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2/02/2016 7:10 pm  #1


Thomistic Natural Law

Hello all, this is my first post here. I was referred to this board from a different philosophy forum to discuss this question as I was told there would be actual Thomists here. For the record, I am an agnostic (leaning towards deism) and a philosophical pessimist.

For the sake of time, I'm just going to copy-paste what I wrote on the other forum onto here:

Natural Law: from what I understand it to be, what is moral is what is natural, and we can know what is moral by looking at what leads to the "flourishing" of something.

I have problems with this theory, specifically the Thomistic version espoused by the Catholic Church at large:

First of all, I fail to understand how it bridges the is-ought gap, especially if certain actions that are said to be moral do not lead to the flourishing of a person. A gay person forced into a straight marriage will not flourish, and will be humiliated in the bedroom.

It is of my opinion that if we have to label someone as "defective" (as Feser has himself) to account for certain desires that are not "natural", then our theory of ethics has failed entirely. What a load of rubbish, filled with biased assertions and appeals to conformity. If you have not already noticed, I have bit of an issue with the Catholic Church's doctrine on homosexual relations. But I digress.

Second, I believe that the Thomistic Natural Law is very unscientific. Things do not have telos in themselves, just as a rock rolling down a hill does not have a telos. We can perceive and anticipate what the rock will do in the future but that does not mean there is actually some metaphysical telos that inhabits this rock. We can anticipate that the "purpose" (tongue in cheek) of a penis was to deliver sperm into the vagina. It evolved this way because it helped the organism survive. All this talk of telos and essence is quite honestly immature psuedoscience and more often than not motivated by a religious agenda.

I am not anti-metaphysics, but rather I am very skeptical of traditional metaphysics of the "elaborate" kind, that try to establish great truths about the universe via the armchair. If you were to ask me what my position on metaphysics is, it would be some form of anti-realism, most likely a pragmatist or an OSR naturalized metaphysics.

To continue on with the pseudoscience of Thomistic metaphysical natural law: there is a distinction made between humans and animals, and animals and plants/the rest of the world. This hierarchy is nature reminds me of the ancient scriptures that tell Adam and Eve that they hold dominion over all animals (that is, unless a tiger corners you). It belies our own self-assurance and egos. Humans are said to be the only creatures with rationality (which is blantantly false; see dolphins, whales, certain species of great apes, even dogs), and therefore are obligated to live in a moral way. Therefore, it is asserted that humans are obligated to follow their animal kin in living "naturally"; just as a squirrel hunts for acorns, humans only have heterosexual sex. 

What I have an issue with here is that since humans are rational creatures, it follows that we can evaluate the so-called "natural" actions that our ancestors and animal kin did, and see whether or not we agree with what they did. For example, I consider myself an anti-natalist: that is, I do not condone birth. However, Thomistic natural law would say that this is immoral of me to not only abstain from having children but not condone the breeding process of others, when in reality I hold my position our of compassion. Why have rationality if you aren't going to use it?! Natural law theory prescribes blind obedience to the universe; conformity to the way god made it or the way the majority acts.

If we are to say that what is moral is what leads to flourishing, then what this needs to entail is not some strict, universal "thou shalt not" code of laws but rather a simple metaethical egoism. What allows flourishing is what is productive. What makes me flourish might not make you flourish; if you have a problem with it, too damn bad.

I would like to hear your feedback.


Learn to trim your sail, not curse the wind. -Epictetus

Linguam latinam est molestiae et ambitiosior
 

2/02/2016 8:23 pm  #2


Re: Thomistic Natural Law

Let me see if I can help.

darthbarracuda wrote:

Natural Law: from what I understand it to be, what is moral is what is natural, and we can know what is moral by looking at what leads to the "flourishing" of something.


The term "natural" is ambiguous. Classical natural law theory holds that what's "moral" is what's natural in the sense of what is conformity with one's nature. Morality is limited to rational creatures because they are specifically capable of recognizing the good qua good, so that their flourishing is up to them (in a way that a dog's flourishing is not).

