Classical Theism, Philosophy, and Religion Forum » Some questions on eliminative materialism

Miguel · 4/13/2018 11:41 pm

Gator wrote:
Miguel wrote:
Greg wrote:
Elimination is distinct from reduction. A reductive theory does not deny the existence of what it reduces.

I'm aware of that. That's what I said: it does, indeed, eliminate mind if you believe the mind is not reducible to the brain. In other words, eliminativists take the stance that either consciousness/intentionality/etc are reducible to the brain, or they don't exist. A reductivist may try to reduce mind to the brain, but if he becomes convinced that it can't be done, he may instead become a non-reductive naturalist holding e.g. emergentism. An eliminativist, by contrast, will eliminate consciousness/intent. etc if he becomes convinced that it can't be reduced. So, as I said, for them either the mind is reducible to the brain or else it doesn't exist. They eliminate the data and keep the model.
Agreed. Hence what feser and many others say in that most materialist theories of mind collapse in eliminativism. So is the eliminativist a kind of epipenomenalist in a sense?

I don't think they'd be epiphenomenalists as there wouldn't be anything epiphenomenal at all. There would simply be no mind. If mind is not reducible, then it doesn't exist; it's not that it's epiphenomenal, it just isn't there.

Some eliminativists also charge property dualists with epiphenomenalism. Dennett does that, for instance.

Personally, I don't think eliminativists can even be taken seriously. To me their position is insane, like dialetheism. I see it as madness, and that's it. Not saying eliminativists haven't ever written interesting things, just that eliminativism itself is just madness.

In a way, they are on our side, though. It's like they agree with the arguments from reason defended by Aristotle, Aquinas, Leibniz, Kant, etc -- the difference is they accept the absurd conclusion. They throw away "folk" intentionality and reason. They take the reductio ad absurdum and bite it. So, in a way, you can read the Churchland's work -- for example -- and take it as a reductio ad absurdum against materialism: "folk" psychology is, and must be, correct, therefore materialism is false, etc.

In this sense, Dennett and the Churchlands have done a great job exposing the problems of materialism.

Last edited by Miguel (4/13/2018 11:43 pm)

Greg · 4/14/2018 12:02 am

Miguel wrote:
I'm aware of that. That's what I said: it does, indeed, eliminate mind if you believe the mind is not reducible to the brain. In other words, eliminativists take the stance that either consciousness/intentionality/etc are reducible to the brain, or they don't exist.

I don't see that this is a premise of their arguments, though of course they are committed to it just by addition. From "the mind does not exist," it follows that "the mind is reducible to the brain or the mind does not exist". But for that matter, so does "the mind is not reducible to the brain or the mind does not exist."

The argument claiming that folk psychology is a flawed theory which will be superseded by mature neuroscience, for instance, does not premise that intentional attitudes, if they exist, are reducible. It's supposed to be an argument against the existence of intentional attitudes however they are conceived (as long as they are imperfectly predictive, need to be hedged with ceteris paribus clauses, etc.). (Indeed, I suspect Churchland is the sort of philosopher who thinks of Cartesian dualism as a kind of primitive scientific theory.) Proof of this is that the argument is supposed to be an argument against anomalous monism, which does not hold that intentional attitudes are reducible.

(It's of course true that no one would entertain eliminativism if he had in hand an actual, detailed, not merely promissory reduction of the mental to the physical. In that sense the eliminativist is becoming an eliminativist "because" he thinks the mind can't be reduced. But then, all the same, no one would endorse eliminativism if he were persuaded by an argument for Cartesian dualism.)

Miguel wrote:
Greg wrote:
One would need another strategy to defend phenomenal consciousness.
Gentle ridicule, perhaps. As Thomas Reid would recommend.

Well, I think it's a delicate issue, that human beings are (self-)conscious but qualia, as many philosophers conceive of them, don't exist.

