- DanielCC
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Re: Dealing with a Scientistic Naturalist
Perhaps one would get off to a more profitable start by looking at the necessities scientific theorising and pre-scientific activity presuppose. In that way one looks into the perquisites of there being any natural science or scientists in the first place without devaluing their work when kept to its field.
For instance one might ask exactly what does the ‘necessity’ involved in the laws of nature entail? If this is taken in a Humean way then no matter how many past confirmations said law has received then it is but a ‘cosmic coincidence’; if not then we needs must do hard metaphysical work to explain the necessity in question. The same can be applied when talking about instances and natural kinds.
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A lot of the problems raised in this thread don't seem that insurmountable, or are at least smaller than they may appear. For example, the issue of how we can be certain the laws apply universally is easily solved: we can't.
This precisely how I would point out the decisive inferiority and uncertainty of so-called scientific knowledge. Metaphysics built on rigorous logic and carefully examined presuppositions is much more certain than science ever will be. Science itself cannot proceed except by rigorous logic and carefully examined presuppositions. This is the method that really works.
And your attitude is precisely why many scientists dislike "superior" philosophers. When there is so much disagreement among philosophers about what the "certain" metaphysical results are, it is hard to take your position seriously. To use the language of Aquinas, science may give objectively less certain knowledge, but it is subjectively far more certain - there is far more certainty among scientists about contingent truth than there is among philosophers about necessary truth. Obviously science uses the same tools as philosophy, but it also constantly tests its results against the "real world", so to speak. Far too many philosophers don't bother with this, so scientists don't take them seriously.
That is really a matter between scientists and philosophers rather than philosophy per say. In other words qua people we might care but qua philosophers we don't. If people aren't interested in philosophy then fine but they should refrain from making grand philosophical statements on behalf of the natural sciences (of course the point I'm making above is that any scientific theory immediately makes a whole host of metaphysical assumptions, which is fine in itself, though it will come down to the philosopher to unpick them – if anyone wishes to disagree with their conclusions they too must engage in consciues philosophical activity).
Last edited by DanielCC (8/19/2015 7:31 am)
- iwpoe
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Re: Dealing with a Scientistic Naturalist
who make declarations that end up sounding like "since science makes metaphysical presuppositions, no science could possibly throw any metaphysical theory into doubt".
Well- and I grant that this would have to be nuanced with respect to what's actually being talked about -it can't, per se, on the terms you've just stated. That everything be either act or potency or something and not nothing at all or that universals exist in some sense, & etc are inherently non-empirical in the scientifically relevant sense.
Now, scientists can be *doing* metaphysics themselves, particularly when they're making methodological changes, and this may involve very specific metaphysical argumentation, but the research program does not *discover* the methodology in the laboratory because that cannot be done.
The inferiority of the empirical sciences to philosophy is not an inferiority of ability, knowledge, or social rank, but an "inferiority" of logical priority. It is the sort of inferiority that the statement "All dogs are brown." has to the statement "There are propositions which can express universals in categorical statements." (followed by an account of all these things).
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Thread Starter- iwpoe
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Re: Dealing with a Scientistic Naturalist
who make declarations that end up sounding like "since science makes metaphysical presuppositions, no science could possibly throw any metaphysical theory into doubt".
Well- and I grant that this would have to be nuanced with respect to what's actually being talked about -it can't, per se, on the terms you've just stated. That everything be either act or potency or something and not nothing at all or that universals exist in some sense, & etc are inherently non-empirical in the scientifically relevant sense.
Obviously some metaphysical theories are not empirical in any sense, and so science could not speak on them. But others, it seems, are otherwise. Theories of motion are an obvious example, as are theories of time and space, which are all fair game for physicists as much as for philosophers. Philosophy of nature as a whole seems one which has become increasingly open to both philosophy and science. Theories of the mind may also be discountable on the basis of scientific evidence, as I suggested in an earlier post on this thread.
Well, sometimes a metaphysical claim is an account with respect to what's present in the natural world, and in that sense empirical findings can, at the very least, make the thing be accounted for irrelevant. Aristotle's cosmology is a good actual case of this: for, while empirical investigation of the physical world can never demonstrate that there is no hierarchy of being in ontology, it can show that his specific hierarchical ranking of the heavens with respect to their being is incorrect. When we look at the heavens we are not looking at different spheres which are closer to the eternality of the intellectual realm, as Aristotle thought we were, but that can never show that the intellectual realm is itself corruptible just like the heavens turned out to be. Aquinas' embryology in term of male form and femine matter also comes to mind.