Thomists sometimes have qualms with the term "moral". See Elizabeth Anscombe's classic article "Modern Moral Philosophy". Another helpful article is John Haldane's "Is Every Action Morally Significant?".

darthbarracuda wrote:

I have problems with this theory, specifically the Thomistic version espoused by the Catholic Church at large:


It's worth qualifying that the Catholic Church is not committed to any particular natural law theory, though some of its claims seem to require some sort of natural law theory.

darthbarracuda wrote:

First of all, I fail to understand how it bridges the is-ought gap, especially if certain actions that are said to be moral do not lead to the flourishing of a person.

There is, as far as I can tell, a very wide range of positions that natural lawyers take on the is-ought gap. Some Thomists, perhaps, feel as though they ought to reject it because it's a specious modern doctrine. I think Feser's position is not always that clear. There are various Thomists I know of who concede a form of the is-ought gap and do not take it to imply skepticism about ethics.

For Hume, the is-ought gap is taken to support the idea that morality does not depend on reason. This supposes that reason only operates in the domain of "is," in discovering relations of ideas and matters of fact. If one drops that assumption, as most non-Humeansm, and particularly Thomists, would, then the is-ought gap is not destructive of traditional morality.

The Haldane article I mentioned is one way of doing this. There's also a "new natural law" tradition that embraces the is-ought gap and often gets a lot of flak from traditional Thomists for that reason.

darthbarracuda wrote:

A gay person forced into a straight marriage will not flourish, and will be humiliated in the bedroom.


Well, the Thomist might concede this and would not necessarily urge everyone to marry. (Though I do think there are gay people in happy, traditional marriages. That's not to say that it is to be recommended for everyone.) The Thomist's claim is instead that the gay person would not flourish in a same-sex "marriage".

darthbarracuda wrote:

It is of my opinion that if we have to label someone as "defective" (as Feser has himself) to account for certain desires that are not "natural", then our theory of ethics has failed entirely. What a load of rubbish, filled with biased assertions and appeals to conformity.

Well, set aside the controversial implications of natural law theory for a moment. Is labeling a desire as defective necessarily rubbish? (This isn't about labeling people as defective. Or, rather, if it is, then every person is defective in some respects.) Consider someone who enjoys inflicting pain on others. I think it's fair to say that his desire to inflict pain on others is defective. Respecting others and avoiding inflicting pain on them when reasonable is part of what is constitutive of living a good human life; those who desire otherwise are, in that respect, defective.

One might doubt this on various grounds. Perhaps one doesn't think that there's such a thing as "living a good human life," or one is persuaded by social-Darwinist reasons to think that inflicting pain on others might actually be constitutive of a good life. But for an ethical theory to judge such desires as defective because unnatural is not eo ipso for that theory to fail.

For the natural lawyer / virtue ethicist, pleasure is basically the appearance of the good. What pleases is what "looks" good. There are various ways in which what appears good and what is really good can come apart, but in the virtuous individual they come together. The vicious (or akratic) individual takes pleasure in what is not good for him.

darthbarracuda wrote:

Second, I believe that the Thomistic Natural Law is very unscientific.


Well, Thomists do make claims about ends in nature. Feser argues that that sort of conception is necessary to make sense of science at all. I won't rehearse his arguments since I assume you are familiar and unsatisfied with them.

Some, either for theoretical or retorsive reasons, do not think that it is necessary to make claims about teleology. The new natural lawyers are the most obvious group here; they think that natural law begins entirely from the first-person perspective. I think more traditional views could attempt a similar position for retorsive reasons. The Haldane article I mentioned argues that part of what is constitutive of rational human action is that it is for the good; one might attempt to motivate a natural law theory without too much reliance on claims about teleology in that way.

darthbarracuda wrote:

Humans are said to be the only creatures with rationality (which is blantantly false; see dolphins, whales, certain species of great apes, even dogs), and therefore are obligated to live in a moral way.

