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9/21/2015 5:56 pm  #1


Demonstrating The First Way

I've been reviewing The First Way and have been trying to develop a chain of causes and effects that would demonstrate the proof. It seems to me that any example that revolves around an action being performed by a person would not work becuase humans have their own independent power and free will and can thus be the first causes of any series of effects that starts with a them. So to demonstrate the proof one must work from a series of non-human causes and effects. Every time I try to do this I get stuck and confused. Can someone actually write out a detailed series of causes and effects that effectively leads to a necessary purely actual first cause? (Are people still reading these forums? I really hope they are. I guess we will see )

 

9/21/2015 7:36 pm  #2


Re: Demonstrating The First Way

sam regarf wrote:

It seems to me that any example that revolves around an action being performed by a person would not work becuase humans have their own independent power and free will and can thus be the first causes of any series of effects that starts with a them.

It might seem so, but that's actually not the case. A human being works okay for illustrative purposes and can be a "prime mover" in a relative or subordinate way that's sufficient to get the point across, but the genuine Prime Mover is what holds him in existence and confers on him his (relatively) independent powers and will.

The reason for this is that (according to Thomism) the existence of anything (other than God) is itself the actualization of a potency (and the actualization of potencies is the beating heart of the First Way). For Aquinas and those of us who agree with him, the nature or essence of (say) Socrates stands in potency to the existence of Socrates, and this potency must be actualized by something that is itself already in act.

 

9/21/2015 8:52 pm  #3


Re: Demonstrating The First Way

I recall reading somewhere (though I don't remember where) that Geach (inĀ Three Philosophers) takes the position that you can't actually write out the series of changers. The reality of change implies a kind of incompleteness of the world that requires something that's pure act, but (Geach, in my recollection of the paraphrase, continutes) the proof is not defensible starting with a single item. (This is probably not a thesis that every Thomist would immediately accept.)

Another possible position (in the context of a different proof, though perhaps still applicable in this case) is that, though the argument, to be valid, requires a claim about series, in practice the series are single-item. This is taken by Barry Miller, who wants to formulate the cosmological argument in this way: Start with the fact that Fido, a contingent individual, exists. By dint of analysis of the predicate "exists", show that God exists. He thinks that God is the immediate actualizer of each being's existence, though he has to defend a claim about causal series. Obviously, you can't produce a series of causes of Fido's existence in this case, for there are no intermediates between Fido and God. The proof strictly leaves this open, but if Miller is right, then you couldn't find any.

 

9/22/2015 1:52 pm  #4


Re: Demonstrating The First Way

Greg wrote:

Another possible position (in the context of a different proof, though perhaps still applicable in this case) is that, though the argument, to be valid, requires a claim about series, in practice the series are single-item. This is taken by Barry Miller[.]

If I recall correctly, Fr. Copleston took a similar approach and said that all he needed in order to prove the existence of God was the existence of one contingent being. I think that's right. If pressed, I might even agree that the series are single-item even in theory.

 

10/02/2015 8:59 am  #5


Re: Demonstrating The First Way

Thanks a lot Scott and Greg. Very helpful. It seems to me though that an appeal to an argument from existence may be powerful, but is not The First Way and does not necessarily relate to a causal series per se. And regarding what Greg wrote that "The reality of change implies a kind of incompleteness about the world that requires something that's pure act," I dont really understand what this is saying. How does change imply incompleteness? isn't it possible for something to be complete and yet still change, at least a non-essential feature? Also, why does the incomleteness of the world require an explanation such that we are led back to a purely actual being? Why can't the world be "incomplete" without appealing to a purely actual being? Sorry for my lack of understanding. Thanks again!

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