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5/16/2018 2:07 pm  #1


Yujin Nagasawa

Does anyone know if Yujin Nagasawa is a theist? I’ve seen his name pop up during discussions about the Ontological Argument.

 

5/16/2018 3:29 pm  #2


Re: Yujin Nagasawa

Yes, he is, or at least he writes in favor of the OA as a successful argument for God (in fact he goes as far to say it is one of humanity's greatest discoveries). I will be reviewing his recent book, Maximal God, next month.

 

5/19/2018 2:04 pm  #3


Re: Yujin Nagasawa

Is it worth the $40? It looks mesmerizing.

 

5/25/2018 12:19 am  #4


Re: Yujin Nagasawa

DanielCC wrote:

Yes, he is, or at least he writes in favor of the OA as a successful argument for God (in fact he goes as far to say it is one of humanity's greatest discoveries). I will be reviewing his recent book, Maximal God, next month.

 
Where is your review? Just write it already. I think Nagasawa's idea of taking a top-down approach to the possibility premiss seems at least promising.

 

5/25/2018 4:14 am  #5


Re: Yujin Nagasawa

Miguel wrote:

DanielCC wrote:

Yes, he is, or at least he writes in favor of the OA as a successful argument for God (in fact he goes as far to say it is one of humanity's greatest discoveries). I will be reviewing his recent book, Maximal God, next month.

 
Where is your review? Just write it already. I think Nagasawa's idea of taking a top-down approach to the possibility premiss seems at least promising.

Final papers for various course modules have to be turned in first. The review will be slightly more indepth than my take on Ed's book as I was using separate articles to discuss individual issues with the arguments (and still plan to do one on the eternal truths argument).

 

5/26/2018 3:04 pm  #6


Re: Yujin Nagasawa

Are you a graduate student Daniel? Do you publish/post reviews anywhere, or do you post them here?

 

5/27/2018 1:57 pm  #7


Re: Yujin Nagasawa

Here we are folks. For the sake of having this review out in reasonable time and because the remaining material ran into the hundreds of words I will be posting a follow-up about the book's central thesis next week.

https://ontologicalinvestigations.blogspot.co.uk/2018/05/review-maximal-god-by-yujin-nagasawa.html

mnels123 wrote:

Are you a graduate student Daniel? Do you publish/post reviews anywhere, or do you post them here?

No, sadly. I'm doing an undergraduate humanities degree really just as a means to an end.

 

5/27/2018 8:34 pm  #8


Re: Yujin Nagasawa

DanielCC wrote:

Here we are folks. For the sake of having this review out in reasonable time and because the remaining material ran into the hundreds of words I will be posting a follow-up about the book's central thesis next week.

https://ontologicalinvestigations.blogspot.co.uk/2018/05/review-maximal-god-by-yujin-nagasawa.html

mnels123 wrote:

Are you a graduate student Daniel? Do you publish/post reviews anywhere, or do you post them here?

No, sadly. I'm doing an undergraduate humanities degree really just as a means to an end.

 
Quick question: how does Nagasawa derive necessity (as in necessary existence) from the Maximal God thesis? How do we get necessary existence from "the maximal consistent set of power, knowledge and benevolence" without assuming necessary existence is possible and terefore part of the maximal consistent set?

 

5/28/2018 4:27 am  #9


Re: Yujin Nagasawa

Miguel wrote:

DanielCC wrote:

Here we are folks. For the sake of having this review out in reasonable time and because the remaining material ran into the hundreds of words I will be posting a follow-up about the book's central thesis next week.

https://ontologicalinvestigations.blogspot.co.uk/2018/05/review-maximal-god-by-yujin-nagasawa.html

mnels123 wrote:

Are you a graduate student Daniel? Do you publish/post reviews anywhere, or do you post them here?

No, sadly. I'm doing an undergraduate humanities degree really just as a means to an end.

