Edward Feser, and a lot of other philosophers, argue that logical positivism is false because of the classical argument arguing that the verification principle is self-refuting.

Yet, I read an interesting blog post saying that it isn't the case, because the principle can be construed as either an analytic statement, or an empirical statement, or a meaningless yet useful statement.
Here it is: https://graspedinthought.org/blog/2017/12/4/why-verificationism-isnt-self-defeating

I was thinking about the "pragmatic" way: the verification principle as an heuristic principle. Now, could we still defend the idea of self-refutation, on the ground that it would mean that it's a ethic statement, with a "You should", and, as such, would still need a truth value.
What do you all think?

RomanJoe wrote:

Of course the reply might be that to even regard it as a tragedy is only to mirror my own cultural philosophical bias. 

Maybe. But obviously, some civilization had knowledge of that: a lot of them complained about the fatum, wich is an echo of it, I think.
 

Personnally, I wouldn't say that's an "argument" for an afterlife, but rather for God. Something along those lines: if we there is objective meaning to our sense, it can't disappear, never. Therefore, someone must remember it without any corruption and for eternity: that's basically God.
But that can't be a real argument as such, that can prove the existence of God, because I think we can't say that there's objective meaning or not. It's more a psychological argument, in the line of Pascal Wager and Kant's pratical argument; If we believe that there's objective meaning, and I think that a lot do, we should believe in God.

Well, obviously, the dices are loaded: the fact is that our culture was shaped by theism, so it's not innocent that we think about the question of meaning.

Why not simply think about what you're going to say before speaking it?
You mentally formulate an exact phrase, then you say it word for word.

Also, one great thing to be better in everything wich concerns "oral matters", I recommand theater.

Well, I get the general idea, but I've gome the same question as you say just before: why not say that the First Cause has the effects eminently in it?

Miguel wrote:

that everything that exists is either a physical thing, an abstract object, a mental content, or a mind.

Why not an immateriel concrete object? Is it something logically impossible? After all, it seems to beg the question against those who maintain that The Absolute is impersonal.
It would be the only thing we know like that of course, so, as you say, by parsimony, it's less probable. But if someone is some "local materialist", arguing that materialism is true for human being, he could say that he doesn't know either embodied mind. Therefore, embodied mind and immaterial impersonal being are both new ontological planes.

Miguel wrote:

It is enough that we have a coherent concept of unembodied minds, and even materialists should at least grant the possibility of unembodied intellects.

Why though?
Even if brilliant philosophers weren't materialist, it would mean that there is an epistemological possibility rather than a logical one.
Let's say someone take an agnostic stance: "I don't claim that materialism is necessarily true, necessarily false or possible." What argument could we give him? Some concevability as guide to possibility?
But it's a dangerous path, because someone could retort that then brute facts are also concevaible.