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Theoretical Philosophy » What are your favorite ways of showing the first cause is God? » 4/22/2018 8:08 am

Ouros
Replies: 20

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I would also know what you think about Feser argument for the intellect of the first cause, but I'm also rising this subject because of something I think about lately.

I think that we can show the First cause is personnal if materialism is possibly false, because ultimately, the First Cause would ground that possibility of immaterial mind.
Now, how can we prove this possibility premise, without showing that materialism is actually false? In a sense, it's more modest, but it's also harder.

Theoretical Philosophy » Libertarian free will and rollback objection » 4/22/2018 8:02 am

Ouros
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Then, two questions from what you've all said:

1) Can we really say that an agent is free when he do an action necessarily, even purposely, by an infinite good, say? ( I don't see in what other case an agent would "freely" AND necessarily do something.)
I would say that it's because X is an agent that in a case of an infinite good, he will necessarily choose the infinite good. But the fact that X is an agent isn't determinate by the agent himself, obviously. That would be meaningless.

2) Would you say that it's the motivation that fix the possible probabilities? If that's the case, then it seems that the agent isn't free, because they are external to him and fix what he could do.
If not, then how can we know what an agent would do, even without certainty? There would be nothing to observe, to measure.

Theoretical Philosophy » Are we immortal? » 4/14/2018 10:49 am

Ouros
Replies: 12

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DanielCC wrote:

On a sharper note: although I am open to some form of hylemorphic dualism there is a fundamental two-facedness in some Christians' endorsement of it - for sure these people will attack materialism but the moment one speaks of the disincarnate soul they will spout gobbets of Ryle and Wittgenstein and of Humean empiricism in an attempt to sabotage anything *too* spiritual in case it in jeopardizes dogma regarding the Resurrection of the Body. Hence all the rhetoric about 'impoverished states', 'the soul limping along' and Haldane's flirtation with soul sleep.

What would you say that hylemorphic dualism more likely involves?

Theoretical Philosophy » Libertarian free will and rollback objection » 4/12/2018 12:53 pm

Ouros
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Well, I agree with what both of you said.
But then we get back to my original question: how can we explain the precise values the probabilities have? It seems that there is a gap here: we get something arbitrary and quantitative, from something rationnal and qualitative.

Another thing that I think strange with this suggestion, it is that it seems to imply that basic particles are also free. Or, would you say that free will require consciousness, or something like that? If that's the case, reflexes and other unconsciouss actions wouldn't be free?

Theoretical Philosophy » Libertarian free will and rollback objection » 4/12/2018 4:12 am

Ouros
Replies: 13

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- Yes, it's an objection to libertarian free will. Basically, the intuition is that even indeterminism is a threat to libertarian free will. If we say that the probabilities are the cause for Luke's choice, then it seems that he isn't free anymore.
- After God's action, the situation is exactly as it was juste before the choice. So Luke doesn't know that he got reseted.
- Well, I think that free will doesn't mean unpredactibility. If that was the case, human wouldn't choose freely very often.

Theoretical Philosophy » Libertarian free will and rollback objection » 4/12/2018 3:14 am

Ouros
Replies: 13

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I have been thinking lately about this subject.

The rollback objection is this:
Let's imagine Luke, in the morning, deciding what he will drink: coffee or tea.
Now, when he will have choose, God will reset the world just before Luke's choice.  He do that again and again, until we get probabilities of what Luke will do: let's say something like 40% of time he take tea, and 60% coffee.

So, given that, two questions:

- How do we make sense of those probabilities? They can't be something external to Luke, or it would mean that he is not free. But if they are internals, how can we explain their precise values?
- How can we know them? If we want a science of human behavior, it seems we need to know thoses probabilities, so we can predict human behavior. (Given that we can predict what our neighbort would do in some situation, I would say that we can.)

