I propose for discussion the hypothetical - and maybe not so hypothetical at Adam's time - issue that I call "corpus purus", from the well-known issue of "natura pura":

Is our biological layer viable as a purely animal entity, without being infused a spiritual soul?

To note, the issue appeared in the discussion of this article by Prof. Feser:

http://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2014/12/knowing-ape-from-adam.html

On this issue, there are two possible positions:

1. An organism biologically identical to human beings but without a spiritual soul is a viable animal. It will be just a smart ape, lacking abstract thinking and possibly also universal grammar (adopting Chomskian linguistic terminology). Let's call it q-human, from quasi-human.

2. An organism biologically identical to human beings but without a spiritual soul is NOT a viable animal, as the design of a human brain would cause it to collapse if it were not interacting with a spiritual soul.

First of all, is position 1 compatible with the definition from Vienne that "the rational or intellectual soul is ... of itself and essentially the form of the human body"? Sure it is, because "an organism biologically identical to human beings but without a spiritual soul" is not human! It is the spiritual soul what makes us human!

In his article, Prof. Feser described "a proposal developed by Mike Flynn and Kenneth Kemp to the effect that we need to distinguish the notion of a creature which is human in a strict metaphysical sense from that of a creature which is “human” merely in a looser, purely physiological sense", which is just position 1 above, and then stated that "I have yet to see any plausible objections to the Flynn-Kemp scenario", which is consistent with what I said in the previous paragraph.

Having shown that position 1 is a theoretically legitimate hypothesis, let's focus now on the nature of a q-human. IMV, it is clear that its nature, as that of any animal, is correctly described by Mario Bunge's emergentist materialism, so that we can combine the concepts from this theory with those from Thomism and state that the sensitive soul which is the substantial form of the animal is an emergent property of the matter of its body, just as the vegetative soul which is the substantial form of a plant is an emergent property of the matter of the plant's body. It is important to note that an animal has only one soul, the sensitive, which includes the powers of the nutritive or vegetative soul of a plant.  In St. Thomas' terms, the sensitive soul, being a higher form, contains virtually the nutritive soul, so that itself alone does whatever the lower form does in plants (ST I q.76 a.4 & q.76 a.6 ad 1).  From the perspective of emergentist materialism this view is clearly correct: as a living being's substantial form is an emergent property of the matter of its body, each living being has only one substantial form which reflects the nature of its body, the higher the being the more functional the form.

Now, since a q-human is biologically identical to us, clearly God can at any moment infuse a spiritual soul to him, whereby he would become truly human, capable of abstract thinking and universal grammar, and with his newly-infused spiritual soul as his substantial form. Moreover, in the Flynn-Kemp scenario that was exactly the case with Adam and Eve.

From the perspective of Thomistic anthropology, then, the existing q-humans before creation, being animals and not true humans, had as the substantial form of their bodies a sensitive soul that was an emergent property of the matter of their bodies.  In the case of biblical Adam and Eve, after they were created humans they had as the substantial form of their bodies their spiritual soul, as defined by the Council of Vienne.  But St. Thomas Aquinas goes further by stating consistently that the infusion of the spiritual soul causes the previous sensitive soul to "perish", "be removed", "be corrupted", "fade away". (SCG II q.89 a.11; ST I q.76 a.3 ad 3; ST I q.118 a.2 ad 2; QD de potentia III.9.ad 9; QD de spiritualibus creaturis III.ad 13; QD de anima XI.ad 1; CT 92)

Now, given that in the Flynn-Kemp scenario, consistent with position 1, the creation of Adam and Eve as human beings consisted just in infusing them a spiritual soul without making any physical modification in their bodies, how could it be that, according to Thomistic anthropology, their bodies were no longer producing a sensitive soul? There are two possible solutions to this problem:

One is simply that the actual case is position 2, not 1. In this case, a macro-mutation simultaneous to the infusion of the spiritual soul changed the design of the brain so that it was prepared to work under a spiritual soul and only under a spiritual soul.

The other comes from a more refined understanding of the position of St. Thomas in relation to emergent materialism: the "sensitive soul" is not intrinsically identical with "the sensitive layer of emergent properties of matter" but a possible role of it, so that:

- when there is no spiritual soul, "the sensitive layer of emergent properties of matter" acts as an "end point" and therefore a "sensitive soul".

- when there is a spiritual soul, "the sensitive layer of emergent properties of matter" acts as an "intermediate layer" which is no longer a "sensitive soul".

Thus the infusion of the spiritual soul does not cause the removal or corruption of the emergent properties of the brain, but a reconfiguration of their mode of operation, so that they now become part of the Aristotelian "matter" for which the spiritual soul is the "substantial form".

 

Last edited by Johannes (8/17/2015 12:50 pm)