Hm. That's a lot to take in, but I think your bolded section is the part to skip to for discussion.

at the ontic level, the level of being, the relation of causality is the opposite: the consecrated host is substantially the body of Christ precisely because the soul of Christ is its substantial form.

This seems philosophically uninteresting. Are you saying that the material that makes up the bread has the substance of Christ because it has the substance of Christ? That's sounds circular, unless I misunderstand what you're asserting. 

In general, your arguments seems to obliterate any meaningful connection between form and matter. You write that "a living organism is the body of Peter because the soul of Peter is its substantial form, i.e. because it is "informed" (in the hylomorphic sense) by the soul of Peter, i.e. substantially joined to it." But by the same token the soul is also dependent on the body: Peter's soul could not inform just any hunk of matter (a door, say), but rather only that specific body. Think of a rubber ball: its form includes roundness and bounciness, but these attributes are specific to that grouping of matter and could not inform other groupings such as bricks or trees. 

I will synthesize my thesis to the maximum, to facilitate perceiving its compatibility with de fide Catholic doctrine and Thomism. There are three de fide Catholica definitions (DFCn) in play, coming from three respective Ecumenical Councils:

DFC1, from Chalcedon: Jesus has a true human nature, composed of rational soul and body.
DFC2, from Vienne: The rational soul is the substantial form of the human body.
DFC3, from Trent: The consecrated host is substantially the body of Jesus.

It is immediately seen that the conjunction of DFC1, 2 and 3 yields:

The soul of Jesus is the substantial form of the consecrated host.

If a Catholic denies that, then in the worst case there is an anathema going his way, having being launched from a silo at Chalcedon, Vienne or Trent, depending on the specifics of the denial, and in the best case he may just have a problem with propositional logic.

Now, combining the above with the standard hylomorphic notion:

HM, from ST I, q. 5, a. 5, Resp.: Everything is what it is by its form.

we arrive at:

The consecrated host is substantially the body of Jesus because the soul of Jesus is its substantial form.

which describes transubstantiation in esse, with the corresponding description of transubstantiation in fieri being:

The bread becomes substantially the body of Jesus at consecration because the soul of Jesus is united to it as its substantial form.

This thesis could be called "transubstantiation as and by hylomorphic union" (with "as" describing in esse and "by" describing in fieri). To note, "hylomorphic union" is a standard Thomistic term for the description of human nature.

It actually surprises me that, AFAIK, nobody has proposed this before.

 

Last edited by Johannes (8/07/2015 11:24 am)

Scott, from the viewpoint of faith, there are two possible ways to approach the issue of the "substantial form" of the bread. The basis for that possibility is that the Ecumenical Council of Vienne, by defining that "the rational or intellectual soul is ... of itself and essentially the form of the human body", implicitly defined that hylomorphism is a correct framework for describing human nature, and by extension, we can safely assume, angelic nature (pure forms). However, the Council did not say anything regarding whether hylomorphism is a correct framework for describing purely material essences. Therefore, Catholics are free, from the viewpoint of faith, to hold either of these positions:

a. that hylomorphism is a valid description of nature in all cases.

b. that hylomorphism is a valid description of nature only when the form in question is spiritual, such as the human soul.

To note, I know this is mainly a Thomist, and therefore Aristotelian, forum. Thus, I do not mention position b because I expect it will be popular here, but because I want to cover the legitimate case of a Catholic that holds it.

Regarding the linked ST III q.75, clearly anyone holding position b simply would not care about the whole article 6, because from his viewpoint there was no "substantial form" in the bread before the consecration, as it was just matter organized in a certain way. Only when the soul of Jesus is united to it does the host have a substantial form.

Turning now to position a, there are two possible ways to approach hylomorphism: monolevel and multilevel.  If you adopt monolevel hylomorphism, then you must hold that the form of the bread is replaced by Jesus' soul.

In multilevel hylomorphism, in contrast, when a higher-level form (typically of spiritual nature) comes to inform an entity already constituted by (matter + lower-level form), the higher-level form becomes the substantial form of the new resulting entity, causing it to be something different from what it was before. I.e., the new entity has as its form the higher-level form and as its matter the compound (matter + lower-level form).

Clearly, in the last part of my article I am adopting multilevel hylomorphism.

Turning now specifically to St. Thomas' reply to objection 2:

"Reply to Objection 2. The soul is the form of the body, giving it the whole order of perfect being, i.e. being, corporeal being, and animated being, and so on. Therefore the form of the bread is changed into the form of Christ's body, according as the latter gives corporeal being, but not according as it bestows animated being."

it is consistent with what I said in my article, quoting from another part of ST:

From St. Thomas' statement that "the whole soul is in each part of the body, by totality of perfection and of essence, but not by totality of power" (ST Part I, Quest. 76, Art. 8, Resp.), it is clear that, given that the consecrated host is substantially the body of Jesus, the soul of Jesus is wholly in each part of the host by totality of perfection and of essence, and at the same time, given that the consecrated host is Jesus' sacramental and not natural body, the soul of Jesus is not in any part of the host with regard to its powers (sight, hearing, etc.). Thus:

- since the soul of Jesus is in each part of the host by totality of perfection and of essence, when the host is broken each fragment is the whole body of Jesus;

- since the soul of Jesus is in no part of the host with regard to its natural powers, Jesus does not feel anything when the host is broken, swallowed, etc.