But to the contrary what ever could empirical investigation say to the claim that all motion is the actualization of a potential or, more basically, that effects follow causes, or even more basically, that there is an external natural world in some sense?
As for Philosophy of nature: this has been the nearly exclusive domain of the empirical sciences for at least a hundred years. It's only now started to make a reappearance in philosophy, probably since it's painfully obvious to analytic philosophy that answers to the hard problems in metaphysics are not just around the corner in the empirical sciences.
That said, with respect to theories of mind , motion and of time, I welcome you to give an empirical refutation of different theories that aren't question begging or circular. I don't see how that can be done. The best you can do is show that whatever it was you thought you were looking at that you were accounting for doesn't actually show up and thus the metaphysics is unmotivated. But unmotivated by the empirical evidence is not the same as refuted by it.
Last edited by iwpoe (8/19/2015 2:54 pm)
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Thread Starter- iwpoe
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Re: Dealing with a Scientistic Naturalist
I think some of iwpoe's objections will vanish simply with a little clarification: Please be aware that I am not saying "science can supplant philosophy", nor have I said "science disproves [insert philosophical theory here]". All I am suggesting is the rather modest claim that science can potentially engage with, criticise, and provide support for various philosophical ideas, to a greater degree than many philosophers are willing to admit.
Well, I mean, I did admit that scientists can be, and indeed at important junctures *are*, doing philosophy. My worry is more about the import of empirical "scientific" methods to metaphysics. If all you mean is that *guys who do science* can have philosophically interesting things to say, then absolutly.
Simply put: why is this such a terrible thing to claim?
Well, the usual bad thing about the claim, though I don't think it's what you seem to mean now that you've said more, is that it's usually the very strong claim that "You philosophers should listen to us because we do empirical work, and you're illigitimate bullshit until you start doing empirical work."
For reference see the remarks of, amongst others, Dawkins, Stephen Hawking, Lawrence Krauss, and Neil deGrasse Tyson on philosophy.
I'm not seeing much in the way of reasoned objections to it. iwpoe seems to suggest that even if scientists showed that what some philosophers seek to account for isn't there, science would not have delivered a serious blow to those philosophers. I hope I don't have to point out why that fails to convince me.
Well, look, when you show with modern embryology that both the man and the woman contribute relivant matter and, in some attenuated sense, form during reproduction you do, in some sense deal a blow to Aquinas (and Aristotle also, I think?). But the more metaphysically important matter is the distinction between matter and form in man, which cannot be refuted in any empirical manner.
And there are plenty *part* of philosophy that are very vunerable *in that way*. Political philosophy, applied eithics, *some* aspects of philosophy of nature, etc. But my main concern is metaphysics itself- first philosophy.
Fighting to the death "the noonday demon" of Acedia.
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It is precisely “values” that are the powerless and threadbare mask of the objectification of beings, an objectification that has become flat and devoid of background. No one dies for mere values.
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Thread Starter- seigneur
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Re: Dealing with a Scientistic Naturalist
The inferiority of the empirical sciences to philosophy is not an inferiority of ability, knowledge, or social rank, but an "inferiority" of logical priority. It is the sort of inferiority that the statement "All dogs are brown." has to the statement "There are propositions which can express universals in categorical statements." (followed by an account of all these things).
Even if that were a reasonable way to put it, this kind of "inferiority" would obviously be more accurately expressed with the words "posterior" and "prior" in place of "inferior" and "superior", which in any context are used almost exclusively to make value judgements. I also think it's fairly clear that the post I was originally responding to was using inferior in the sense of "inferiority of knowledge", especially given that they declared metaphysics to be "much more certain than science ever will be".
Long story short, inasmuch as the scientistic naturalist (which is the type we are discussing in this thread) claims that science is more about facts, reality, and truth than metaphysics will ever be, I'd attack the claim head-on and promptly turn the tables. In the process, I have absolutely no concern whether I will be liked or not. In fact, if I will not be liked, I will tactically cite this as an example that the opponent tends to attribute factuality to things that he likes rather than to things that are really factual. And the debate will be over soon enough. Why prolong it?
