Classical Theism, Philosophy, and Religion Forum

You are not logged in. Would you like to login or register?



7/08/2015 4:13 pm  #31


Re: God and Free-Will

Since I have been gone from the message boards all day, I want to come back in and respond toa  few things. I'll number my points.

(1) I am not arguing that there is a conflict between omniscience and foreknowledge. I'm just raising some questions about it. 

(2) I pick on the barometer analogy because it makes an important point about future predictions. The future can only be known with infallible certainty (for a temporal observer like a barometer--and by temporal observer I also wish to leave aside prophecy or time travelers) on account of some cause in the present which necessitates its effect. There is no disjunct between this and anything else, it is the only way. The reason I included "luck" was because one could in theory predict the future correctly by making educated guesses, but of course, God's foreknoweldge isn't like this. So we should discard luck. Again: for temporal observers, the future is known by knowing present causes and can only be known with certainty when those present causes necessitate their effects.

(3) Now, as the Boethian solution would have it, God is outside of time. So He need not know the future by knowing present causes which necessitate future effects. God can simply observe the future. Fair enough, but as Boehtius himself states (a few paragraphs after he discusses divine eternity) this alone does not solve the problem. Because...

(4) It would mean that God's knowledge  of a future free-choice is caused by the choice or in some sense dependent on it. In other words, if God knows are free choice because we choose it, then God's knowledge is in a sense passive. Boethius does not like this, neither did Augustine before him or Aquinas after him. So Boethius says, God's knowledge is the cause of our choices albeit, He causes them to remain free. This is essentially Aquinas's solution as I understand it, and as many others since him have understood it. Regardless of whether or not this interpretation is correct, it is a live option in the philosophical debate about freedom and foreknoweldge. 

(5) This raises an issue however: If God is the cause of our choices, then can they really be free? Of course, a compatibilist would say yes. But this is why I made the OP a discussion about compatibilism and libertarianism in the context of classical theism. A libertarian should say NO! God cannot cause our choices. So the libertarian has reject what Boethius says and argue that our choices are the cause of God's knowledge. In other words, there are two potential solutions:

Compatibilist (Augustine, Boethius, arguably Aquinas): God is the cause of our choices. Therefore, He knows our choices because He causes them to be. 

Libertarian (arguably Anselm): God's knowledge of our choices is caused by our choices. Therefore, He knows what our choices are because we make them. 

The compatibilist solution has the distinct philosohical problems associated with compatibilism and the theological problem of reconciling this with God's universal desire to save and the teaching of the Church that God does not positively reprobate the damned. The libertarian solution has the problem that it makes God's knowledge passive rather than causal. It also entails a B-theory of time because there must be a contingent future existing for God to observe in His eternity. Some may see this as an issue, I do not as I accept the B-theory of time. Either way, there is the dilemma. I'm not saying either the compatibilist or libertarian solution fails. I just want to discuss it further. In fact, I think the libertarian solution is correct, but it does face the issue I just mentioned. 

 

7/08/2015 4:45 pm  #32


Re: God and Free-Will

Hi Tom,

I'm not sure I meant to accept Boethius's solution tout court, but either way:

TomD wrote:

(5) This raises an issue however: If God is the cause of our choices, then can they really be free?

Okay, and the answer that's been presented (and largely ignored) is that they can if God contingently causes our choices.

TomD wrote:

The compatibilist solution has the distinct philosohical problems associated with compatibilism and the theological problem of reconciling this with God's universal desire to save and the teaching of the Church that God does not positively reprobate the damned.

For the record, I take it that there are good responses to this type of problem of evil too, such as those from Davies's work.

TomD wrote:

 I just want to discuss it further. In fact, I think the libertarian solution is correct, but it does face the issue I just mentioned.

Okay. Well, that's cool. But it doesn't seem like the contingent causation response is compatible with the avenue of the issue you're interested in exploring, and I don't really have much else to add that wouldn't be presenting arguments for the same point. So. I think I'm going to step back for now and see what else is said. Thank you for the discussion so far.

 

7/08/2015 5:04 pm  #33


Re: God and Free-Will

John West wrote:

Okay, and the answer that's been presented (and largely ignored) is that they can if God contingently causes our choices.

And just to be crystal clear here: what I mean in presenting this solution is not just that the "primary" causal process by which God causes us, our choices, and everything else is contingent (as of course it is in the most important sense; God is under no necessity to create), but that He's perfectly capable of being the primary cause of a contingent process of secondary causation.

This was Aquinas's own solution, at least according to Fr. Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange (with whom I agree). It's a matter of some dispute whether Aquinas counts as a "libertarian" or a "compatibilist" (especially since he didn't pose the question in those terms), but at the very least your Point (5) isn't simply a done deal: if there's any sense of "libertarian" for which Aquinas qualifies, then it's not true that a libertarian must answer "no" to the question whether our choices can be free even when they're caused by God. They're free in the only order of causation -- the secondary -- in which "freedom" makes any sense. There's a clear sense in which I could have chosen otherwise even though I didn't, and my choice is "made" not merely by antecedent or circumstantial factors but by me -- specifically, my exercise of my own power of volition.

In the end, wanting "freedom" even from primary causes strikes me as trying to jump off one's own shadow. If that's really what libertarianism requires, I'm inclined to say, so much the worse for libertarianism.