I think most of the cases for the rationality of animals are pretty specious. It's a topic Thomists have written on a lot. Feser, of course, has said a lot about it. Oderberg argues against the view that animals are rational in his Applied Ethics. Alasdair MacIntyre was very concerned to treat the subject in his Dependent Rational Animals. Aquinas thought that animals had "rationality" of a sort but nevertheless thought there was a difference in kind.

darthbarracuda wrote:

For example, I consider myself an anti-natalist: that is, I do not condone birth. However, Thomistic natural law would say that this is immoral of me to not only abstain from having children but not condone the breeding process of others, when in reality I hold my position our of compassion.


I don't think Thomistic natural law requires everyone to have children, though I do imagine that it is incompatible with anti-natalism. But anti-natalism is a normative position, so it must be supported by some other normative theory that is surely inconsistent with Thomism, anyway.

 

2/03/2016 12:11 am  #3


Re: Thomistic Natural Law

I also wanted to address the idea that claiming 'desires are defective is illegitimate' from the side. I'll try an argument from the fact of psychological treatment and see how you respond:

1. 'Health' is a normative idea.
2. Mental health and mental illness exist.
3. Much of mental illness consists simply in defective desires (e.g. excessive and uncontrollable desires: 'compulsions', excessive sexual desires for inappropriate objects: 'paraphilias', etc).
∴ Normatively defective desires exist

Ethics, as opposed to psychological medicine, is simply the science that investigates these qua their normativity rather than qua their management and treatment.

Last edited by iwpoe (2/03/2016 7:31 am)


Fighting to the death "the noonday demon" of Acedia.
My Books
It is precisely “values” that are the powerless and threadbare mask of the objectification of beings, an objectification that has become flat and devoid of background. No one dies for mere values.
~Martin Heidegger
 

2/03/2016 2:26 am  #4


Re: Thomistic Natural Law

Thank you for putting your position forth in a very lucid manner. Naturally, given all the kinds of things you reject, the Thomistic account will fail to make proper sense. Since I'm not that well versed with the literature in ethics, I'll try to deal with the metaphysical beefs. I hope Greg and the others continue to reply. 

darthbarracuda wrote:

Second, I believe that the Thomistic Natural Law is very unscientific. Things do not have telos in themselves, just as a rock rolling down a hill does not have a telos. We can perceive and anticipate what the rock will do in the future but that does not mean there is actually some metaphysical telos that inhabits this rock. We can anticipate that the "purpose" (tongue in cheek) of a penis was to deliver sperm into the vagina. It evolved this way because it helped the organism survive. All this talk of telos and essence is quite honestly immature psuedoscience and more often than not motivated by a religious agenda.

I am not anti-metaphysics, but rather I am very skeptical of traditional metaphysics of the "elaborate" kind, that try to establish great truths about the universe via the armchair. If you were to ask me what my position on metaphysics is, it would be some form of anti-realism, most likely a pragmatist or an OSR naturalized metaphysics.

The best way to reply would be to deal with the claims that you've put forth. So here are my questions. Are you aware of the powers theory of causation?

Stephen Mumford, Rani Lill Anjum wrote:

"We place a bag of apples on some weighing scales. The pointer on the scales moves. This is causation. The apples caused the pointer's movement. We know, of course, that it might not really be a genuine case of causation. The pointer may have moved for some other, unexpected, reason. Philosophers pride themselves on being able to contrive such cases. But all they show is that our causal knowledge and expectation is defeasible. They don't really affect the issue of what causation is. Let us assume that the apples on the scale truly did cause the pointer to move.

We now already have a number of  metaphysical questions before us. What exactly was the cause of the pointer's movement? Was it the apples? Was it the fact that the apples were on the scales? Was it the event of the apples being placed on the scales? These options in turn suggest that objects, facts and events are the relata of causal relations. In this book, we defend another view. It is the properties that do the causal work, and they do so because they are powerful." --- Pg. 1, Getting Causes from Powers.