Gator · 4/14/2018 12:10 am

Miguel wrote:
Gator wrote:
Miguel wrote:

I'm aware of that. That's what I said: it does, indeed, eliminate mind if you believe the mind is not reducible to the brain. In other words, eliminativists take the stance that either consciousness/intentionality/etc are reducible to the brain, or they don't exist. A reductivist may try to reduce mind to the brain, but if he becomes convinced that it can't be done, he may instead become a non-reductive naturalist holding e.g. emergentism. An eliminativist, by contrast, will eliminate consciousness/intent. etc if he becomes convinced that it can't be reduced. So, as I said, for them either the mind is reducible to the brain or else it doesn't exist. They eliminate the data and keep the model.
Agreed. Hence what feser and many others say in that most materialist theories of mind collapse in eliminativism. So is the eliminativist a kind of epipenomenalist in a sense?

I don't think they'd be epiphenomenalists as there wouldn't be anything epiphenomenal at all. There would simply be no mind. If mind is not reducible, then it doesn't exist; it's not that it's epiphenomenal, it just isn't there.

Some eliminativists also charge property dualists with epiphenomenalism. Dennett does that, for instance.

Personally, I don't think eliminativists can even be taken seriously. To me their position is insane, like dialetheism. I see it as madness, and that's it. Not saying eliminativists haven't ever written interesting things, just that eliminativism itself is just madness.

In a way, they are on our side, though. It's like they agree with the arguments from reason defended by Aristotle, Aquinas, Leibniz, Kant, etc -- the difference is they accept the absurd conclusion. They throw away "folk" intentionality and reason. They take the reductio ad absurdum and bite it. So, in a way, you can read the Churchland's work -- for example -- and take it as a reductio ad absurdum against materialism: "folk" psychology is, and must be, correct, therefore materialism is false, etc.

In this sense, Dennett and the Churchlands have done a great job exposing the problems of materialism.

Ya reading Rosenberg has done a lot for my faith haha. I do respect this breed for following the tunnel of their theories. Except Dennett (although his takes on concioisness being an illusion are always great for a laugh). I’ve just become really interested in the phenomena of eliminativism. I don’t see how any of these ppl could live this out consistently (great illustration of this is Rosenberg penning a novel a few years back, truly hilarious).
Again, I know Ibe states this earlier, but I think much of the confusion comes with how eliminativism is presented. Maybe it’s just me, but I often see it pitched in an attitude of “housekeeping of the mind” in the sense of changing the language we use to something more scientific and technical. But it’s far more radical than that, and I don’t think EMs are hiding this per se, but they also aren’t quick to shine a light on it. The whole position must rid itself of intentionality, and I think when we use everyday examples and practical scenarios, it’s easy to see how ludacris it is. Now this won’t necessarily disprove it, that can be done by other means which have been stated before and seen on Ed’s blog. But often I find the need to take a step back and say “what is it we’re really arguing about here?” I find it’s easy to get deep in the arguments and lose touch with what exactly an EM is theorizing. Am I off base with this?

Last edited by Gator (4/14/2018 12:13 am)

Jeremy Taylor · 4/14/2018 12:35 am

Greg wrote:
I haven't sifted through the literature in a few years, but the core argument is basically: Folk psychology is a theory; beliefs, desires, etc. are posited to explain behavior. In fact they do so rather well, but far from perfectly. A scientific theory of the mind would explain behavior better, and the theory of folk psychology would have been succeeded. It should be regarded as any other succeeded theory, like Newtonian physics; that is to say, we should not believe that the entities it posits exist.

But why would one assume that, one, neuroscience gives an complete picture of the mind? and, two, that neuroscience eliminates things like intentionality?

My own estimate of the philosophy profession's opinion of eliminative materialism is that most philosophers think it is wrong and that its proponents are provocateurs whose arguments in some way are not successful. I think that in most philosophy departments the opinion of Cartesian dualism is probably lower, though.

I recall my philosophy of mind lecturer dismissed Cartesian dualism virulently. He had done his Ph.D in philosophy of mind and cognitive science, but the arguments he gave against dualism were, in my opinion, dire. They were things like dualism is anti-scientific and would prevent a proper science of the mind and, of course, the so called interaction problem. From much else I have seen, I'm not convinced that the opinion of dualism amongst contemporary philosophers (or scientists) is well-informed. Many neuroscientists and psychologists, for example, just assume dualism is unscientific and any entertainment of it (even when on the face of it, it might seem scientifically justified to explore it, such as in instances of extreme psychophysical influence) is a reversal of five hundred years of scientific progress.

