- Dennis
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Re: Problems for Presentism
Johannes wrote:
What would you say to the presentist ...
That I fully agree with him, being myself a presentist.
Which is consistent with my previous statement that presentism is the correct description of reality from the viewpoint of man (or of any creature living in time), and with the fact that I am a man.
So, the talk tensed/tenseless theories of time is basically just talk of viewpoints rather than the nature of time itself, and that its nature cannot be talked of without invoking a viewpoint?
- John West
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Re: Problems for Presentism
Presentism describes reality from the viewpoint of man.
Growing block describes the state of the human intellect, to the extent that it keeps (partial and fading) memories from the past.
Eternalism describes reality from the viewpoint of God, Who Is outside time and for Whom all time is eternally present (*).
I'll just note that this doesn't solve the truthmaker problem. Past tense truthmakers still don't exist. It doesn't solve the other two issues with presentism Scott and I have mentioned. It ignores them. It also doesn't give us an answer to the problem of God and future contingents.
Unless it means to say either that if we had an omniscient perspective, we would see eternalism is correct, or that the Moving Spotlight Theory is correct, perhaps.
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Thread Starter- Johannes
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Re: Problems for Presentism
Presentism describes reality from the viewpoint of man.
I'll just note that this doesn't solve the truthmaker problem. Past tense truthmakers still don't exist.
Focusing on the truthmaker problem as described in this quote from a previous comment of yours:
"The point is that the totality of present state-of-affairs is compatible with multiple incompatible pasts. As a result, the totality of the present state-of-affairs is an insufficient truthmaker for determinate statements about any one past."
it is clear that said problem, if it in fact exists (which would require further examination) is only epistemological, not ontological.
It doesn't solve the other two issues with presentism Scott and I have mentioned. It ignores them.
Focusing on the issue raised by Scott:
Consider two such moments, for example my eating of a peanut butter sandwich for lunch yesterday and my recollection of that experience today. It seems unproblematic to say that the first moment of experience temporally precedes the second. There seems to be a real relation between the two such that the first comes before the second and the second comes after the first.
First of all, consciousness is not a necessary part of the case. We can just as well consider two moments, or more exactly events, in the evolution of a star, e.g. the start of nuclear fusion and the explosion as supernova, and state: "It seems unproblematic to say that the first moment of (star evolution) temporally precedes the second. There seems to be a real relation between the two such that the first comes before the second and the second comes after the first."
If “before” and “after” are not real relations, relations that in fact obtain between two objectively existing moments of consciousness, then it seems that time is unreal and eternalism follows trivially.
They indeed are real "relations that in fact obtain between two objectively existing moments of consciousness" (or star evolution).
But if they do obtain, then the non-eternalist faces a worse difficulty. For if all that is ever real is the present moment, then there is never a time at which both moments of experience (or star evolution) exist, and so at least one of the relata always fails to exist.
This is no problem, because the real relation under consideration is between two different moments, or more exactly events, in time, which by definition cannot exist at the same time. Causality is what relates the two events.
BTW, that's why there is no philosophical problem in the relativistic fact that different observers, depending on the movement of their respective frames of reference, may observe different time relations between two events A and B, so that for one observer A preceded B and for another observer B preceded A. Because that can only happen when, for all observers, there was no relation of causality between both events. This is because the invariant interval ds between two events is the same for all observers: ds^2 = -c^2 dt^2 + dL^2
Granting that my eating of the peanut butter sandwich yesterday does not exist now, if there is no sense in which it exists timelessly, then it simply isn’t “there” to be in a relation of “coming before” to the moment of my recollection.
The sense in which the past event exists timelessly is in its effects. Your eating of the peanut butter sandwich yesterday "exists" in your mind due to the effect it produced on your soul and brain (leaving aside the exact distribution of roles between soul and brain in memory). Similarly, the start of nuclear fusion "exists" in the star due to the effect it produced on it.
If past and present never coexist in any eternal sense whatsoever, then it should be simply meaningless to say that one comes “before” the other; the past simply fails to exist, and therefore can’t be “related” to anything.
Past and present do not coexist in any eternal sense. The present exists really, as present, and the past "exists" in its effects.
