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2/03/2016 11:39 pm  #21


Re: Thomistic Natural Law

iwpoe wrote:

Greg wrote:

Actually, in the domain  of practice, the principle you are suggesting seems to contradict itself. For the possibilities for human action are radically open-ended. I could devote my life to studying philosophy or devote my life to studying biology. On a natural law account, both of those contribute to my flourrishing. But it's not the case that they both morally ought to be done, for it's not the case that I can do both.

I'm not sure re the more general idea, but I think this is wrong. Were it possible that I could both practice medicine and study philosophy and practice law and be a businessman and ... (adequately) then I ought to do those things.

The principle was: 'Were it possible that X could be done, then X should be done.'

Suppose X is "devoting one's life to medicine" and Y is "devoting one's life to philosophy". X and Y are both possible. By the principle, X should be done and Y should be done. Thus X and Y should be done. (I find that inference plausible, at least.) But X and Y are not jointly possible. (I mean "devoting" to have this sense.) Since ought implies can, this means it's not the case that I should do both X and Y. But we also said X and Y should be done. That is a contradiction.


I don't think this is true either: "Were it possible that I could both practice medicine and study philosophy and practice law and be a businessman and ... (adequately) then I ought to do those things." We can drop the special sense of "devoting" for something like this. But still, the combination of good pursuits here is incompatible with pursuing some other combination of good pursuits, and it's not the case that I ought to do both sets of good things, because I can't.

 

2/03/2016 11:48 pm  #22


Re: Thomistic Natural Law

I've never understood devotion to a calling to be literal: it's not that I am giving my life to X in principle, it's that I can over the course of my life only do X and not other callings adequately. If I could learn faster, had more time, etc. then I would think that in principle it would be better that I have more abilities and actualize more goods, etc.

I suppose then that I don't understand "devotion to a calling" as such to be a good or at least I understand it as some merely subordinate instrumental good.

Greg wrote:

But still, the combination of good pursuits here is incompatible with pursuing some other combination of good pursuits, and it's not the case that I ought to do both sets of good things, because I can't.

But the question was about whether hypothetically all goods should be actualized, not whther they can be so. Unless you just mean that, in priciple it's logically impossible to be both a philosopher and a doctor, which I simply disagreed with, as per above.


Fighting to the death "the noonday demon" of Acedia.
My Books
It is precisely “values” that are the powerless and threadbare mask of the objectification of beings, an objectification that has become flat and devoid of background. No one dies for mere values.
~Martin Heidegger
 

2/03/2016 11:52 pm  #23


Re: Thomistic Natural Law

Hi darthbarracuda, thanks for the reply.

darthbarracuda wrote:

I think causation is a useful tool for analysis of structures on a certain scale and environment, such as the scale and environment we live in today. So far in my life, I haven't had anything crazy happen that couldn't be explained by some kind of causation, which I take to be either two or more particulars coming into contact or influencing each other via fields. Without any general structure of causation on the scale we live at, it'd be chaos. Outside of our little bubble, who knows?

What would you mean by 'scale' and 'environment'? You then move on to say that you hadn't had anything crazy happen that couldn't be explained by some kind of causation. But that's the thing I'm asking you, what exactly explanatory role does causation have, how does it explain anything, without a metaphysical thesis? Causation is a metaphysical thesis, not a scientific one. Science depends on a theory of causation and thus it is a bit more fundamental here. You move on to mention that causation to be either two or more particulars coming into contact via fields. Here you espouse on some form of causation, but this needs more expansion. You then proceed that without any 'general structure'(which I don't know what it means), it'd be chaos and then outside of our 'little bubble'. . .who knows?' 

I admit, I do not know what you're trying to insinuate by the last statements at all. You have to expand on them, much much more than just this. I suppose you're already committed to denying Direct Realism. If so, which theory of perception do you ascribe to, or are most lenient towards?


darthbarracuda wrote:

By power, do you mean like disposition? So like the structure of a hydrogen atom (the properties of a hydrogen atom) and the structure of an oxygen atom allow the creation of a water molecule. In which case...this is fairly self-evident based on what science has told us and our everyday experiences do as well.

Saying it fairly self-evident does not amount to a free metaphysical ticket of explanation. I'll take the position to say that science, without a metaphysical substratum fails to tell us anything. All theories in science rest on further, much deeper metaphysical assumptions. And then the debate becomes suddenly metaphysical. In short, if you're going that science says 'this' I hope you are prepared to argue the metaphysical suppositions that you argue along with it.

