I would also know what you think about Feser argument for the intellect of the first cause, but I'm also rising this subject because of something I think about lately.

I think that we can show the First cause is personnal if materialism is possibly false, because ultimately, the First Cause would ground that possibility of immaterial mind.
Now, how can we prove this possibility premise, without showing that materialism is actually false? In a sense, it's more modest, but it's also harder.

DanielCC wrote:

On a sharper note: although I am open to some form of hylemorphic dualism there is a fundamental two-facedness in some Christians' endorsement of it - for sure these people will attack materialism but the moment one speaks of the disincarnate soul they will spout gobbets of Ryle and Wittgenstein and of Humean empiricism in an attempt to sabotage anything *too* spiritual in case it in jeopardizes dogma regarding the Resurrection of the Body. Hence all the rhetoric about 'impoverished states', 'the soul limping along' and Haldane's flirtation with soul sleep.

What would you say that hylemorphic dualism more likely involves?

- Yes, it's an objection to libertarian free will. Basically, the intuition is that even indeterminism is a threat to libertarian free will. If we say that the probabilities are the cause for Luke's choice, then it seems that he isn't free anymore.
- After God's action, the situation is exactly as it was juste before the choice. So Luke doesn't know that he got reseted.
- Well, I think that free will doesn't mean unpredactibility. If that was the case, human wouldn't choose freely very often.

John West wrote:

But Vallicella doesn't argue that we can't prove the theses are metaphysical laws (cf. example 4). Only that we can't prove they are by retorsion.

I think we can. Of course, I'm no expert, but for me, every attempt to apply them only to thought is condemned to be meaningless.
Kant was a prime example for that: even if he wanted to show that we can only use the PSR for phenomens, he used it also, in a more subtle way, on the things-in-themselve.

Well, there was a lot of thing since my last post. :-D

DanielCC wrote:

I am not sure what you mean so this response will focus on the first. No we do not have to justify something’s seeming to be the case - it’s the sceptic’s job to try to drive a wedge between appearance and reality (which historically they have attempted to do by a number of arguments with interesting results) - the sceptic cannot start with a presumption of guilt (this seems to confuse the sceptical project with Descartes’ project, which is to assume everything which can mislead does mislead).

But why can’t he start with a presumption of guilt?Maybe you’re thinking about inconsistency in his own life: but if that’s the case, why couldn’t he be inconsistent? And when to draw the line between what seems to be real, and what seems to be a simple illusion?

FrenchySkepticalCatholic wrote:

Hey, Ouros,

I think you're putting too much into these non-classical logics. So far, I've seen nothing really scary about "well, the law of excluded middle doesn't hold". Alright, what does it even mean? Does it mean that such a law is FALSE? If so, it's also true?

I take most of these logic to be a huge appeal to idealism and to divorcing yourself from reality, and I wouldn't spend much time into them.

God bless,

FSC

 Well, obviously those who relativize those basics laws are anti-realist, but precisely! I want to know what we can say to them. ;-)

John West wrote:

BV's argument doesn't depend on Kant's transcendental idealism, guys.

 What argument exactly?

seigneur wrote:

Let's go over it again.
The answer to the question depends on the scope of the "certain domain" in the above paragraph. Does the "certain domain" touch metaphysics? We have no examples that it does, so the question has no basis.

 But it touches to how we can justify them. If the same method can justify two things, and we discovered after that one of them was in fact wrong, the other became l