Greg · 4/14/2018 11:38 am

Jeremy Taylor wrote:
But why would one assume that, one, neuroscience gives an complete picture of the mind? and, two, that neuroscience eliminates things like intentionality?

Well, I think the answer to the second question is that eliminative materialists think it's a condition of something's being a science that it eliminates intentionality. The notion of a "theory" which does a lot of work in the argument for eliminative materialism is that of something suited to prediction, and the conditionals in which the predictions are couched are going to be purely extensional (otherwise they will be imperfect as predictions).

But that just puts more pressure on the response to your first question, for why does there have to be a "theory" of the mind in that sense? I think it's just an article of faith, perhaps expressive of an underlying neo-Humeanism about causation, that all causation is an instance of some causal law, that the world is intelligible in that way.

Jeremy Taylor wrote:
From much else I have seen, I'm not convinced that the opinion of dualism amongst contemporary philosophers (or scientists) is well-informed.

I agree.

Gator · 4/14/2018 12:48 pm

Greg wrote:
Jeremy Taylor wrote:
But why would one assume that, one, neuroscience gives an complete picture of the mind? and, two, that neuroscience eliminates things like intentionality?
Well, I think the answer to the second question is that eliminative materialists think it's a condition of something's being a science that it eliminates intentionality. The notion of a "theory" which does a lot of work in the argument for eliminative materialism is that of something suited to prediction, and the conditionals in which the predictions are couched are going to be purely extensional (otherwise they will be imperfect as predictions).

But that just puts more pressure on the response to your first question, for why does there have to be a "theory" of the mind in that sense? I think it's just an article of faith, perhaps expressive of an underlying neo-Humeanism about causation, that all causation is an instance of some causal law, that the world is intelligible in that way.

Jeremy Taylor wrote:
From much else I have seen, I'm not convinced that the opinion of dualism amongst contemporary philosophers (or scientists) is well-informed.
I agree.

But how can the EM appeal to any sort of theory? This would imply accuracy over other theories, which implies truth values. I see you out theory in quotes now so maybe that’s what your hinting at. But if I’m EM we can’t so much as make predictions or even plan anything, I don’t see how you could even how notions of theory within a different conceptual framework devoid of intentionality. Additinally, EMs speak as if they are separated or “outside” of their own framework to get their point across, since if they were to operate inside it there would be nothing to say. It’s as if they say “for the sake of argument, assume our theory is false. Now let me argue it’s truth.” Maybe I’m off base here, I do get mixed up with EM from time to time but I think that’s in part due to the lack of consistency on their end. I mean, could the EM argue that no words have meaning, therefore anything we say to refute them has no meaning therefore is worthless? This would seem to implicate their own statements, and this is where I get mixed up. It’s as if the EM theorist is constantly jumping in and out of the pool of intentionality, and it’s difficult to pin them down. But I’m curious what everyone else thinks, and I apologize if this turned into a bit of a ramble

Maybe I can phrase my initial question a bit better: when it comes to our inner mental lives, from my readings EM simply regards this as illusory and not reliable correct? So this aspect of “mind” or this inner mental life would be what the EM theorists is looking to eliminate I’m assuming?

Last edited by Gator (4/14/2018 1:21 pm)

Greg · 4/14/2018 5:24 pm

Gator wrote:
But how can the EM appeal to any sort of theory? This would imply accuracy over other theories, which implies truth values. I see you out theory in quotes now so maybe that’s what your hinting at.

I put "theory" in quotes because they are using the term somewhat technically in claiming that folk psychology is a theory.

To their credit, they are trying to make use of a notion of a "theory" which is other than a collection of universal generalizations (the sort of characterization you get in early philosophers of science like Hempel and Popper). Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions is their point of departure, and the theory is tied to the practices of working scientists. It's probably their most promising option to hope that they can articulate that notion of "theory" in terms of warranted assertability rather than truth, which is indeed what Rorty does.

