Let me state to be what I take to be an argument equivalent to the rendtion of Parmenides's argument DanielCC presented in the thread to which you linked:

1. Everything that changes is changed by something else.
2. Being and only Being exists.
C. Therefore, nothing changes.

This argument is valid. One can avoid the conclusion by accepting one of the following:

~1. Something that changes is changed by itself.
~2. Something other than Being exists.

One can refute the above rendition of Parmenides without invoking potency. Suppose one accepts ~2 by saying that the objects in the scenario of the man who pushes a stone with stick exist. The man changes the stone by pushing it with the stick. Therefore, something changes.

Last edited by truthseeker (7/08/2015 9:11 pm)

Timocrates wrote:

So you believe that from nothing anything and, indeed, everything comes and will follow? 

Do you believe that wood itself and as such can be anything or everything?

No, I believe neither of these propositions. I assume you ask these questions in connection with my rejection of Parmenides's argument providing a compelling reason to accept the act/potency distinction.

Feser, paraphrasing Parmenides, wrote:

(1) Change would require being to arise out of non-being or nothingness.
(2) From non-being or nothingness, nothing can arise.
(C) Therefore, change is impossible.

All one needs to do to refute the argument is choose one of the following: 

~(1) Change would not require being to arise out of non-being or nothingness.
~(2) From non-being or nothingness, something can arise.

Accepting ~(1) seems to me to be the best way to deal with Feser's Parmenides. Here's a scenario that disproves (1): A man covers a hole by pushing a stone in front of it with a stick. The state of affairs of the stone covering the hole is a being. When that being comes into being after not being the case, one can say that that being arises. That being arises out of the man's pushing the stone with the stick, and the man's pushing the stone with the stick is also a being. There is a change here, and the change doesn't involve being arising out of non-being or nothingness. It involves a being arising from another being. I did not have to invoke the act/potency distinction in this scenario, so there are other ways of refuting Parmenides's argument than invoking the act/potency distinction. Thus, the argument doesn't force us to accept the act/potency distinction.

 

Last edited by truthseeker (7/10/2015 10:09 am)

Yes.

truthseeker wrote:

1. Everything that changes is changed by something else.
2. Being and only Being exists.
C. Therefore, nothing changes.

This argument is valid.

Only if it's regarded as an enthymeme with the missing premise

3. Being is simple and is not multiplied.

We need (3) in order to infer that "one" Being (or part thereof) can't be changed by "another" Being (or part), from which it follows by (1) that Being does not change. That lemma doesn't appear to follow just from (1) and (2), at least without what might be regarded as a tendentious definition of "Being."

I'm mentioning this just for completeness, as it indicates another point at which the argument can be questioned.

Last edited by Scott (7/11/2015 11:25 am)

John West wrote:

Hi truthseeker,

Would it be correct of me to suppose that, at root, you're asking "What entails that we ought to accept the act/potency distinction?"

Excuse me, I should've been more careful in my reply. Ultimately, I want to know what entails that we ought to accept the act/potency distinction. But thus far in the thread, I just want to know how refuting Parmenides requires that we accept the distinction, and how refuting Zeno requires that we accept the distinction. I would appreciate it if for now we focused on Parmenides' and Zeno's arguments and how they require that we accept the distinction.

Scott wrote:

truthseeker wrote:

1. Everything that changes is changed by something else.
2. Being and only Being exists.
C. Therefore, nothing changes.

This argument is valid.

Only if it's regarded as an enthymeme with the missing premise

3. Being is simple and is not multiplied.

When I wrote 2., I intended 'Being' to be a proper name for the one and only entity. Thus, I understand your 3. to be equivalent to my 2.