SapereAude wrote:

Ouros wrote:

The basis of metaphysics, first principles, can only be defended with retorsion argument, or it seems so.

Too bad for metaphysics then.
 

Well, I know what Kant and his successors had to say about that, but I don't think transcendantal idealism work, for three reasons:
1. Antinomies are solvable: If we apply first principle outside experience, ther's no contradiction.
2. Transcendental idealism presuppose, in fact, metaphysical principles as the PSR.
3. I think that we can probably, given 1. and 2., make a retorsion argument against the mere idea that first principles are only epistemically necessary.

The basis of metaphysics, first principles, can only be defended with retorsion argument, or it seems so.

Now, given the advance of non-classical logic, where the law of excluded-middle or the law of non-contradiction can, at least that's what their proponents claims, be rejected on a certain domain.

*Does it mean that retorsion argument doesn't work? In any case, what does it imply for general metaphysics?
If retorsion argument can't be used, then it seems we can't neither use first principles without begging the question.
*Or maybe I'm wrong, and that would just means that metaphysics principles are faillible; but then, again, we couldn't uses them without appealing to intuition, which is close to begging the question.

Miguel wrote:

The thing is I find that the teleological argument gets stronger when combined with the cosmological one. So we don't need to present it as an individual argument; as a manner of bridging the "gap problem" it is very effective. Because what the cosmological argument tells us that there actually is a necessary/independent being responsible for the existence of contingent ones. It is no longer a point of contention, whereas in the teleological argument one might respond that perhaps it's all explainable by powers and that's it, etc; once we know that there is a cause for contingent beings, their teleology becomes even more striking. This necessary being didn't just create anything; it created orderly beings in a harmony which allowed for the existence and development of human civilization, for instance. So when we combine the cosmological argume with teleological considerations, I think it may get stronger than normal teleological arguments: now we know there is a necessary foundation for the universe, the fact that this universe exhibits so much order is certainly a strong indication that the foundation is rational.

Alternatively or additionally, the tleeological arg at the end of a cosmological one can also be much simpler. It needn't even refer to anyhing specific, but merely to how contingent things come to be in an orderly fashion, not according to chaos, as I said in my other post. I think that's very striking.

A mixture of the cosm arg with the teleological arg is my favorite way to bridge the gap problem.

I think an argument of natural theology is better the more it stand alone, with the less metaphysicals foundations.
Even a slighty use with teleology on the ground that "the universe is sustained, wich is better explained by a intelligent being" is too much for me.

Besides, I was thinking on another way to simply show that the First Cause is God.

1. The First cause is an imperso

Well, after reading Samuel Clark, I think that there a basically two big ways to show that the first cause is God:
- Either by arguing that the universe show order, wich is a sign of a designer, so a personal first cause: but that is basically the teleological argument, wich doesn't need the cosmological argument in the first place.
- Or by arguing that because there is intellect in the universe, and that it's irreductible to non-intellectual things, then the first cause posseses intellect, and can inject it in the creation. That means that materialism is possibly, in the ontological sense, false.

Ironically, that would mean, contra Kant, that the cosmological could depends on the physico-theological argument, and not the opposite.
So, for me, if we want to have a cosmological argument who doesn't need another theological argument, then we need to show that materialism is possibly false.
Thoughts?

So, it's the idea of a complex yet necessary thing?

Well, I'm probably with you, from what I've read of you.
I would say that a necessary being can, in some sense, parts. But, I think that in that case, the parts will be formally different, in a scotist way.

Still, it would not be a problem for the theist: if the First Cause is infinite and "simple enough", it would still be God.