Last edited by Scott (7/08/2015 5:07 pm)

 

7/08/2015 5:18 pm  #34


Re: God and Free-Will

Scott,

TomD did write:

TomD wrote:

I take it that this is the common understanding of the Thomistic view. Specifically, God's primary causation causally determines the will however it is free in the sense that there are no secondary causes which determine the will. Therefore, God knows our future free actions by knowing His own causal activity.

He may have meant something a lot like what you're writing, there (though, I didn't, at the time, understand it that way).

 

7/08/2015 5:27 pm  #35


Re: God and Free-Will

John West wrote:

TomD did write . . .

True, and fair enough; I wasn't thinking of that post when I wrote and submitted my own. At any rate, though, I wasn't trying to disagree with TomD about that.

I might quibble over the use of the word "future" in "future free actions," because to God they're not "future"; He eternally causes the entire cosmic process "all at once" in one act of creation. But they're "future" to us, so that quibble would really be nothing more than a clarification.

Last edited by Scott (7/08/2015 5:29 pm)

 

7/08/2015 5:47 pm  #36


Re: God and Free-Will

Scott and John West,

(1) I agree that "future" is a misnomer because to God they are present. So the real issue is the relation between God's knowledge (which at least in general is causal) and our actions simpliciter, no need to qualify it by saying "future" actions.

(2) The terms "comaptibilsit" and "libertarian" are my quickhand way of dividing up the two solutions, although, I would agree that these terms aren't entirely applicable to a thinker like Aquinas. 

(3) Scott- your position, is what I termed (rightly or wrongly), the compatibilist solution. I agree that God can contingently cause something, of course, He contingently causes the universe because He is free to create or not. That said, I am wondering whether or not God can cause an action to be free in the secondary cause sense--i.e. can God (freely) cause a human to choose X, freely. You say "yes," and that seems to be St. Thomas's solution and the solution of many of his commentators like Fr. RGL. 

But, if that solution is correct, I see 3 main problems which I'd be interested in hearing your (or others's) answers too:
1. How do we reconcile this view with a sincere desire for God to save all men?
2. How can an act be free if it has a cause, EVEN IF that cause is in the primary rather than secondary order. Standard arguments against compatibilism seem to be applicable here.
3. How can God cause an act of sin but not reprobate the damned prior to the consideration of demerits? 

     Thread Starter
 

7/08/2015 6:01 pm  #37


Re: God and Free-Will

I'll have to save the third question until I have more time. (The short answer, I would say offhand, is that God doesn't "cause" acts of sin in the way you seem to be thinking, but merely concurs in their occurrence in order to bring greater good from them. But a longer answer is required in order to reconcile that statement with what I've already said. Again, Fr. Garrigou-Lagrange dealt with the matter better than I'll probably manage here, and perhaps someone else will tackle it before I get around to it.)

But I think I can give short responses to the first two:

TomD wrote:

1. How do we reconcile this view with a sincere desire for God to save all men?
2. How can an act be free if it has a cause, EVEN IF that cause is in the primary rather than secondary order.

1. I don't see that compatibilism has any more of an issue here than libertarianism does. If my "freedom of will" and divine primary causation are compatible, then they're compatible. It's not as though on this view "my" actions somehow all become exclusively God's doing. If "compatibilism" means that I can rob a bank and then turn around and say it was God's fault, where did the compatibility go?

In that case "free will" is something of a red herring. The underlying question is really, "If God desires that all men be saved, and yet they're not, then why aren't they?" This seems to be a special case of the so-called problem of evil, and Brian Davies (to whom John West has already referred) is excellent on that subject. (To his recommendation I would add this and perhaps this.)

2. The very freest of acts has a secondary cause too (namely the agent), and that doesn't make it any less free. What specific issue is raised by the introduction of primary causation?

Last edited by Scott (7/08/2015 6:16 pm)

 

7/09/2015 4:05 pm  #38


Re: God and Free-Will

Scott wrote:

In that case "free will" is something of a red herring. The underlying question is really, "If God desires that all men be saved, and yet they're not, then why aren't they?" This seems to be a special case of the so-called problem of evil, and Brian Davies (to whom John West has already referred) is excellent on that subject. (To his recommendation I would add this and perhaps this.)

2. The very freest of acts has a secondary cause too (namely the agent), and that doesn't make it any less free. What specific issue is raised by the introduction of primary causation?

1. I'll definitely check out Davies's work. But in the meantime, I'd point out that it seems different than a special case of the problem of evil. The reason is that standard solutions to the problem of evil explain why God allows certain evils in light of His perfect goodness. However, this problem focuses specifically on one aspect of God's goodness, namely, His desire to save all men. Now, if God can save all men (which if He is the first cause of all of our choices, this seems to be the case) and He wants to save all men (as Scripture indicates), then why doesn't He? I see two options: say God can't save all men which is a denial of the Thomistic solution regarding God's causing our choices OR qualify the statement about Him desiring to save all men. 

2. By introducing primary causation, it seems that standard arguments used against typical versions of compatibilsim would apply. If the will had a secondary cause which determined the action, then it wouldn't be free. Likewise, if the will had a cause in the primary cause order that determined the action it wouldn't be free. It seems that true freedom necessarily involves the agent being the source of his own action completely. 
 

     Thread Starter
 

Board footera

 

Powered by Boardhost. Create a Free Forum