Yes, the burden of proof is not very important because the theist has many good arguments, but it is a topic that is often brought up by contemporary atheists, and I think without warrant. '

I'm not sure, because there does seem to have to be a position of just not knowing, but doesn't any claim about the evidence ​come with an equal burden of proof, whether that is God exist or he doesn't, whether likely exist or likely doesn't exist? Atheism would seem to imply claims about the evidence for God (and, more generally, the nature of the universe) and I don't see why it should have any less of a burden of proof than the theist.

Alexander wrote:

It seems fair to say, for example, that an absence of proof for the existence of God could itself be used as evidence in favour of atheism.

"Weak" atheism, which is merely agnosticism. Pop-atheists claim what are usually called agnostics for themselves merely as a rhetorico-political move, because people who merely "don't know" anything about religion or philosophical arguments for God's existence now often share with actual atheists a suspicion of "God talk".

Moreover, I'm not sure, given what we're describing, that there even is properly speaking, evidence. Someone who likes analytic epistemology more than I do might be able to provide me better terminological distinctions, but what would it even mean to say 'I have evidence *for* my own ignorance of X'?

I'll take my own mental life: I know next to nothing about the country Laos. There is, in some sense, a psychological default position of ignorance, from my perspective, of anything called Laos. But this ignorance is not a belief with supporting evidence; it's not even a belief I hold. I simply don't know of Laos. Now, maybe some people start speaking to me of Laos, I come to know about it as something of which others speak and I ask about it and they tell me it exists somewhere. At this point I suppose I believe, with immediate evidence, something like 'Laos is something said to exist by others.' I'm ignorant of the truth of this claimed existence and, if I'm so inclined, I might begin to investigate.

Maybe, for whatever reason, I cannot travel to Laos and all the people who tell me about Laos have strange or contradictory claims about it. Would this be evidence that there is nothing that answers by the name Laos? No. Would it be evidence *for* my own ignorance of the existence of Laos? No, because "evidence *for* ignorance" is an absurdity. Would it be evidence that Laos exists? Likely not, though it would be further support for the belief that there is "Something called Laos said to exist by others." With respect to the claim 'Laos exists." I would simply remain in ignorance and in want of sufficient justification for belief, since nothing could justify believing otherwise. I could, I suppose, assent by will to the belief that "Laos exists." but I would have no justification. Indeed, I don't even think I would have managed to move beyond ignorance; I simply have beliefs about things of which I am ignorant. The only new belief I might be justified in is the belief that "Laos is something said to exist that others say strange and contradictory things about."

Agnosticism seems to me to properly be ignorance with respect to God coupled with a belief that God is something people speak of and of which I've heard/had no sufficient justification for my believing in it. Simple ignorance of God isn't even any kind of position and does not admit of support. An infant isn't an atheist or an agnostic: he's merely ignorant.

A stronger agnostic position might amount to the claim that 'Everyone who speaks of belief in God has no justification for that belief.' Even this wouldn't amount to so-called strong atheism. For the mere fact that everyone lacks justification for believing X exists does not entail that X doesn't exist. This actually seems to be the real position that most pop-atheists are defending when it comes down to it (though they usually defend it badly), and it is practically indefensible, particularly if religious experience can count as justification for belief in God. More relevantly, such a position can hardly hold claim any kind of 'default' position. It's one think to say *I* have no justification for believing in God. It's quite another to say prima facie that no one anywhere does. The latter claim does seem to require argument. For instance, if I say "I know God because he spoke to me." it does seem to be on you to show why that wasn't what I thought it was.

Alexander wrote:

But the reverse is not true - absence of proof for the non-existence of God probably cannot be used as evidence in favour of theism.

Well, we might distinguish, as you have in the case of atheism, between strong theism and weak theism. Weak theism simply holding that 'God may exist." But this is agnosticism, and it shows you why the strong atheist was illegitimate in claiming agnostics for himself.
Lack of disproof for God is, indeed, evidence that the belief that "God doesn't exist." is not justified (since the only possible justification for that belief *is* such a disproof). If you include in theism, "weak theism" as I just have, then indeed, lack of disproof *is* support for theism of *some* sort.

