1 - iwpoe
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Re: Onto-illogical!
This wasn't as bad as I expected, but dat title doe.
Fighting to the death "the noonday demon" of Acedia.
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It is precisely “values” that are the powerless and threadbare mask of the objectification of beings, an objectification that has become flat and devoid of background. No one dies for mere values.
~Martin Heidegger
- Greg
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Re: Onto-illogical!
I am somewhat surprised that he says lots of people are defending Anselm's ontological argument. I am not sure that I've ever seen anyone defend it, and I see a lot more of Plantinga's argument, which isn't mentioned here. (Gyula Klima in one paper kind of defends Anselm, using the argument to motivate some other considerations about semantics and objects of thought, but he ultimately argues that an atheist need not accept the argument, and it's not clear that he accepts it.)
- iwpoe
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Re: Onto-illogical!
I think he probably means that he sees it a lot online.
Fighting to the death "the noonday demon" of Acedia.
My Books
It is precisely “values” that are the powerless and threadbare mask of the objectification of beings, an objectification that has become flat and devoid of background. No one dies for mere values.
~Martin Heidegger
- Greg
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Re: Onto-illogical!
Well, I imagine that's true, but I still think it's rare to find someone defending Anselm's argument even online. On the other hand, I have seen handfuls of people trot out Plantinga's version.
But I do try to stay away from theism / atheism discussions on the internet these days.
- iwpoe
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Re: Onto-illogical!
Isn't Plantinga's just a soupedup presuppositionalist (transcendentalist) apologetics tool for trying to show the "reasonability" of Theism?
Fighting to the death "the noonday demon" of Acedia.
My Books
It is precisely “values” that are the powerless and threadbare mask of the objectification of beings, an objectification that has become flat and devoid of background. No one dies for mere values.
~Martin Heidegger
- iwpoe
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Re: Onto-illogical!
Sure, but the whole thing rests on the "reasonability" of accepting premise 1. But I don't think that knowledge is going to work out such that reason subsists in the mere capacity for choosing amongst any number of well formed arguments.
Fighting to the death "the noonday demon" of Acedia.
My Books
It is precisely “values” that are the powerless and threadbare mask of the objectification of beings, an objectification that has become flat and devoid of background. No one dies for mere values.
~Martin Heidegger
- Greg
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Re: Onto-illogical!
That's what Plantinga says. People who use (or critique) the argument in the apologetics sphere often elide that fact.
Alexander wrote:
Isn't Plantinga's just a soupedup presuppositionalist (transcendentalist) apologetics tool for trying to show the "reasonability" of Theism?
So he claims. But his logic is valid so, if his premises are true, I assume his argument would be successful. I don't see why Plantinga played down the argument as he did.
Well, a sound argument isn't the same as a good argument and certainly isn't the same thing as a demonstration. Lots of arguments that are, for most people, circular are still sound. That is what I feel is the defect in Plantinga's ontological argument, that the supposition of possibility is tantamount to the supposition of existence.
I take it that an atheist most deeply feels that God does not exist because God can't exist, because the universe just isn't and couldn't be that way. I suppose it's the question remains whether the atheist is warranted in believing that.
My other beef with Plantinga's argument is that it sort of "takes for granted" the reality of great-making properties. As an atheist, I was pretty inclined to hold that objectively speaking there is no value. So I would have been inclined to say that nothing could have the great-making property of "maximal goodness"; there's just no such property.
- iwpoe
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Re: Onto-illogical!
My objection is more along the lines of rejecting the pluralistic-Kantianism of the whole approach.
He says of his "victorious" argument:
“Our verdict on these reformulated versions of St. Anselm's argument must be as follows. They cannot, perhaps, be said to prove or establish their conclusion. But since it is rational to accept their central premise [i.e. "There is a possible world in which there is an entity which possesses maximal greatness."] they do show that it is rational to accept that conclusion”
I object because it is first repugnant that reason turn out to be ultimately the competition of any number of mutually incompatible internally consistent transcendental systems and second repugnant that everything ground out merely on the level of epistemology. What does it mean that "it is rational" to accept that premise? Just to take it up with no further ado? And one might stand there?
Fighting to the death "the noonday demon" of Acedia.
My Books
It is precisely “values” that are the powerless and threadbare mask of the objectification of beings, an objectification that has become flat and devoid of background. No one dies for mere values.
~Martin Heidegger
- Greg
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Re: Onto-illogical!
I object because it is first repugnant that reason turn out to be ultimately the competition of any number of mutually incompatible internally consistent transcendental systems and second repugnant that everything ground out merely on the level of epistemology. What does it mean that "it is rational" to accept that premise? Just to take it up with no further ado? And one might stand there?
I think I agree with this assessment as well.
The mode of argument has some parallel elsewhere in contemporary philosophy. At some point, Judith Jarvis Thompson asserts that whether or not it's permissible to procure an abortion, women can be rational in doing so, so a liberal society should not constrain them from doing so.
But the response is obvious (whether or not one thinks that abortion should be permitted): It may seem rational, but if there were a decisive, probative, "publicly reasonable" argument against permitting abortion, then one would be rational to the extent that one accepts it, and not rational to the extent that one doesn't. There is a lot that seems rational that isn't rational, and that's why there are lots of disputes in philosophy.
I find it hard to see how one could "rein in" this mode of argument. Plantinga has given the free will defense against the problem of evil, but might it still be rational for an atheist to hold that the argument from evil is sound? Why not? (Plantinga does claim that atheism is irrational, I believe, so there cannot be any sound argument each premise of which it is "rational" to accept.)