iwpoe wrote:

Well, I'm trying to think of a case of something that is both a potency but can also be said to not exist, which does go back to his question. I understood Feser to gloss potencies as things which exist qua capacity to become actual. (SM p 33 par 1) The flatness of a ball that is now round "is not nothing".

I see.

When a potency is actualized, it doesn't go from non-being to being. It goes from one kind of being, being-in-potency, to another kind of being, being-in-act. Everything that has being exists. So, potencies exist. So, there are no cases of potencies that do not exist. 

iwpoe wrote:

So, I'm trying to think of what Daniel could possibly mean to speak of when he asks "After all how can a non-existent being stand in potency to anything?" What is something that might exist that doesn't stand in potency of anything? "Unicorns" and "square-circles" are standard things that are said to not exist, though in different ways, so I tried them out and hoped they would be clarifactory.

“Things” that don't exist can't stand in potency to anything, because they don't exist. We're not referring to anything when we write “Things that don't exist”. The term is vacuous, having no referent. It's meaningful, but vacuous.

edit: I misread this:

iwpoe wrote:

What is something that might exist that doesn't stand in potency of anything?

Sorry about that. Late night. I see Daniel's already replied, so I'll leave it there. Dinosaurs are another example.
 

Last edited by John West (7/03/2015 12:41 pm)

iwpoe wrote:

John West wrote:

Nope, square circles' concepts contain contradictions and do not even have a logical possibility to exist. Unicorns, maybe or maybe not (ie. Saul Kripke, for example, would say it's not even possible for unicorns to exist because of vague identity.) But let's try to keep this thread about truthseeker's questions. People get real passionate over that unicorn stuff.

Well, I'm trying to think of a case of something that is both a potency but can also be said to not exist, which does go back to his question. I understood Feser to gloss potencies as things which exist qua capacity to become actual. (SM p 33 par 1) The flatness of a ball that is now round "is not nothing".

So, I'm trying to think of what Daniel could possibly mean to speak of when he asks "After all how can a non-existent being stand in potency to anything?" What is something that might exist that doesn't stand in potency of anything? "Unicorns" and "square-circles" are standard things that are said to not exist, though in different ways, so I tried them out and hoped they would be clarifactory.

You're right on the money with the unicorn option (there was a controversy over that particular example but for the purposes of this thread it doesn't matter - people can say dodos if they wish).

iwpoe wrote:

1. Are dodos/unicorns a potency that might be actualized?

No, unicorns aren't potencies. Unicorns are metaphysically possible (at least, for the sake of discussion).

iwpoe wrote:

2. If so, would it be wrong to say they don't exist?

It's correct to say that unicorns don't exist.

iwpoe wrote:

3. Also, secondarily, of what are they a potency?

Nothing. They don't exist, nor do they exist as potencies. For the classical theist, pure possibilities are grounded, not in potentiality, but in pure actuality.

Last edited by John West (7/03/2015 5:25 pm)

iwpoe wrote:

Are you and Daniel in agreement or disagreement on that point?

I don't think we're in disagreement. Assuming you're referring to Daniel's post here:

Daniel wrote:

This is a very good point. The intrinsic possibility to exist, the 'mere' logical possibility to look at it in a more modern way, is separate from the notion of Potency as normally understood. After all how can a non-existent being stand in potency to anything?
 
The later Scholastics, in particular Scotus, were aware of this and referred to it by the term ‘Objective Potency’: this is one of the reasons why Scotus has been called the ancestor of modern modal theory.

I think Daniel was just pointing out that Scotus used the term "objective potency" to mean logical possibility, and connote that "objective potency" is distinct in meaning from "potency" as potency is traditionally understood (and the sense in which we're using it here). In other words, the potency we're using here and the "potency" in "objective potency" have different meanings.

iwpoe wrote:

And can you say more about the last point?

Well, the purely possible (ie. the possibility of a unicorn) is grounded in God, and God is absolutely simple, pure act. We can draw purely logical distinctions and speak in greater detail of the Divine Speculative Intellect, but I think that would take us far adrift the topic and needlessly complicate the matter at hand.

Last edited by John West (7/03/2015 6:28 pm)

iwpoe wrote:

And can you say more about the last point?

Is this the point you mean?

John West wrote:

For the classical theist, pure possibilities are grounded, not in potentiality, but in pure actuality.

If so, then to whatever John West may have to say about it, I'll add briefly that for Aquinas in particular, "possibilities" can be grounded either in the mind/intellect of God (Who is Pure Act) or in the potencies of substances that actually exist (which are not only actual themselves but also dependent on Pure Act for their existence, including their potencies).

You'll find a little bit (not a lot) of further discussion of the issue in Gaven Kerr's Aquinas's Way to God (http://www.amazon.com/Aquinass-Way-God-Proof-Essentia/dp/0190224800), a book I highly recommend in general anyway (and it's relevant to this subject overall even if not to that precise question; Aquinas's real distinction between existence and essence is a crucial part of Ed's own understanding of Thomism).

Last edited by Scott (7/03/2015 9:37 pm)