A final observation on this last quote from Scott:
My experience of eating a peanut butter sandwich has a certain quality of presentness that is simply part and parcel of the experience; without that quality the experience would not be what it is/was, and indeed would arguably not be an “experience” at all. (Sprigge’s own example, which has the advantage of great vividness, is a toothache.) If that moment of experience is not eternally “there” with that very quality of presentness, then it is no longer available as a temporal relatum,
We should not stress too much "the quality of presentness" of an event, because that could imply that a subsequent state of amnesia would have the consequence that the past event would lose its (past) reality.
Last edited by Johannes (9/18/2015 1:12 pm)
- John West
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Re: Problems for Presentism
"The point is that the totality of present state-of-affairs is compatible with multiple incompatible pasts. As a result, the totality of the present state-of-affairs is an insufficient truthmaker for determinate statements about any one past."
it is clear that said problem, if it in fact exists (which would require further examination) is only epistemological, not ontological.
Truthmaking is explicitly about the ontological grounds of truths. It's a basic rule of truthmaking that if a state-of-affairs can exist without a statement being true, then the state-of-affairs isn't a truthmaker for that statement.
If it can be the case that the totality of present states-of-affairs exist with a completely different past having existed, then it can be the case both that the present state-of-affairs exist and statements about the past aren't true.
No philosopher thinks that truthmaking is epistemological.
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Thread Starter- Johannes
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Re: Problems for Presentism
(Deleting the comment and keeping away from any discussion on truthmakers after having read the first section of the entry at plato.stanford.edu linked by John below.)
Last edited by Johannes (9/18/2015 3:12 pm)
- John West
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Re: Problems for Presentism
Ontologically, it means that just SOAx is not enough to determine whether S is true or not.
You've switched from an ontological statement to an epistemological one midway, here.
because the present does not causally determine the past, by the intrinsic nature of causality!
Of course not. We're not talking about causation.
In fact, I'm not going to let you embarrass yourself any further about this. See here, here, and (for a book length treatment) here for material on the subject you're trying to talk about.[1]
It is not immediately evident, at least to me, whether the problem can also be solved without recourse to the divine Intellect.
See my reply to Daniel (and then Scott) concerning a similar reply using the Act of Creation earlier.
[1]This is the standard objection to presentism. It's worth learning the terms involved.
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Thread Starter- John West
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Re: Problems for Presentism
I wonder if the truthmaker problem for presentism isn't especially bad for theists. I wonder if, since we tie our notions of metaphysical possibility up with God (radically powerful, to say the least), there may also be theistic reasons to affirm that the totality of present states-of-affairs is an insufficient truthmaker for past tense statements.
Basically, I don't see a reason why it would be outside God's Ability to, acting through Primary Causation for non-malicious, benevolent reasons[1], have replaced or changed even an otherwise incompatible totality of past states-of-affairs such that it led to the present state-of-affairs. If it's metaphysically possible for God to do this, then the totality of present states-of-affairs is an insufficient truthmaker for statements about the past.
Do we have any good (especially non- scriptural or catechismal) reasons for denying that God could have done this through His Primary Causation?
[1]Though as adherents of the theological skepticism defense against the problem of evil like to point out, it's often hard for us to know what those are.
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Thread Starter- Scott
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Re: Problems for Presentism
First of all, consciousness is not a necessary part of the case. We can just as well consider two moments, or more exactly events, in the evolution of a star, e.g. the start of nuclear fusion and the explosion as supernova[.]"
Sure, if you want to ignore the problem I was raising and talk about something else instead. But I think I was pretty explicit that I was talking about a problem specifically raised by experience.
I also don't think you're appreciating the problem in general. This:
["Before" and "after"] indeed are real "relations that in fact obtain between two objectively existing moments of consciousness" (or star evolution).
. . . is simply inconsistent with presentism, according to which there are never "two objectively existing moments" of anything. This:
This [the absolute nonexistence, according to presentism, at any given time of at least one of the moments/events related by a temporal relation] is no problem, because the real relation under consideration is between two different moments, or more exactly events, in time, which by definition cannot exist at the same time. Causality is what relates the two events.
