by positing massive hallucination—as per Quine’s famous thesis—but this runs into severe counterarguments.

Much more reasonable than the wholesale hallucination thesis is the thesis that there are hallucinations on the one hand and clear perception of reality on the other. How is the difference between the two determined? Do you separate hallucinations from "proper" reality *materially*? And when you have done such separation, then that which is left is it entirely material?

The fact is that the work of separation of hallucinations from reality is *purely* (psycho)logical, not material at all. You do not touch the matter of hallucinations in order to separate it from reality. (You cannot, because hallucinations are not material.) At the same time, you cannot say that hallucinations are unreal, because if they were unreal, you would not need to separate them from "proper" reality. Logically, when you separate one thing from another, both are presupposed to be real. So, hallucinations are real, but immaterial.

Further, the work of separation done, is the reality that is left, after hallucinations have been separated, entirely material? Wasn't the entire work purely (psycho)logical? Thus psychology and logic determine reality at least as much as bosons and quarks, if not more.

And there cannot be any argument to the effect that psychology and logic are made up of the same bosons and quarks, because if this were so, then go ahead and show the relevant boson to me. Show me the nerve cell that contains the thought that I am having. If this were possible, then neurologists who study people's brains would be mind-readers, knowing much better from their third-person perspective what people think than people know from their own first-person perspective. Since all this is not the case - and cannot be - materialism/naturalism is not the case.

Resources » Islamic resources » 8/19/2015 6:25 pm

seigneur
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This may test some people's tolerance, but Islam happens to have its own very solid classical theist tradition too. For example, the famous Evangelical debater William Lane Craig has a fine history of encounters with Muslim debaters, and Muslims come across as more consistently monotheistic.

The best classical theist authority within Islam is Al-Ghazali, both as a starting point and as a subject of advanced study. He is not just a name among others, but a truly gigantic practical scholar who adequately systematised the entire Western and Islamic philosophical thought that had preceded him. On top of this, his own insights are veritable revelations that opened new paths in both philosophy and theology of Islam. As a theologian, he argued for the normalisation of the Sufi movement on both philosophical and scriptural grounds. 

A good grasp of the style and method of Al-Ghazali is provided by The Just Balance, a brief overview of the aspects of the syllogistic reasoning.

And here's an article by Aaron Hughes on what Al-Ghazali had to say about the relationships of mental world and the physical world http://www.ghazali.org/articles/hughes.pdf

For example,

Aaron Hughes wrote:

Against the philosophers, Ghazali claims that the imaginative faculty is both primary and superior to the rational faculty because it is responsible for the creation of images (muthul, sing. mithâl) that enable the embodied individual to perceive the imperceptible and to express the inexpressible. [...]

A world cannot exist without its display or without meaningful articulations. In the world of Neoplatonism—the ontological system to which Ghazali subscribed—these articulations occur within an emanative framework, wherein images issue ontically from a nonmaterial source. Within this framework sense phenomena are necessary conditions for our knowledge of both the transcendence of the world and what is transcendent to the world. From the embodied human perspective, Neoplatonic articulation

Theoretical Philosophy » Dealing with a Scientistic Naturalist » 8/19/2015 5:44 pm

seigneur
Replies: 47

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Alexander wrote:

iwpoe wrote:

The inferiority of the empirical sciences to philosophy is not an inferiority of ability, knowledge, or social rank, but an "inferiority" of logical priority. It is the sort of inferiority that the statement "All dogs are brown." has to the statement "There are propositions which can express universals in categorical statements." (followed by an account of all these things).

Even if that were a reasonable way to put it, this kind of "inferiority" would obviously be more accurately expressed with the words "posterior" and "prior" in place of "inferior" and "superior", which in any context are used almost exclusively to make value judgements. I also think it's fairly clear that the post I was originally responding to was using inferior in the sense of "inferiority of knowledge", especially given that they declared metaphysics to be "much more certain than science ever will be".

Long story short, inasmuch as the scientistic naturalist (which is the type we are discussing in this thread) claims that science is more about facts, reality, and truth than metaphysics will ever be, I'd attack the claim head-on and promptly turn the tables. In the process, I have absolutely no concern whether I will be liked or not. In fact, if I will not be liked, I will tactically cite this as an example that the opponent tends to attribute factuality to things that he likes rather than to things that are really factual. And the debate will be over soon enough. Why prolong it?

Theoretical Philosophy » Dealing with a Scientistic Naturalist » 8/19/2015 7:10 am

seigneur
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Alexander wrote:

And your attitude is precisely why many scientists dislike "superior" philosophers.

I was under the impression that truth mattered. Instead, it seems now that like and dislike matter more.

Alexander wrote:

When there is so much disagreement among philosophers about what the "certain" metaphysical results are, ...

When there's so little knowledge among scientists about what makes up the universe (4.9 percent by their own calculations) and even what the universe is...
 

Theoretical Philosophy » Dealing with a Scientistic Naturalist » 8/19/2015 4:39 am

seigneur
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Alexander wrote:

A lot of the problems raised in this thread don't seem that insurmountable, or are at least smaller than they may appear. For example, the issue of how we can be certain the laws apply universally is easily solved: we can't.

This precisely how I would point out the decisive inferiority and uncertainty of so-called scientific knowledge. Metaphysics built on rigorous logic and carefully examined presuppositions is much more certain than science ever will be. Science itself cannot proceed except by rigorous logic and carefully examined presuppositions. This is the method that really works.

Practical Philosophy » Best Arguments Against Same-Sex Marriage » 8/19/2015 4:22 am

seigneur
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Jeremy Taylor wrote:

 But I largely agree with you that society doesn’t have a separate being or substance to the individuals that make it up.

I.e. society is nothing but the individuals that make it up. Can someone explain how this is not reductionism, atomism, and/or nominalism?

(Yes, I noticed that you immediately contradict this in the next sentence by saying "society does seem to be, in some sense, something more than the individual members that make it up" but this is just that, a contradiction that you don't resolve. As a minimum, it looks like you are undecided in your commitments in this area.)

Theoretical Philosophy » Dealing with a Scientistic Naturalist » 8/18/2015 3:45 pm

seigneur
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iwpoe wrote:

...but is it even true that "Fundamental science supports naturalism as it rules out an all powerful God in the only world that we know."

Of course it's not true. The scientific (and scientistic) fact is that the current standard model of cosmology can account for only 4.9 percent of the matter-energy that *should* exist in the universe. Much of the rest of the universe is made of the hypothesised "dark" (i.e. invisible and undetectable) matter-energy, and there's still some percentage left that no scientist can wrap their brain around.

So, science knows little (4.9 percent) and of what it knows, it cannot tell if it's God moving it or what.

If I were interested in talking to such a person, I would point out the holes in his cosmological account and lay out my awesome alternative account with far superior explanatory power in the same level of detail as he did his. 

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