| Theoretical Philosophy » Theoretically, could the prime mover have unactualized potentials? » 11/26/2017 4:58 am |
- GeorgiusThomas
- Replies: 21
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RomanJoe,
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In your first comment here you distinguish between two pure acts, as it were, the first pure act being relevant to causal efficacy in the per se causal chain, the second the pure act of existence of the thing having said causal efficacy. For the difficulty to make sense, these things would have to be really distinct, not simply logically, as in the latter case you would simply have one pure act, and in the order where the act is pure there's simply no 'space' for any potency admixed (to wit, as the act wouldn't merit the characterisation as 'pure').
Now, the thing in question has to be a substance. It cannot be a merely accidental unity, as in that case both 'parts' would have substantial identity, and hence be two different things, one, however, dependent on the other (since, as you grant, existence precedes causal efficacy). That dependence, moreover, would be causal, as the first thing's potential to exist would have to be actualised first, so we have the same regress again and only the latter thing would merit the name of prime mover.
That leaves us with both pure acts being said to be acts of one and the same thing. That's where parts come in. Now, whatever a part is, it is really distinct from the whole.
If we are talking of physical (not "material' or 'bodily'; the term connotes relevance to the things activity) parts of a substance, in order to 'fit' at all, they have to be accidents. Yet, accidents are -dependent- on the substance (their existence is derivative of the substance, and hence we have an actualised potency). Further, accidents are determinations of the substance, and hence the substance is also potential in respect of the accident (it really can be so determined). So the 'efficacious' pure act (the power, clealy) cannot be had (as an accident, and these are only had by substances). And if it cannot be had, but has to obtain (as it does, in order to explain the causal series), it leaves us with it simply being.
| Theoretical Philosophy » The pure actuality of the first mover » 4/02/2017 11:25 am |
- GeorgiusThomas
- Replies: 4
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"So here's a question, why can't the first mover be unchanging and unchangeable and still lack actualized potentials?"
What follows is largely based on a discussion of a similar objection in Prof. Feser's "Aquinas".
The quick answer would be that the First Mover is not something that has actualised potentials.
For if that is what we're talking about, we have to ask, what actualises potentials relevant to the actualisations of other things' potentials? Suppose the answer is "the First Mover".
In that case, it would seem that some part actualises the other parts. We then have to ask whether this part in turn requires some potential to be actualised for it to actualise other potentials. If it does, then the regress continues. If it doesn't, then it will have to be pure act and the real First Mover. But given that parts are in potency to the whole, and pure act cannot be in potency to anything, it is impossible for pure act to be a part of something. So it appears that our supposition that the First Mover is a part of some whole is wrong, and is rather "a substance" that is purely actual.
| Practical Philosophy » Natural Law Theory Shows Killing Animals and Plants is Wrong? » 7/23/2015 1:20 pm |
- GeorgiusThomas
- Replies: 4
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Pardon my laziness, but this topic has been discussed in this thread.
As to the supposed weakness of natural law, I find remarks like that rather odd. I suppose topics like sexual morality (and abortion) do receive a lot of attention among natural lawyers, but surely that's understandable. One should not mistake this emphasis for inability to provide ethical analysis of other items.
Even today natural lawyers provide in depth treatments of topics like the common good, just war, distributive justice...
I think it generally gets more complicated when it comes to various accidental arrangements (property titles included). But questions of this sort were and still are being considered by natural moralists.
On the subject of selfishness, I recommend reading this post:
The recommendation extends to the blog generally, esp. on the subject of good, common or otherwise.
| Practical Philosophy » Thomism on meat-eating, animal farming methods, and hunting. » 6/29/2015 1:41 pm |
- GeorgiusThomas
- Replies: 10
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I've found Oderberg's discussion of animal rights in Applied Ethics to be very informative.
I suppose it can be considered an elaboration of Aquinas' treatment of the issue (absent the biblical references and with less explicitly Scholastic wording).
I've lent the book, so I can't check the correctness of my presentation (in any case, I consider my argument to be correct), but the key theme of it is that the ability to know purposes-as-reasons-for-action is a precondition of having rights. The goods of brute animals do not amount to reasons for rational human actions, therefore there is no 'conflict of rights' (the one present in murder situations, for example). The reasons for thinking that something is morally wrong when it comes to animals, therefore, concern privations of human goods, private or common.
If this reasoning is correct, instances of animal killing for purposes other than procuring food that make moderns cringe, like bullfighting or fox hunting, are not immoral per se, but only per accidens (if pursued for vanity, love of cruelty etc.). I personally believe the mentioned traditions to be very good, as they are arguably conducive to growth in virtue and are reported to be good sport.
P.S.
There are other considerations, such as risk, obviously pertinent to the cases of the corrida de torros and (sport) hunting , but I'm yet to find a detailed treatment of the ethics of risk, so I confess I don't have much to say on that topic.