It seems to be a rule that when you have a so-called free country, as opposed to a police state, then every upstart is free to assume police functions. When there is no censorship, then self-censoring can spill over. Etc.

Greg wrote:

It's not terribly obvious to me that survivalism has any greater tendency toward reincarnation than corruptionism. Both, I think, would resist the thought that the resurrected person has a "new" body on the same basis, that such a description seems to require "bodies" to have a priority to the composites of which they are parts.

I fully agree that both survivalists and corruptionists, insofar as they are Christians, would resist the idea that the soul keeps acquiring and shedding bodies through the cycles of return. However, as philosophers, what is their basis for resisting that idea? How do they, particularly survivalists, explain reincarnation away?

Because if the soul survives death, and there is another, eternal, life, after this death, then whatever body we have in that other life is another body. It bdoes not matter if the bodies are just two or of indefinite number like on Hinduism, the same basic question of reincarnation remains.

Greg wrote:

seigneur wrote:

As far as I have understood, substance on Aristotelianism is form+matter. That is, substance is composite. When it comes to a human being, the soul is the form of human, just the form. Lacking matter, it is not a substance.

I disagree with this definition of substance, but it is what it is. Aristotelianism stands on it.

That is not Aristotle's definition of substance, since he thinks the unmoved movers are immaterial substances.

Some commentator (S. Marc Cohen) seems to explain that Aristotle, after getting past the famous first examples of substances, such as man and horse, settles for the conclusion that (created) things are composites of form and matter, they constitute substances of various kinds where the form is essential and matter is accidental, and where substance is not an element (certainly not a third element in addition to form and matter) and also not a composite of elements, but a "principle".

This explanation would, in my opinion, u

Greg wrote:

There is a blog post where Feser is more transparent in saying that he is a survivalist but believes the textual evidence points toward corruptionism, in which case he would disagree with Aquinas.

Do you mean this one? http://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2016/03/so-what-are-you-doing-after-your-funeral.html "In any event, on the substantive metaphysical question about what happens to the human being after death, I am definitely a survivalist.  On the exegetical question about what Aquinas himself thought, I am agnostic."
 
In my view, survivalists have to answer the reincarnation question. Survivalism implies reincarnation. Christians should reject reincarnation because it's not in the Bible. And if a survivalist philosopher rejects reincarnation, it would be interesting to know the metaphysical mechanics as to how the implication of reincarnation can be bypassed.

ficino wrote:

Ralph McInerny in his SEP article on Aquinas says that intellectual soul is not a substance but is something subsisting.

As far as I have understood, substance on Aristotelianism is form+matter. That is, substance is composite. When it comes to a human being, the soul is the form of human, just the form. Lacking matter, it is not a substance.

I disagree with this definition of substance, but it is what it is. Aristotelianism stands on it.

aftermathemat wrote:

If PSR is true, then no gratuitous evil can exist, since we would have something happening for no reason whatsoever.

Yes. All sorts of problems of evil, modal or otherwise, always seemed deeply problematic for me.

If the problem of evil is supposed to refute God, then my question is: Without God, what is evil in the first place so that it could be there to refute God? What does a system of (moral) good and evil look like when there is no God? Does that good/evil have any scope beyond subjective sentiment?

And when someone brings up gratuitous evil, which is the more emphatic form of evil, then my question simply becomes more emphatic.

The only sort of problem of evil that I acknowledge is a theist's puzzle, If God is good, then why is there so much evil in this world? But this is an emotional puzzle, not an intellectual or metaphysical one. When the theist truly comprehends that death is release from evil (as e.g. first-century Christians very well understood and were happy to be martyred), there is really no problem of evil at all.

So, let's start with the basics: Can someone point out an instance of gratuitous evil?

As far as current objections to final causes are concerned, I cannot point to any authors. I guess everybody simply thinks final causes are dead and buried. (To the contrary, I can point out a few current authors who argue that final causes are back with a revenge.)

When the times turned modern, objections to final causes have involved pointing out that there is too much supernatural or unempirical in them (as in statements like "this is how God made it" or "it serves nature perfectly"), too much subjective or vague in them (as in appeals to harmony or beauty) or that they do not seem like causes at all, but more like explanations with no necessary relation with causality (as in answers to most why-questions).

I personally think that the framework of four causes is an Aristotelian peculiarity that does not serve everybody equally well, and possibly arises from some translation problem http://www.borishennig.de/texte/2016/fourcausesbk.pdf

Boris Hennig wrote:

Aristotle says that in order to really understand a thing, we need to understand its aitia, and he distinguishes between four kinds of aitia. This term, aitia, is usually translated as “cause”. However, not all of Aristotle’s four aitiai are causes in the modern sense of this word. Perhaps none of them are.