If this general solution to the problem of evil is correct, it seems to me that plausibly, some beings will live after their corporeal death.

Basically, the POE assumes that God can't actualize a world where there's gratuitous evil, where we define gratuituous evil as an evil which isn't necessary to some greater good.
Let's put aside the epistemic possibility that, in fact, it's impossible to have no possible world where there isn't any gratuitous evil. It still seems wrong to say that a benevolent being can't authorize some gratuitous evil.
If some being do some action that imply an evil, but without making this action for the sake of the said evil, and that it make sure that this evil is further compensate, would it imply that this being is evil? It doesn't seems so. Yet, this evil would be gratuitous: it's occurence wasn't necessary for a greater good: it could have happened for a lesser good, or a neutral thing.

Given this account, we must say then that every evil that a sentient being underwent must be compensante, in this life or thereafter.
Surely, some have suffered a lot without counterbalancing good; for example, if a baby is throw in a trash and die, it seems necessary for God to resurrect him if we assume that God is good.

Some could say that I presume univocal predication beetween God's goodness and his creatures' goodness, but if His isn't at least characterize by the two criteria I gave, it would seems misleading to say that He's Good in any sense.

Or maybe my account of goodness is too weak?

Last edited by Ouros (11/22/2018 10:09 am)