Does this seem unscientific to you as well? Let me know what you think about it.

Given what you've said about the Thomistic approach to be 'unscientific' what exact power or role does science play in your ontology, with the base of a naturalized metaphysics? How do you, as an anti-Realist deal with ontological commitments, and are still able to hold the approach to be 'unscientific.' The case for naturalized metaphysics, I think would be significantly different from Pragmatic ones. Maybe it's a weaker one against scientific realism, but let's see what you think. Just to reiterate the question; As an anti-Realist how do you deal with ontological commitments?

Last edited by Dennis (2/03/2016 3:27 am)

 

2/03/2016 2:54 am  #5


Re: Thomistic Natural Law

Greg wrote:

I think most of the cases for the rationality of animals are pretty specious. It's a topic Thomists have written on a lot. Feser, of course, has said a lot about it. Oderberg argues against the view that animals are rational in his Applied Ethics. Alasdair MacIntyre was very concerned to treat the subject in his Dependent Rational Animals. Aquinas thought that animals had "rationality" of a sort but nevertheless thought there was a difference in kind.

I also think it's relevant to address the place this sort of objection is usually coming from. The thought is that animal rationality would entail that animals are bound to act like we do (which is- so it is said -absurd, and thus taken to be a reductio of some kinds of moral thought). It seems to be a vast expansion of typical culturally relitivist attempts to debunk ethics except instead of arguing 'Others cultures do things differently, so ethics doesn't hold.' it proceeds 'Other rational animals do things differently, so ethics doesn't hold.'.

Even if it was the case that animals possessed some kind of rationality would either of these follow:

1. Animals are bound, by their natures, to the same general moral precepts we are. (It makes no sense that, for instance, any of our sexual morals would apply to an animal with a vastly different reproductive nature).
2. Observed animal behavior is in fact in accords with natural law. (Take a usual example of this idea: Why would we suppose that every case of homosexual activity in any species is eo ipso in accord with natural law? They could be in a distorted state just as well as we could [by way of distress, sickness, manipulation, etc].)

Last edited by iwpoe (2/03/2016 7:45 am)


Fighting to the death "the noonday demon" of Acedia.
My Books
It is precisely “values” that are the powerless and threadbare mask of the objectification of beings, an objectification that has become flat and devoid of background. No one dies for mere values.
~Martin Heidegger
 

2/03/2016 5:55 am  #6


Re: Thomistic Natural Law

Before I begin let me note:

A. Provided the term is used in the modern sense persons like Christopher Hitchens used I'm quite happy to identify as a Deist.

B. Am famouly unsympathetic towards Natural Law Theory.

darthbarracuda wrote:

It is of my opinion that if we have to label someone as "defective" (as Feser has himself) to account for certain desires that are not "natural", then our theory of ethics has failed entirely. What a load of rubbish, filled with biased assertions and appeals to conformity. If you have not already noticed, I have bit of an issue with the Catholic Church's doctrine on homosexual relations. But I digress.

As I said I don't agree with Feser but you're going to have to explain why the above is true.

darthbarracuda wrote:

Second, I believe that the Thomistic Natural Law is very unscientific. Things do not have telos in themselves, just as a rock rolling down a hill does not have a telos. We can perceive and anticipate what the rock will do in the future but that does not mean there is actually some metaphysical telos that inhabits this rock. We can anticipate that the "purpose" (tongue in cheek) of a penis was to deliver sperm into the vagina. It evolved this way because it helped the organism survive. All this talk of telos and essence is quite honestly immature psuedoscience and more often than not motivated by a religious agenda.

Nonsense. The revival of Essentialism in general came about because of the advancements in Quantified Modal Logic with Barcan and Kripke. Harder' non-possible world essentialism came about as a form of uber-robust scientific realism following the collapse of the most prominent anti-realisms e.g. Logical Positivism and Plain Language. 