Last edited by Johannes (8/17/2015 12:14 pm)

Scott wrote:

Johannes wrote:

St. Thomas' reply to objection 2 . . . is consistent with what I said in my article[.]

That reply alone certainly seems to be, sure, and that's the main reason I posted the link.

Good, and thank you for bringing it to my notice.

Scott wrote:

However, the article overall disagrees with the view you're now expressing that the substantial form of the bread remains as part of a higher-level unity. I had not understood that to be the view you were espousing at the end of your original post, where you wrote, "After the consecration, the 'elements' and the 'material organizational form' themselves remain identical to what they were before, but the presence of the soul of Jesus causes that they are no longer the elements or the material organizational form of a piece of bread, but of the sacramental body of Jesus." If you intended the "material organizational form" to be the substantial form of bread, that was not clear to me, and if that's what you meant, I don't think it's correct. The substantial form of bread (if it has one, as Aquinas thinks it does) is not merely a "breadwise arrangement" of material elements.

I can assure you that I did not change my mind between the first post and the last, so I might not have been clear enough in one of the posts, or maybe in both.
---
EDIT: I have just seen where exactly I was not clear enough. In my first post I should have included the text in bold below:

In the host, before the consecration:

Bread: elements of the bread + material organizational form of the bread, which is the substantial form of the bread.
---

First of all, we must be careful with the use of "substantial form". After consecration, there is only one substantial form in the consecrated host (and wine): the soul of Jesus. That's de fide, period.

With that clear, a Catholic who holds Hylomorphism for Purely Material Entities (which was position a in my previous post, and for which I will coin the acronym H4PME, hence the capitals) can in turn hold either of two sub-positions regarding what there was in the bread before consecration, and therefore what transubstantiation entails at a detailed level:

Hard-H4PME, consistent with monolevel hylo: Ordinary bread (or any other purely material entity) consists of more than just its elements plus its material organization. Specifically, its substantial form is not the organization of its matter. So in transubstantiation the host "loses" something, namely the substantial form of bread, which is "replaced" by the soul of Jesus.

Soft-H4PME, consistent with multilevel hylo: Ordinary bread (or any other purely material entity) consists of just its elements plus its material organization, so that its substantial form is the organization of its matter (a dynamic organization in living beings). So in transubstantiation the host does not "lose" anything physical, but the soul of Jesus is united to it as its substantial form, which causes the material organization of the host to no longer be its substantial form.

Since I have always held Soft-H4PME, it is no wonder that my thesis is compatible with it. But IMV the thesis is also fully compatible with Hard-H4PME. You just have to posit that there is more in bread than just its material elements and their organization, namely a "substantial form", and that at transubstantiation the soul of Jesus replaces that "substantial form", which just vanishes.

Scott wrote:

You had also written:

Johannes wrote:

It actually surprises me that, AFAIK, nobody has proposed this before [i.e., that "[t]he consecrated host is substantially the body of Jesus because the soul of Jesus is its substantial form"].

And you were right to be surprised, because, indeed, someone had. That's the other reason I posted the link.

And I'm happy to know that the view had been previously proposed by none other than St. Thomas. Because in my modest work I strive for orthodoxy and usefulness, not for originality.
 

Last edited by Johannes (8/17/2015 5:00 pm)

Ah, I see -- you did intend the "material organizational form" of the bread to be its substantial form. Thanks for clarifying.

Well, I don't think Aquinas (whom I take to be a supporter of Hard-H4PME) agreed (and, far less importantly, I don't either). But I do think there's a good deal of legitimate question about whether non-animate artifacts like bread even have substantial forms (that is, whether they're really "substances") at all, let alone precisely what these are in any particular case. It's not a burning issue in its own right, and moreover I think you're right to say that your thesis is compatible with Hard-H4PME anyway.

So I'm in agreement with what you've called "transubstantiation as and by hylomorphic union": that the consecrated Host is the body of Christ because Christ's soul is its substantial form. In fact, that much, as you say, is de fide anyway, and I was a little puzzled about what was supposed to be new in your proposal. Now I know.

I'm not, however, entirely persuaded that it's consistent with the doctrine of transubstantiation to identify the "substantial form" of the bread with its "material organizational form" and to acknowledge that even though the bread loses this "substantial form" as a substantial form upon consecration, it doesn't just vanish. It's one thing if the bread has no substantial form to lose in the first place (i.e., bread just isn't a "substance"). But it seems to be another to say that the bread does have such a form and to define it as something that doesn't seem to be lost on consecration.

The consecrated Host, we're agreed, has just one substantial form (the soul of Christ). In that case, what does your account say is the new role of the bread's persisting "material organizational form"? It's still a form (isn't it?) even though it's not the consecrated Host's substantial form. If it's now a sub-form of a higher-level substance, then is it not still the "substantial form" of (the) bread -- apparently contrary to the doctrine of transubstantiation, which holds that what was bread now itself is Christ's body and not merely a component thereof?

Last edited by Scott (8/17/2015 7:06 pm)