Theoretical Philosophy » Verification critera and self-refutation » 5/23/2018 10:43 am |
Well, I think your answers are pretty much correct.
After thinking about it a little much, I think that basically the three ways that he's using is basically the same way to redefine what metaphysicans call truth, and then doing a fallacy of equivocation, which is pretty much useless. And I also think that Greg's remark for the difference beetween verification and understanding is devastating.
Thank's everyone.
Theoretical Philosophy » Verification critera and self-refutation » 5/20/2018 11:23 am |
Edward Feser, and a lot of other philosophers, argue that logical positivism is false because of the classical argument arguing that the verification principle is self-refuting.
Yet, I read an interesting blog post saying that it isn't the case, because the principle can be construed as either an analytic statement, or an empirical statement, or a meaningless yet useful statement.
Here it is:
I was thinking about the "pragmatic" way: the verification principle as an heuristic principle. Now, could we still defend the idea of self-refutation, on the ground that it would mean that it's a ethic statement, with a "You should", and, as such, would still need a truth value.
What do you all think?
Theoretical Philosophy » Materialist's definition of matter » 5/15/2018 3:06 pm |
Greg wrote:
If that's the case, then the denial of materialism also isn't even wrong. You can't take the negation of nonsense, unless you want some more nonsense.
Fair enough. But I l would say that what materialists call dualists and idealists can define coherently what is matter and what isn't, something not avaible to them.
Theoretical Philosophy » Is life meaningless without an afterlife? » 5/15/2018 6:08 am |
RomanJoe wrote:
Of course the reply might be that to even regard it as a tragedy is only to mirror my own cultural philosophical bias.
Maybe. But obviously, some civilization had knowledge of that: a lot of them complained about the fatum, wich is an echo of it, I think.
Theoretical Philosophy » Materialist's definition of matter » 5/15/2018 6:00 am |
What is it? I don't wan't to strawman others, and I honnestly don't know.
How do they basically escape the Hempel Dilemna? Maybe by saying something along the lines that there's some common denominator beetween all physics, present and future, but what would it be?
The more I think about it, the more I think that materialism isn't even wrong.
Theoretical Philosophy » Is life meaningless without an afterlife? » 5/14/2018 6:21 pm |
Personnally, I wouldn't say that's an "argument" for an afterlife, but rather for God. Something along those lines: if we there is objective meaning to our sense, it can't disappear, never. Therefore, someone must remember it without any corruption and for eternity: that's basically God.
But that can't be a real argument as such, that can prove the existence of God, because I think we can't say that there's objective meaning or not. It's more a psychological argument, in the line of Pascal Wager and Kant's pratical argument; If we believe that there's objective meaning, and I think that a lot do, we should believe in God.
Well, obviously, the dices are loaded: the fact is that our culture was shaped by theism, so it's not innocent that we think about the question of meaning.
Religion » Trouble with Hell/Sin » 5/06/2018 8:02 am |
Two points then:
* I don't think that someone deserve eternal punishment given a finite time on earth, even if he did something trully evil, like torturing innocent people. Obviously, he should be punished, and suffered how he made other suffered, but not more.
Yes, Himmler and other should rotten in hell for a very long time, probably billions of years. But! That shouldn't be unlimited in duration.
* I don't think either that what you call "true evil" really exist. I don't think that anyone did an evil for the sake of evil: the malicious take pleasure in an evil action, and pleasure is a good in itself.
In fact, I think that saying that "true evil" exist can be pretty dangerous for classical theism, because it seems to imply that evil is a concrete reality, which would mean that God is beyond good and evil, given that he's the source of everything.
Chit-Chat » Learning how to speak cogently » 5/06/2018 7:12 am |
Why not simply think about what you're going to say before speaking it?
You mentally formulate an exact phrase, then you say it word for word.
Also, one great thing to be better in everything wich concerns "oral matters", I recommand theater.
Religion » Trouble with Hell/Sin » 5/06/2018 5:30 am |
It's a thing to say that someone would prefer going to hell when he'll die, it's an altogether another thing to say that he would prefer to stay eternally in hell.
I think that the majority of universalist doesn't deny the reality of hell: only its unlimited duration.
It seems to me that everyone got his limits, and ultimately, it seems very plausible to say that everyone will ultimately choose to stay with God.
Moreover, it's borderline unintelligible to say that someone may freely choose, on full knowledge, eternal misery and suffering. Given that free will is inherently teleological, and that agents choose on what they perceive as good, it seems illogical to say that someone wouldn't choose what is the source of goodness itself.
Theoretical Philosophy » What are your favorite ways of showing the first cause is God? » 4/22/2018 12:37 pm |
Well, I get the general idea, but I've gome the same question as you say just before: why not say that the First Cause has the effects eminently in it?
Miguel wrote:
that everything that exists is either a physical thing, an abstract object, a mental content, or a mind.
Why not an immateriel concrete object? Is it something logically impossible? After all, it seems to beg the question against those who maintain that The Absolute is impersonal.
It would be the only thing we know like that of course, so, as you say, by parsimony, it's less probable. But if someone is some "local materialist", arguing that materialism is true for human being, he could say that he doesn't know either embodied mind. Therefore, embodied mind and immaterial impersonal being are both new ontological planes.
Miguel wrote:
It is enough that we have a coherent concept of unembodied minds, and even materialists should at least grant the possibility of unembodied intellects.
Why though?
Even if brilliant philosophers weren't materialist, it would mean that there is an epistemological possibility rather than a logical one.
Let's say someone take an agnostic stance: "I don't claim that materialism is necessarily true, necessarily false or possible." What argument could we give him? Some concevability as guide to possibility?
But it's a dangerous path, because someone could retort that then brute facts are also concevaible.