Interest in the notion of Telos/Final Causality/Physical Intentionality in modern philosophy was revived by a group of philosophers who were themselves devotedly committed to a strong form of naturalism aka the Andersonians (Australian Realists).

darthbarracuda wrote:

What I have an issue with here is that since humans are rational creatures, it follows that we can evaluate the so-called "natural" actions that our ancestors and animal kin did, and see whether or not we agree with what they did.

Maybe this is true but evaluate them to what standard?

darthbarracuda wrote:

For example, I consider myself an anti-natalist: that is, I do not condone birth.

I have written about Anti-Natalism and Natural Law in the past (one of my criticisms of NL is that it does not provide a positive case for reproduction being a good and thus cannot answer the Anti-Natalist save in a negative way). Please see here:

Positive Moral Arguments for Reproduction?

darthbarracuda wrote:

However, Thomistic natural law would say that this is immoral of me to not only abstain from having children but not condone the breeding process of others, when in reality I hold my position our of compassion. Why have rationality if you aren't going to use it?! Natural law theory prescribes blind obedience to the universe; conformity to the way god made it or the way the majority acts.

Yes, if there's a problem with Natural Law then it's that it bases too much on the biological sciences instead of too little. It should not be seen as a form of blind obedience however but a form of self-realization (to which I would query that biology captures what we really are fundamentally as opposed to accidentally).

To say that one holds a position out of compassion is no more argument the truth of said position than to claim that one holds it out of malice however.

darthbarracuda wrote:

If we are to say that what is moral is what leads to flourishing, then what this needs to entail is not some strict, universal "thou shalt not" code of laws but rather a simple metaethical egoism. What allows flourishing is what is productive. What makes me flourish might not make you flourish; if you have a problem with it, too damn bad.

Productive for what?

If you mean that in the absence of any external moral standard then human ends become a matter of self-will then yes. When it comes down to it one's reasons are a matter of shear arbitrary aesthetics. As for egotism yes again in as much as if the good is to have one's will then that ethics is solely for one's self. This blade cuts too deeply for the pessimist though who generally wants to claim there would be something wrong with gradually skinning Schopenhauer's poodles whilst he watches helpless before moving on to him, force feeding Thomas Ligotti laxatives, encouraging others to have children for the sake of their future unhappiness and just generally maximising the suffering of others for kicks.

There's a lesson to be learnt here: if it comes down to Schopenhauer and Nietzsche then the one with the moustache (in the actual world) is going to win.

Last edited by DanielCC (2/03/2016 6:07 am)

 

2/03/2016 5:34 pm  #7


Re: Thomistic Natural Law

Greg wrote:

Well, set aside the controversial implications of natural law theory for a moment. Is labeling a desire as defective necessarily rubbish? (This isn't about labeling people as defective. Or, rather, if it is, then every person is defective in some respects.) Consider someone who enjoys inflicting pain on others. I think it's fair to say that his desire to inflict pain on others is defective. Respecting others and avoiding inflicting pain on them when reasonable is part of what is constitutive of living a good human life; those who desire otherwise are, in that respect, defective.

 
From a biological perspective, yes, the psychopath would be "defective", just as the homosexual would be "defective" in the "grand scheme of things", that is, the way life has evolved on earth for the past 2.7+ billion years.

But I contend that we can transcend this crude, biological system and realize that it is quite restricting and flawed, and make new values.


Learn to trim your sail, not curse the wind. -Epictetus

Linguam latinam est molestiae et ambitiosior
     Thread Starter
 

2/03/2016 5:38 pm  #8


Re: Thomistic Natural Law

iwpoe wrote:

I also wanted to address the idea that claiming 'desires are defective is illegitimate' from the side. I'll try an argument from the fact of psychological treatment and see how you respond:

1. 'Health' is a normative idea.
2. Mental health and mental illness exist.
3. Much of mental illness consists simply in defective desires (e.g. excessive and uncontrollable desires: 'compulsions', excessive sexual desires for inappropriate objects: 'paraphilias', etc).
∴ Normatively defective desires exist

Ethics, as opposed to psychological medicine, is simply the science that investigates these qua their normativity rather than qua their management and treatment.