Last edited by seigneur (8/19/2015 7:06 pm)
- iwpoe
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Re: Dealing with a Scientistic Naturalist
Even if that were a reasonable way to put it, this kind of "inferiority" would obviously be more accurately expressed with the words "posterior" and "prior" in place of "inferior" and "superior", which in any context are used almost exclusively to make value judgements. I also think it's fairly clear that the post I was originally responding to was using inferior in the sense of "inferiority of knowledge", especially given that they declared metaphysics to be "much more certain than science ever will be".
I missed this post. But there is a sense in which because of its method metaphysics *is* more certain than the empirical sciences. I hesitate to say this is simply a deductive certainty, since, for instance, "It is impossible for the same thing to belong and not to belong at the same time to the same thing and in the same respect." is known neither empirically nor deductivly.
Last edited by iwpoe (8/19/2015 7:17 pm)
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Thread Starter- John West
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Re: Dealing with a Scientistic Naturalist
I missed this post. But there is a sense in which because of its method metaphysics *is* more certain than the empirical sciences. I hesitate to say this is simply a deductive certainty, since, for instance, "It is impossible for the same thing to belong and not to belong at the same time to the same thing and in the same respect." is known neither empirically nor deductivly.
I'm not sure about the rest of what you've written, but Principles like the Law of Non-Contradiction are known because they can't be coherently denied, and the retorsive arguments demonstrating that are deductive.
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Re: Dealing with a Scientistic Naturalist
I think some of iwpoe's objections will vanish simply with a little clarification: Please be aware that I am not saying "science can supplant philosophy", nor have I said "science disproves [insert philosophical theory here]". All I am suggesting is the rather modest claim that science can potentially engage with, criticise, and provide support for various philosophical ideas, to a greater degree than many philosophers are willing to admit.
Simply put: why is this such a terrible thing to claim?
I'm not seeing much in the way of reasoned objections to it. iwpoe seems to suggest that even if scientists showed that what some philosophers seek to account for isn't there, science would not have delivered a serious blow to those philosophers. I hope I don't have to point out why that fails to convince me.
Maybe this is very naive of me, but could most of the overlap disappear if a proper distinction is made between philosophy and science. Is a lot of the problem that philosophers and, in particular, scientists are thinking enough about where their discipline ends and the other starts?
I do think your original post was not helped by the use of the term real to refer to the world of scientific investigation (I won't say empirical - science isn't interested in a lot of the empirical world, or at least in aspects of a lot of it: just compare the scientist to the phenemologist). This came close to pat empiricism; an almost seeing is believing mind set (which many of those scientists and, especially, their non-scientific defenders, seem to suffer from).
- iwpoe
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Re: Dealing with a Scientistic Naturalist
I'm not sure about the rest of what you've written, but Principles like the Law of Non-Contradiction are known because they can't be coherently denied, and the retorsive arguments demonstrating that are deductive.
I gave the metaphysical formulation of Aristotle, and it's not clear to me (and I'm following Bill Vallicella on the particualar point see here: ) that retorsive arguments are sufficient to grasp the LNC as a metaphysical principal, though it may be sufficient to demonstrait it as a law of thought.
My Platonist leanings tend to push me in a direction that Bill (and presumably Kant) calls "dogmatic".
Last edited by iwpoe (8/19/2015 7:59 pm)
Fighting to the death "the noonday demon" of Acedia.
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It is precisely “values” that are the powerless and threadbare mask of the objectification of beings, an objectification that has become flat and devoid of background. No one dies for mere values.
~Martin Heidegger
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Thread Starter- John West
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Re: Dealing with a Scientistic Naturalist
Maybe this is very naive of me, but could most of the overlap disappear if a proper distinction is made between philosophy and science. Is a lot of the problem that philosophers and, in particular, scientists are thinking enough about where their discipline ends and the other starts?
Well, if metaphysical claims imply facts about empirical, physical reality (sight, sound, smell, feel, taste), then empirical investigation (which can include but is not exhausted by experimental testing done by scientists) can in principle rule out those metaphysical claims by modus tollens. This may be metaphysics that takes into consideration scientists' work, but the scientists' work would still be playing a key role.
Science does, however, have a demarcation problem. I think we're seeing it rear its head here.
[Edited to remove an obvious typo I failed to notice earlier (an "unless" between "then" and "empirical").]
Last edited by John West (8/19/2015 11:26 pm)