But, of course, this is silly. The real fight is the fight between those who don't know if God exists and those who would claim to know he does. It's agnostics vs theists. The people who would claim to know God doesn't exist are deluding themselves unless this claim amounts to a very specific rejection of a very specific so-called God.

Last edited by iwpoe (9/01/2015 7:20 am)

Alexander wrote:

Perhaps you are right. I'm not particularly sure it matters either way, since in practice there are good arguments for God's existence. My thinking was along the lines of "If God exists, we should expect to be able to demonstrate God's existence. So, if we cannot, this is itself evidence that God does not exist." This seems to me to suggest more than agnosticism, but I could be wrong.

I suppose that's the divine hiddenness argument, no?

You and I both seem to agree that the argument fails outright, simply because God isn't "hidden". I also happen to think that the given premise is false. It's completely compatible with the idea of God that he could, in principle, be, as a matter of fact, unknowable by any person living. I suppose, hypothetically, a person in the epistemic position of Adam and Eve with no sophistication of knowledge would never be able to perform any demonstration of his existence. It could also, in principle, be the case that God is only really knowable by direct revelation. That would forestall any possibility of "demonstration" (since showing God's existence would be entirely up to God, not us) but not of knowledge. It might be a false to say that God is, in principle, of himself unknowable (since that would entail that even God couldn't know himself), but that doesn't entail that *we* should ever be in the position of demonstrating his existence.

Last edited by iwpoe (9/01/2015 9:53 pm)

Jeremy Taylor wrote:

I'm not even sure agnosticism does not have an equal burden. After all, to say the evidence doesn't point one way or the other is still a claim about the evidence. But I do think there does have to be a place for just shrugging your shoulders. Perhaps it is more a matter of not arguing at all for such an agnostic. Only those making arguments can have a burden of proof.

I take the agnostic at his best to merely be reporting his epistemic state. He is, ideally, a man who has as good a rational aparatus as is to be expected, and he is merely telling you that having been ignorant of God before he's not been given any warrant to take on the God belief as presented to him.

It may turn out that such a man can't really exist (I don't think beliefs are really so "atomistic" as this), but many people do at least think this is a plausible position to be in. I certainly once thought so of myself.

These four definitions in coin in Philosophy of Religion circles might be helpful:
 
Atheism: We have evidence that God does not exist. The burden of proof is on the atheist here.
 
Non-Theism: We have no evidence that God exists. There was a controversy between William Lane Craig and Anthony Flew over this due to Flew’s having taken the above description as a definition of atheism into to include Agnostics under that heading.
 
Theism: We have evidence that God does exist. The burden of proof is on the theist here unless one wants to argue for Reformed style presuppositionalism.
 
Hard-Agnosticism: We cannot (at least in this life) know if God exists. Associated with Positivism and some forms of Kantianism
 
Sort-Agnosticism: We do not know if God exists.

Alexander wrote:

You are possibly right. And of course I agree with you that the divine hiddenness argument fails because God is not hidden. However, I still think there is something to be said for the premise that God's existence ought to be demonstrable if God does in fact exist. After all, if the theist is correct, God is the ground of all being, the source of all goodness, and so on. This seems to make God so central to a proper understanding of the world that it becomes hard to see how we could not be able to demonstrate his existence, at least in principle.

Practically you may be right but the last qualification really seeds what the atheist wants from the hiddenness argument i.e. that we should have immediate or at least very easily accessible access to the truth of God's existence. We might say that if an ideal mind couldn’t fathom God’s existence it might point to the uncomfortable conclusion that God is a Brute Fact, something which would constitute a more powerful atheist objection.

We also need to be careful since I suspect a lot of Hiddenness Arguments contain implicit Christian assumptions e.g. knowledge of God is necessary for salvation and we only have a finite time to obtain this knowledge.

Last edited by DanielCC (9/02/2015 4:40 am)