Theoretical Philosophy » Retorsion argument, first principles and non-classical logic » 4/07/2018 9:07 am

Ouros
Replies: 40

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John West wrote:

But Vallicella doesn't argue that we can't prove the theses are metaphysical laws (cf. example 4). Only that we can't prove they are by retorsion.

I think we can. Of course, I'm no expert, but for me, every attempt to apply them only to thought is condemned to be meaningless.
Kant was a prime example for that: even if he wanted to show that we can only use the PSR for phenomens, he used it also, in a more subtle way, on the things-in-themselve.

Theoretical Philosophy » Retorsion argument, first principles and non-classical logic » 4/07/2018 3:18 am

Ouros
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John West wrote:

SapereAude wrote:

Too bad for metaphysics then.

Ouros wrote:

What argument exactly?

Haha. Come on, Ouros! Bill writes in good, clear English. (He's giving counterexamples to the thesis that retorsion arguments for theses establish those theses as laws of reality.)

Oops! Sorry, I wasn't trying to be mean, I was sincerely asking what you were talking about because of the distance beetween the two messages, and I wasn't sure what were the initials "BV" standing for. :D

Well, I think that, in fact, what he suggest IS transcendental idealism. That's basically what was Kant arguing for: that first principles were only epistemically necessary, and not metaphysically necessary.

Theoretical Philosophy » Retorsion argument, first principles and non-classical logic » 4/06/2018 3:18 pm

Ouros
Replies: 40

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Well, there was a lot of thing since my last post. :-D

DanielCC wrote:

I am not sure what you mean so this response will focus on the first. No we do not have to justify something’s seeming to be the case - it’s the sceptic’s job to try to drive a wedge between appearance and reality (which historically they have attempted to do by a number of arguments with interesting results) - the sceptic cannot start with a presumption of guilt (this seems to confuse the sceptical project with Descartes’ project, which is to assume everything which can mislead does mislead).

But why can’t he start with a presumption of guilt?Maybe you’re thinking about inconsistency in his own life: but if that’s the case, why couldn’t he be inconsistent? And when to draw the line between what seems to be real, and what seems to be a simple illusion?

FrenchySkepticalCatholic wrote:

Hey, Ouros,

I think you're putting too much into these non-classical logics. So far, I've seen nothing really scary about "well, the law of excluded middle doesn't hold". Alright, what does it even mean? Does it mean that such a law is FALSE? If so, it's also true?

I take most of these logic to be a huge appeal to idealism and to divorcing yourself from reality, and I wouldn't spend much time into them.

God bless,

FSC

 Well, obviously those who relativize those basics laws are anti-realist, but precisely! I want to know what we can say to them. ;-)

John West wrote:

BV's argument doesn't depend on Kant's transcendental idealism, guys.

 What argument exactly?

seigneur wrote:

Let's go over it again.
The answer to the question depends on the scope of the "certain domain" in the above paragraph. Does the "certain domain" touch metaphysics? We have no examples that it does, so the question has no basis.

 But it touches to how we can justify them. If the same method can justify two things, and we discovered after that one of them was in fact wrong, the other became l

Theoretical Philosophy » Retorsion argument, first principles and non-classical logic » 4/04/2018 4:10 pm

Ouros
Replies: 40

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But to say that they have to overthrow intuitive support assumes that intuition, or rather prima-facie "perception" is a good truth-tracking method in the first place. How would you even justify that?
Also, is it possible that the skeptic truly believe what he say, without deceiving himself? If so, how can that be the case, and how can we say which one, beetween him and you, is correct?

What would you propose as indubitable knowledge? If you say tautologies, it ultimately depends of the validity of the PNC, but its scope is, for you, a matter of subjectivity in the end, if I read you well:


DanielCC wrote:

If some propositions can be both true and false presumably there is some criterion for this. Propositions like ‘I exist’, ‘X PSR holds’, ‘God exists’ or ‘Universals are Abstract Objects’ do not seem like the sort thing that could fall under this - what would it mean for instance to say the PSR is both true and false.

That's a lot of questions. Sorry if it takes your time.

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