. . . is a mere restatement of the problem, not a solution to it -- that problem, again, being how any "relation" can really, ontologically obtain between two moments/events one of which simply fails to exist at any given moment, as presentism holds. (Nor is it true that any "past" event comes before a "present" event merely by being its cause. In fact the implication doesn't hold in either direction: one event can precede another in time without being its cause, and some causes exist at the same moments as their effects. But we'll let that pass.) And this:
Past and present do not coexist in any eternal sense. The present exists really, as present, and the past "exists" in its effects.
. . . flatly contradicts your statement (above) that a temporal relation obtains between two objectively existing moments; in that statement, "existing" must mean "coexisting," and such coexistence must be "eternal" in some sense, in order for the statement to be at all relevant (and arguably even for it to be meaningful). No doubt that's why you feel compelled to put "exists" in scare quotes this time.
We should not stress too much "the quality of presentness" of an event, because that could imply that a subsequent state of amnesia would have the consequence that the past event would lose its (past) reality.
No, it couldn't, and no, it wouldn't; the quality of "presentness" is/was part of the past experience whether we remember it or not. And I gave a very specific reason for stressing that quality, which you haven't even begun to address. Say what you will about some qualities, but if that quality lives on only in its "effects," then it doesn't live on.
I'm going to second John West's recommendation that you look into this question a bit more and learn some of the basics before you try to tackle it further, no matter how "simple" it appears to you at first glance.
Last edited by Scott (9/18/2015 5:20 pm)
- Johannes
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Re: Problems for Presentism
Before leaving the discussion as wisely suggested, I need to make a few clarifications.
First, this statement of mine, as quoted by Scott:
["Before" and "after"] indeed are real "relations that in fact obtain between two objectively existing moments of consciousness" (or star evolution).
was not, as I meant it, inconsistent with presentism, because by "objectively existing" I did not mean "objectively existing at the same time", but that each moment of consciousness, or event in general, existed objectively at its own respective time. (You may say that this meaning of "objectively existing" is so redundant that should not even be considered, and I will not argue with that. I just want to point out that I was not inconsistent with presentism.)
Understood in this presentist way, it is clear that this other quoted statement of mine:
Past and present do not coexist in any eternal sense. The present exists really, as present, and the past "exists" in its effects.
does not contradict my statement quoted above.
Now, if the only legitimate way - either on a philosophical basis or on a linguistical basis or on both - to understand the statement "a temporal relation obtains between two objectively existing moments" is that:
in that statement, "existing" must mean "coexisting," and such coexistence must be "eternal" in some sense, in order for the statement to be at all relevant (and arguably even for it to be meaningful)
I have no problem in acknowledging that my use of the statement with a presentist meaning was illegitimate, and I withdraw it (the use of the statement with a presentist meaning, not the presentist position).
Lastly, I did not say "that any "past" event comes before a "present" event merely by being its cause", nor was that implied by the comment based on Special Relativity. So there's nothing to be let pass regarding that.
Last edited by Johannes (9/19/2015 5:58 pm)
- Mark
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Re: Problems for Presentism
Eternalism (of any sort) has no more trouble explaining why I don't "experience all points of my reality simultaneously since all are equally real" than it has explaining why two different spatial locations don't collapse into one just because they're equally real.
That’s a good point, but I’m not sure it’s fully analogous. Objects do not occupy different spatial point simultaneously, but Eternalism holds that people (and everything else) can exist simultaneously at different points in time. It’s the simultaneity I’m worried about.
Unfortunately, you still haven't dropped the idea that I'm talking about giving an epistemic account of our experience of the present. It's baldly presupposed in every paragraph in your reply except the last. I don't think we can make any progress until that part is corrected
I thought I was arguing that, not presupposing it. This hasn’t made for a productive discussion. So let’s try this another way: On any alternative view to presentism you care to defend, what is the present, and how does that differ from presentism?
This can be rephrased: "If God arbitrarily selects a unit of time, is that arbitrary?" But God wouldn't arbitrarily select a unit of time in the first place. So, what you've done here is presupposed that it's a non-arbitrary "moment", and smuggled it in without supporting reasons.
You like accusing me of presupposing things. It’s not a very charitable way of interpretation. I was making no assertions at all in that question, as far as I can tell. If I had, Dennis would be quite right that “This would, at least to me, be a very weird way to argue as to why Planck time is the measure of the present.” At any rate, what I meant to question was whether or not it’s a logical possibility for God to have created the present out of a certain measurement of time.