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Here follows very quick summaries of three modal theories which take God as central/fundamental (as befitting Classical Theism). All of them are ‘Actualist’ theories i.e. they take possibility as grounded in something actual.
Option 1 takes possibility to be grounded in the powers and dispositional properties of various beings. This is what might be termed the basic Aristotelian account. Note if we accept the highly plausible premise that the complete set of contingent beings could have been other than they actual are i.e there could have been different contingent beings, then in order for this to be possible said possibility has to be grounded in the powers of an actual being, and one which isn't contingent. This presents us with a nice modal Cosmological Argument for a very powerful if not omnipotent necessary being.
Option 2 takes possibility to be grounded in mental events and/or objects. This theory faces a number of problems, including the usual criticisms applying to all accounts which take logical objects to be mental. The theist is well situated to deal with one major criticism however: Conceivably the universe is not large enough to contain enough finite minds to serve as grounds for all possibilities; however if we were to turn to an infinite mind then that problem would disappear. Like option 1 it can be used to generate a theistic proof (in this case for a necessary omniscient being).
Option 3 takes the familiar Platonic account of Possible Worlds as Maximally Comprehensive Propositions or States-of-Affairs and adds the principle of Theistic Activism i.e. God necessarily creating all abstract objects in all possible worlds. This account is nice though suffers from the other drawback of Plantinga's account, that is that it leaves it disturbingly ambiguous as to what modal truthmakers actually are.
We can of course opt for hybrid models. Perhaps the Abstract Objects in No 3 come about (in a none temporal sense) as a result of the activity in No 2 which is in turn to be explained in No 1. I'll leave it to readers to consider how such proposals would relate to each theories individual problems e.g. the Bootstrapping Problem for Theistic Activism, as well as other fundamental tenets of Classical Theism such as Divine Simplicity.
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With regards to this I have some questions, which are open to anyone:
1. How are contingent beings shown to depend on things outside of them for their existence under this account? Would it be due to them being mixture of act/potency, or essence/existence as Daniel said this approach is Aristotelian in nature.
2. Would substances be hylomorphic under this approach given the Aristotelian nature of this approach? If not then how could one define substances here?
3. With regards to the cosmological argument Daniel thinks could be formulated here, have anyone done any work on it such as what principle it uses like say for example the principle of causality and developed it further to show the attributes of God?
Last edited by AKG (11/04/2016 10:25 am)
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I'll take 1 for now. Maybe someone else can jump in to answer 2 or 3:
1. How are contingent beings shown to depend on things outside of them for their existence under this account?
Suppose the following: there are two not-even-partially-identical mereological sums A and B; in one possible world, A is the mereological sum of all contingent beings; in another, B is the mereological sum of all contingent beings. What makes it true in A-world that B-world is possible?
Since A is completely distinct from B, it's hard to see how the "truthmaker" could be A or a proper part of A. Daniel contends that it has to be a necessary being able to actualize B.
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Hmmm, would this necessary being have to actualize be a truthmaker via mental properties similar to the argument of eternal truths?
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AKG wrote:
Hmmm, would this necessary being have to actualize be a truthmaker via mental properties similar to the argument of eternal truths?
Nope.
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Then it what terms would actualization occur?
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AKG wrote:
Then it what terms would actualization occur?
It could be an act of creatio ex nihilo, which most theists are committed to it being anyway.
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But it wouldn't have to be, and could work as an act of eternal creation such as with the eternal foot, and footprint as well right?
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AKG wrote:
But it wouldn't have to be, and could work as an act of eternal creation such as with the eternal foot, and footprint as well right?
I'm not sure I understand the point of your Aquinas reference. The sums either exist in every possible world, or not. If they do, then even if they have their existence through God they aren't contingent in the sense relevant to the argument. If they don't, they're contingent, but I don't see the purpose of the footprint analogy.
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Oh, I'm just wondering if this argument would necessarily have to commit us to creatio ex nihlo, like the Kalam tries to show.