I forget the details of the study but I'm sure you could dig it up.  Some Japanese (I think) scientists recently did a study with chimpanzees to try to teach them to associate quantities of objects with numerical symbols.  After many many lessons and reinforcements, the chimpanzees were able to consistently make the association.  The interesting thing is that they needed the same number of lessons for each new symbol.  When the same experiment is attempted with human children they need roughly the same number of lessons for the first few numbers, but then are able to associate the further numbers with only a few lessons.  The natural inference is that human children have an ability to step back from the particular case and "get what's going on here."  They are able to say, "Ah these symbols represent numbers, and since the last one was seven and the one before it six, the next will be eight and so on."  This is precisely the kind of higher-order abstraction that is required for rational inference and all the evidence suggests that humans are the only organisms to have it.

As a side note, I'm not so sure how central it is to a classical worldview that humans be the only rational animals.  How much would it really change our picture of the world if we discovered some non-human persons?  Most theists already believe in angels.

Here is a fun rearrangement of letters:  Pilate asked "Quid est veritas?"  The tacit answer staring him in the face is "est vir qui adest."

A true sentence is one in which the contents correspond with reality.  Specifically, the relation between the subject and the predicate of the sentence bears an analogical relation to the relation between an object in the world and a some real feature of that object.  Or paraphrasing Aristotle, speaking true sentences happens when we say about what is that it is or about what is not that it is not, and speaking false sentences happens when we say about what is that it is not or about what is not that it is (Metaphysics 1011b).

Truth is to "true" what Beauty is to "beautiful," in other words, the Truth is that in virtue of which true things are true.  Ultimately, I think that this is Jesus Christ the λόγος of God, in virtue of whom (1) there is a world at all, (2) the structure of that world is intelligible, and (3) a correspondence can exist between our thought and the intelligible structure of that world.  (Incidentally, Νοῦς plays something like this role in Plato and Aristotle.)  At a lower level of analysis, knowing the truth can mean latching onto even a corner of his robe, i.e. achieving even a partial coincidence between our thought and the intelligibility of the world.  And at a still lower level, a correspondence between what we say about the world and the way the world is.

I think it is true that Molinists must hold that there are some logically possible states of affairs that God cannot bring about (because such states of affairs would entail that one or more true CCFs are false).  In general, I think most Molinists would also extend this to the issue of salvation, but I think it is worth noticing that they are not logically forced to accept this further conclusion.  They might think of God's call as a special case that cannot be resisted and does not involve creaturely freedom.  Molinism only requires that some of our actions are the result of creaturely freedom (which they gloss as: we do them because the antecedent of a true CCF was satisfied).

If you ask me, the real problem with Molinism is the truthmaker objection: What makes the true CCFs true, and the false ones false?  It can't be creatures because they don't even exist yet (and would collapse middle knowledge with your (3) above).  It can't be God because that would collapse middle knowledge to your (1) above (and would make God the author of evil).  In my view when we think about God's providence and creative act we need to face head on the difference between views that say God is the absolute cause of every aspect of the way things are (including evil) and those that deny this (usually because of evil).  It seems to me that Molinism attempts to avoid this fork by pushing the question off to the realm of the CCFs, but I don't see how this helps things.

I'm not sure which of Davies's books you have in mind, but many books in philosophy are what the author Alan Jacobs calls "guild books," that is, books that are written by scholars with other scholars in their own relatively small field as the primary audience.  In other words, many philosophers are not even trying to make their books intelligible to a beginner.  Instead, they presume that by the time you are reading their specialized work you have already learned the language.  I think the best way to proceed is to start with many of the excellent books (sometimes by the same authors) that are specifically intended for a wider audience.  The more argument-driven books of C. S. Lewis are a good place to start (e.g. Mere Christianity, Problem of Pain, Abolition of Man).  Peter Kreeft also comes to mind.

I would also recommend perseverance.  The only way to really gain fluency in a foreign language is to persevere through many many difficult hours at a low level of comprehension, simply letting the rhythms and word patterns sink in.  Philosophy has its own language, and some subdisciplines even have such specialized dialects that they are practically unintelligible to other philosophers (try going to a Heidegger conference).

Fair enough.

I only meant that to my knowledge no positive data have been gathered to date that point to this.  It would be cool if someone could cite some.