@ficino, 

ficino wrote:

I wrote a pacific reply, and then I said to myself, this forum is a joke. I thought there were people here who were interested in discussing writings of classical theists. But no one or almost no one wants to do anything scholarly on here. This place is a claque-pit for Feser. I'm done. 
 

It seems to me that your focus is on the parsing the original language used by the authors rather than how their students and followers understood them and developed their ideas.  That is fine since it that is your field of interest.  However I assume that is not the main interest of those participating in a Classical Theism forum and that is why some find it out of place.

It seems that you are making an argument that Thomists misunderstood Aristotle, and so they have foundational problems. Maybe you aren't making that argument, but that is the way it appears.

But if you are making that argument, then it should be no surprise that Thomists or Neo-Platonists would have counter arguments.

@ficino,

"OK, yes, and it follows that ...?"

It follows that I disagree with your hypothesis that Aristotle's inclusion of generation and corruption in the category of motion was merely an early notion he rejected in later more mature writings.  I agree with Helen Lang that he included it when the topic called for it.  

In fact, Aquinas uses the generating cause as proof that everything that is moved is moved by another in the SCG while explaining the reasoning behind the First Way.

Book 1 chapter 13

[8] In the second way, Aristotle proves the proposition by induction [Physics VIII, 4]. Whatever is moved by accident is not moved by itself, since it is moved upon the motion of another. So, too, as is evident, what is moved by violence is not moved by itself. Nor are those beings moved by themselves that are moved by their nature as being moved from within; such is the case with animals, which evidently are moved by the soul. Nor, again, is this true of those beings, such as heavy and light bodies, which are moved through nature. For such beings are moved by the generating cause and the cause removing impediments. Now, whatever is moved is moved through itself or by accident. If it is moved through itself, then it is moved either violently or by nature; if by nature, then either through itself, as the animal, or not through itself, as heavy and light bodies. Therefore, everything that is moved is moved by another.

Aquinas considers the generating cause the ultimate cause of a certain class of present motion and argues this point in his explanation of the First Way.  So things are only in motion as long as the generating cause is active.  So the generating cause must be acting in the present moment.  So divine conservation is considered part of the explanation of the First Way by Aquinas.

"I'd appreciate it if people are more careful in how they use the word "assume." I'm not assuming the above. "

I mentioned that I thought you were a

@grodrigues,

This will be the second time Sean Carroll's article will have been pointed out to him.
Don't expect him to understand it now since he didn't understand it then.

@ficino,

From Aquinas's 

COMMENTARY ON
ARISTOTLE'S
GENERATION AND CORRUPTION

[i]1. As the Philosopher says in On the Soul III, the sciences are divided off in the same manner as things are — for all habits are distinguished by their objects, from which they are specified. Now the things considered by Natural Science are motion and mobile being. Thus the Philosopher says in Physics II that whatever things move, they themselves being moved, these belong to physical speculation. Consequently, it is according to the differences between motions and mobiles that the parts of natural science must be distinguished and ordered.

Now the first motion is local motion, which is more perfect than the other kinds, and common to all natural bodies, as is proved in Physics VII. Therefore, after the study of motions and mobiles in common in the book of the Physics, it was first necessary to treat of bodies as they are moved with local motion. This was in the book On the Heavens, which is the second book of natural science. What remains, therefore, is to consider the other subsequent motions which are not common to all bodies but are found only in lower bodies.

Among these motions, generation and corruption obtain the primacy. For alteration is directed to generation as to its end, and the end is by nature more perfect than what leads to it. Growth, likewise, is subsequent to generation, for growth does not take place without a certain particular generation, namely, that by which food is converted into the thing fed. Thus the Philosopher says in On the Soul II that food nourishes in so far as it is potentially flesh, but it produces increase inasmuch as potentially it is quantified flesh. Therefore, since these motions are in a certain way consequent upon generation, they must be studied along with generation and corruption.

2. Now it should be noted that whatever is found in a number of things should first be considered in common before coming to the specific cases. O

ficino wrote:

Feser often concludes that some aspect of contemporary theory in physics either requires A-T metaphysical theses or comes close to them or does not conflict with them. So I am trying to get straight how much of A-T physics Feser thinks also stands. 
 

As grod mentioned, physics as such is not a concern of Dr. Feser.  He is interested in metaphysics.

Physics and Metaphysics are different things.  Science and Philosophy of Science are different things.
For instance, "From nothing, nothing comes" is not a physics statement, but a metaphysical statement.    But contemporary theory in physics requires this, as did classical physics, as did Aristotelian physics. 

Are you unaware that there is a difference?