Gator wrote:
Maybe I can phrase my initial question a bit better: when it comes to our inner mental lives, from my readings EM simply regards this as illusory and not reliable correct? So this aspect of “mind” or this inner mental life would be what the EM theorists is looking to eliminate I’m assuming?

As I mentioned, almost everyone in the eliminative materialist camp uses the notion of illusion at some point, but it's somewhat inapt for their purposes. They think that folk psychology is a theory, which is pretty good. They think that you can use something like introspection to discover your brain states--but that the inferences are pretty shaky, and would be improved if you had a better neuroscientific vocabulary. (A common theme is that, just as a skilled wine taster might learn how to discriminate 'qualia' between which ordinary people cannot discriminate, our psychological successors would know how to infer facts about their brain "straight off," by introspection. You find this sort of thought in "Quining Qualia", in Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, and in the Churchland's ridiculous way of trying to incorporate neuroscientific language into their everyday speech.)

Gator · 4/14/2018 5:28 pm

Like, for example, if I’m in the supermarket and hear a song playing on the intercom and then start singing that song to myself, what exactly happening on the EM view? Pattern recognition? Replication of sound waves to release so and so chemicals in the brain to induce good feelings? When we break this down, none of these are available to the EM theorist, as these are all intentional models. I’m not one to make appeals to common sense or intuition or anything, but I think this goes further than that. This is immediate sense data we are interpreting that the EM theorist cannot possibly be taken seriously on. I mean am i off with this? It seems that with my example all that EM can say is either me singing the song is illusory or its pure coincidence/chaos. But perhaps I’m off with this

Gator · 4/14/2018 5:36 pm

Greg wrote:
Gator wrote:
But how can the EM appeal to any sort of theory? This would imply accuracy over other theories, which implies truth values. I see you out theory in quotes now so maybe that’s what your hinting at.
I put "theory" in quotes because they are using the term somewhat technically in claiming that folk psychology is a theory.

To their credit, they are trying to make use of a notion of a "theory" which is other than a collection of universal generalizations (the sort of characterization you get in early philosophers of science like Hempel and Popper). Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions is their point of departure, and the theory is tied to the practices of working scientists. It's probably their most promising option to hope that they can articulate that notion of "theory" in terms of warranted assertability rather than truth, which is indeed what Rorty does.

Gator wrote:
Maybe I can phrase my initial question a bit better: when it comes to our inner mental lives, from my readings EM simply regards this as illusory and not reliable correct? So this aspect of “mind” or this inner mental life would be what the EM theorists is looking to eliminate I’m assuming?
As I mentioned, almost everyone in the eliminative materialist camp uses the notion of illusion at some point, but it's somewhat inapt for their purposes. They think that folk psychology is a theory, which is pretty good. They think that you can use something like introspection to discover your brain states--but that the inferences are pretty shaky, and would be improved if you had a better neuroscientific vocabulary. (A common theme is that, just as a skilled wine taster might learn how to discriminate 'qualia' between which ordinary people cannot discriminate, our psychological successors would know how to infer facts about their brain "straight off," by introspection. You find this sort of thought in "Quining Qualia", in Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, and in the Churchland's ridiculous way of trying to incorporate neuroscientific language into their everyday speech.)

Interesting, thanks for the input Greg. Out of curiosity, what’s your take on the EM theory?
I reread a snippet from TLS today and found something I think is appropriate here. It’s not just that the EM theorist must replace ordinary “folk” language with more scientific speak, they must entirely rid their language of any intentionality. I just don’t think that gets driven home enough.
Also, I don’t see how introspection is coherent on EM. The brain is simply introspecting itself? Why would it need to do that if there is no immaterial mind? It seems EM adds layers to account for obvious data that wouldn’t or shouldn’t be there if their theory were true

Greg · 4/14/2018 7:18 pm

Gator wrote:
Out of curiosity, what’s your take on the EM theory?

I don't believe that folk psychology is a proto-scientific theory or that any scientific theory could replace intentional language.