Well, for what it's worth, I think Metzinger and R. Scott Bakker* (who blogs here: https://rsbakker.wordpress.com/) are two of the most interesting people working within the framework of Eliminative Materialsim (of some construal or other). Both are very knowledgeable when it comes to the relevant cognitive and neuro- science, way more than someone like Rosenberg, I would argue. The most noteworthy critique of Metzinger, other than the one made by Harman that you mentioned (which though containing some important points is also infested with ad-hom fallacies) is this one: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/228891275_The_Problem_of_Explaining_Phenomenal_Selfhood_A_Comment_on_Thomas_Metzinger's_Self-Model_Theory_of_Subjectivity

* Bakker had a brief back and forth with Feser back in 2015: http://edwardfeser.blogspot.co.uk/2015/01/post-intentional-depression.html. However, the conversation unfortunately mostly resulted in considerable incomprehension from both sides and was almost singularly unproductive.

Edit: I also see that Bakker's wiki has been massively updated, for those unfamiliar: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/R._Scott_Bakker

Last edited by Paraschis (4/17/2018 1:45 pm)

I'm curious: why the interest in eliminativism? Why not reductionism, or functionalism, or Searle's biological naturalism, or something like that? I ask because I find these more robust materialist theories of mind underrepresented online (especially compared to academic philosophers' views), and I can't help but wonder if we're lending eliminativism an undeserved sheen of respectability by even discussing it in such depth.

(I'm typically very sensitive to both sides of the dialectic these days but, in spite of that and in spite of my recent comments in the provincianism thread, I incline towards the view that eliminativism can be dismissed on Moorean grounds. Kant, Berkeley, F. H. Bradley, McTaggart, David Lewis, D. M. Armstrong, and so on, get a pass because they offer different (sometimes non-obvious) analyses of Moorean facts rather than outright denying them. They identify tables, minds, or dandelions with sense data, material, or whatever, but they don't outright eliminate them.)

I hope this doesn't take you too far from the topic of your thread.

Gator wrote:

I mean do EMs literally deny the existence of the phenomena we call “mind” and all that exists in it?

Yes.

It helps to distinguish eliminativist theories from reductionist theories. An eliminativist about minds literally says that minds don't exist; a reductionist about minds, by contrast, says that minds are identical to brains, brains exist, and therefore minds also exist.*

Eliminativists are also typically replacement theorists. They don't just eliminate (in this case) minds. They also try to offer superior replacements for them. This is, they will say, similar to replacing alchemy with superior scientific theories like chemistry. But they're still literally saying that minds don't exist, and trying to replace them with something non-identical to minds.

For a crude example, if I see a duck in front of me and say “that’s a duck”, the reductionist might say “oh well it’s really (insert technical speak here)”. Would the EM response be “there is literally no duck, it’s an illusion”

Eliminativists about minds aren't necessarily (or at least aren't obviously) eliminativists about objects in the “external world” like ducks. So not necessarily, no.

*The eliminativist-reductionist distinction applies outside of philosophy of mind as well. An eliminativist about tables (e.g. Peter van Inwagen) literally says that tables don't exist; a reductionist about tables (e.g. Berkeley), by contrast, says they're identical to something else (e.g. sense data), that something else exists, and therefore tables exist.

John West wrote:

Gator wrote:

I mean do EMs literally deny the existence of the phenomena we call “mind” and all that exists in it?

Yes.

It helps to distinguish eliminativist theories from reductionist theories. An eliminativist about minds literally says that minds don't exist; a reductionist about minds, by contrast, says that minds are identical to brains, brains exist, and therefore minds also exist.*

Eliminativists are also typically replacement theorists. They don't just eliminate (in this case) minds. They also try to offer superior replacements for them. This is, they will say, similar to replacing alchemy with with superior scientific theories like chemistry. But they're still literally saying that minds don't exist, and trying to replace them with something non-identical to minds.

For a crude example, if I see a duck in front of me and say “that’s a duck”, the reductionist might say “oh well it’s really (insert technical speak here)”. Would the EM response be “there is literally no duck, it’s an illusion”

Eliminativists about minds aren't necessarily (or at least aren't obviously) eliminativists about objects in the “external world” like ducks. So not necessarily, no.

*The eliminativist-reductionist distinction applies outside of philosophy of mind as well. An eliminativist about tables (e.g. Peter van Inwagen) literally says that tables don't exist; a reductionist about tables (e.g. Berkeley), by contrast, says they're identical to something else (e.g. sense data), that something else exists, and therefore tables exist.

That’s very helpful John, I appreciate it! With the Duck example, I meant that more in terms of phenomena. It seems the reductionist about the mind says yes it’s there but it’s not immaterial and is identical with something else. But this almost sounds eliminativist to me. So with the Duck example it just seemed a little more clear cut to me I guess? So when we talk about the content of the mind and conciousness and thoughts and what not, the reductionist says these are real things but they are something else, but the EM says it’s not that hear things exist but are something else, these things literally don’t exist. Do I have that right? If that’s the case it just seems so utterly ridiculous and falsifiable, perhaps that’s the problem I’m having, being “too charitable” to the EM?

Again thanks for the input!

John West wrote:

So when we talk about the content of the mind and conciousness and thoughts and what not, the reductionist says these are real things but they are something else, but the EM says it’s not that hear things exist but are something else, these things literally don’t exist. Do I have that right?

Yes. That's right.

perhaps that’s the problem I’m having, being “too charitable” to the EM?

I think so, haha.

Once I wrap up what I'm doing right now (offline) and can afford to focus on other philosophy stuff, I plan to write a series of articles on “crazy views” for Ontological Investigations. Eliminativism is an unequivocally insane view. Yet by all accounts, the Churchlands are pretty decent, intelligent people, not insane. I think there are deep and interesting metaphilosophical questions in the general vicinity.

But an insane view is still an insane view, and ought to be treated as insane.

I would be very interested to read that!
Yes that’s true, in a sense I think it’s a case of becoming so enveloped in ones theory and so convinced of materialism that the outcome could be essentially anything and it would still be accepted. I think one can almost sever themselves from reality when enveloped in such a theory.
How would you compare EM to solipsists? Which is the more insane view in your books?