 
Quick question: how does Nagasawa derive necessity (as in necessary existence) from the Maximal God thesis? How do we get necessary existence from "the maximal consistent set of power, knowledge and benevolence" without assuming necessary existence is possible and terefore part of the maximal consistent set?

He derives necessity from the perfect being thesis along the lines of maximal excellence and maximal greatness (of course these are just Plantinga's way of putting an older idea). The Maximal-God thesis is a different explanation as to what constitutes the perfect being thesis.

If you mean does he given an argument for the coherence of necessary existence in general, no he doesn't. I think the theist would have the burden of proof on their side if the critic made such a dramatic Quinian move (that is the onus would be on that person to prove why modal concepts are incoherent).

 

5/28/2018 7:19 pm  #10


Re: Yujin Nagasawa

DanielCC wrote:

Miguel wrote:

DanielCC wrote:

Here we are folks. For the sake of having this review out in reasonable time and because the remaining material ran into the hundreds of words I will be posting a follow-up about the book's central thesis next week.

https://ontologicalinvestigations.blogspot.co.uk/2018/05/review-maximal-god-by-yujin-nagasawa.html


No, sadly. I'm doing an undergraduate humanities degree really just as a means to an end.

 
Quick question: how does Nagasawa derive necessity (as in necessary existence) from the Maximal God thesis? How do we get necessary existence from "the maximal consistent set of power, knowledge and benevolence" without assuming necessary existence is possible and terefore part of the maximal consistent set?

He derives necessity from the perfect being thesis along the lines of maximal excellence and maximal greatness (of course these are just Plantinga's way of putting an older idea). The Maximal-God thesis is a different explanation as to what constitutes the perfect being thesis.

If you mean does he given an argument for the coherence of necessary existence in general, no he doesn't. I think the theist would have the burden of proof on their side if the critic made such a dramatic Quinian move (that is the onus would be on that person to prove why modal concepts are incoherent).

 
The critic may just hold that we don't know whether a necessarily existing being is possible (and therefore part of the Maximal God thesis) or not. He need not say it's impossible. And then the ontological argument doesn't go through.

This is one of Jonathan Kvanving's criticisms of the book in his review for Notre Dame:

"The other problem with this defense of the ontological argument threatens to undermine the advantages provided by a top-down approach. For recall that the ontological argument depends on a further great-making property the possession of which can generate an inference from possible existence to necessary existence. Nagasawa relies on the version of the argument found in Alvin Plantinga's The Nature of Necessity, but central to Plantinga's approach is a bottom-up strategy, first identifying great-making properties that have intrinsic maxima and then deriving that God is an omni-being. Then, existence itself, or something involving it, is also taken to be great-making, with necessary existence being the maximum value possible. (My preferred way of expressing this idea is to talk about possible beings that have maximally fragile existence, where any change to a world in which they exist results in a world where they don't exist; then define durability as the capacity to continue to exist despite changes, with maximal durability implying necessary existence.) So, God is not only an omni-being, but also necessarily existent if possible.
Note, however, that this derivation of the property of being necessary if possible is bottom-up. Moreover, it is unavailable to a top-down strategy, in the same way that being an omni-being doesn't follow from being maximally perfect on the top-down strategy. So, from a top-down perspective, one is only entitled to add the durability of existence to the properties of being knowledgeable, powerful, and good, and then see what combinations of these great-making properties generate maximum overall value. Such a maximal value might involve omniscience and it might not; it might involve omnipotence but perhaps not; it might involve omnibenevolence but there is no guarantee of it; and it might involve maximal durability of existence but perhaps not. From a top-down perspective, all bets are off."

The other criticism is that consistency simply doesn't mean possibility. Which is true. So the Maximal God approach does not establish that a Maximal God is possible at all; the possibility premise in the OA remains unsupported.

Perhaps one could reply that consistency gives defeasible support for possibility? Then the Maximal God thesis gives defeasible support to the possibility premise.

 

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