 
Someone should have the choice to be able to seek treatment (so long as they aren't harming others).

I would dispute your first premise. "Health" is not necessarily a normative idea, although I would think many people would contend that it is. It's something that we want, for sure (we all want to be healthy, strong, fit, sexy, etc), but not necessarily what we ought to be. A supermodel ought not to be healthy but rather anorexic if she wants to get the studio shot (which is unfortunate).


Learn to trim your sail, not curse the wind. -Epictetus

Linguam latinam est molestiae et ambitiosior
     Thread Starter
 

2/03/2016 5:49 pm  #9


Re: Thomistic Natural Law

Dennis wrote:

Thank you for putting your position forth in a very lucid manner. Naturally, given all the kinds of things you reject, the Thomistic account will fail to make proper sense. Since I'm not that well versed with the literature in ethics, I'll try to deal with the metaphysical beefs. I hope Greg and the others continue to reply.

Thank you. I'm glad to be on the board, and so far it seems like everyone is generally nice and not flaming.

Dennis wrote:

The best way to reply would be to deal with the claims that you've put forth. So here are my questions. Are you aware of the powers theory of causation?

Stephen Mumford, Rani Lill Anjum wrote:

"We place a bag of apples on some weighing scales. The pointer on the scales moves. This is causation. The apples caused the pointer's movement. We know, of course, that it might not really be a genuine case of causation. The pointer may have moved for some other, unexpected, reason. Philosophers pride themselves on being able to contrive such cases. But all they show is that our causal knowledge and expectation is defeasible. They don't really affect the issue of what causation is. Let us assume that the apples on the scale truly did cause the pointer to move.

We now already have a number of  metaphysical questions before us. What exactly was the cause of the pointer's movement? Was it the apples? Was it the fact that the apples were on the scales? Was it the event of the apples being placed on the scales? These options in turn suggest that objects, facts and events are the relata of causal relations. In this book, we defend another view. It is the properties that do the causal work, and they do so because they are powerful." --- Pg. 1, Getting Causes from Powers.

Does this seem unscientific to you as well? Let me know what you think about it.

Given what you've said about the Thomistic approach to be 'unscientific' what exact power or role does science play in your ontology, with the base of a naturalized metaphysics? How do you, as an anti-Realist deal with ontological commitments, and are still able to hold the approach to be 'unscientific.' The case for naturalized metaphysics, I think would be significantly different from Pragmatic ones. Maybe it's a weaker one against scientific realism, but let's see what you think. Just to reiterate the question; As an anti-Realist how do you deal with ontological commitments?

 

I think causation is a useful tool for analysis of structures on a certain scale and environment, such as the scale and environment we live in today. So far in my life, I haven't had anything crazy happen that couldn't be explained by some kind of causation, which I take to be either two or more particulars coming into contact or influencing each other via fields. Without any general structure of causation on the scale we live at, it'd be chaos. Outside of our little bubble, who knows?

By power, do you mean like disposition? So like the structure of a hydrogen atom (the properties of a hydrogen atom) and the structure of an oxygen atom allow the creation of a water molecule. In which case...this is fairly self-evident based on what science has told us and our everyday experiences do as well.

Our everyday experiences can be the starting blocks for inquiry, but armchair theorizing can't bring about the ultimate truths of the universe.


Learn to trim your sail, not curse the wind. -Epictetus

Linguam latinam est molestiae et ambitiosior
     Thread Starter
 

2/03/2016 6:57 pm  #10


Re: Thomistic Natural Law

darthbarracuda wrote:

But I contend that we can transcend this crude, biological system and realize that it is quite restricting and flawed, and make new values.

You're welcome to contend that. It might be crude or flawed. Any ethical system should be restricting. I don't think we can make sense of the idea of "making new values" until we have an alternative ethical system in place, though.

 

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