The rock falls from the hill. No one ignores that many things cause it to fall, and gravity is at work indeed, but it cannot be efficacious on things that have no weight. The weight is what causes the rock to fall, not it's height, nor its length, and it is this property at play. I do not see how this is 'unscientific,' I see this as a highly bold and concise thesis. There is nothing unscientific in going this far. If you admit that this is self-evident, what problem do you find it with it? Because this is in essence Formal and Final causation. 

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/dispositions/

http://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2009/09/teleology-revisited.html

But given you are an anti-Realist, as you have said, my question now becomes(as it stood before), how do you declare any theory to be scientific/unscientific? You've said the Thomistic account is unscientific, this works as a fine tool for polemic. However, I hope the polemic is dropped, and you give an account of what counts as 'scientific' and what doesn't.


darthbarracuda wrote:

Our everyday experiences can be the starting blocks for inquiry, but armchair theorizing can't bring about the ultimate truths of the universe.

Why do you think this? More needs to be said here. My major question was missed out though. As an anti-Realist, how do you deal with ontological commitments?

 

2/04/2016 1:31 am  #24


Re: Thomistic Natural Law

iwpoe wrote:

But the question was about whether hypothetically all goods should be actualized, not whther they can be so. Unless you just mean that, in priciple it's logically impossible to be both a philosopher and a doctor, which I simply disagreed with, as per above.

The original construction was this: 'Were it possible that X could be done, then X should be done.' If this holds, it holds for all relevant action descriptions. (The relevant ones are those that contribute to the agent's good, correct?)

So if there are two courses of action that both contribute to the agent's good but cannot both be pursued, the principle implies that each should be done, so that both should be done. It seems to me that there are at least two courses of action that are good but cannot both be pursued.

One way to argue for this would be to consider actions that are "conjunctions" of everything some virtuous agent does. The action then "takes up" the agent's life, and it's not possible for him to choose a radically different (though still virtuous) plan for his life without forgoing the first. So both are possible but it's not the case that both can be realized.

 

2/04/2016 2:01 am  #25


Re: Thomistic Natural Law

Greg wrote:

The original construction was this: 'Were it possible that X could be done, then X should be done.' If this holds, it holds for all relevant action descriptions. (The relevant ones are those that contribute to the agent's good, correct?)

Oh, okay, I see. No I think I was thinking about X in terms of states of affairs and wasn't clear about it.

My idea was this:

If it were practically possible you could actualize two states of affairs: state A has 2 goods and state B 4. State B is the one you should prefer to actualize, even if in fact it's only ever possible to actualize A.

Thus if it's good to be a philosopher and good to be a doctor my thought is that ultimately it would always be more good in principle to be both a philosopher and a doctor provided that's not logically contradictory. Practically, you will only ever be one or the other, but it's better to be both.

Greg wrote:

One way to argue for this would be to consider actions that are "conjunctions" of everything some virtuous agent does. The action then "takes up" the agent's life, and it's not possible for him to choose a radically different (though still virtuous) plan for his life without forgoing the first. So both are possible but it's not the case that both can be realized.

Yeah, I don't think we disagree on the point. I think I asked the original question poorly.


Fighting to the death "the noonday demon" of Acedia.
My Books
It is precisely “values” that are the powerless and threadbare mask of the objectification of beings, an objectification that has become flat and devoid of background. No one dies for mere values.
~Martin Heidegger
 

2/04/2016 10:02 am  #26


Re: Thomistic Natural Law

iwpoe wrote:

Greg wrote:

The original construction was this: 'Were it possible that X could be done, then X should be done.' If this holds, it holds for all relevant action descriptions. (The relevant ones are those that contribute to the agent's good, correct?)

Oh, okay, I see. No I think I was thinking about X in terms of states of affairs and wasn't clear about it.

Ah, I see.

iwpoe wrote:

My idea was this:

If it were practically possible you could actualize two states of affairs: state A has 2 goods and state B 4. State B is the one you should prefer to actualize, even if in fact it's only ever possible to actualize A.

Thus if it's good to be a philosopher and good to be a doctor my thought is that ultimately it would always be more good in principle to be both a philosopher and a doctor provided that's not logically contradictory. Practically, you will only ever be one or the other, but it's better to be both.

I do think that if some obtainable good "contains" some other good, then the former is always preferable to the latter.

The new natural lawyers are very interested in the incommensurability of goods. So they hold that containment is the only objective ordering of goods prior to choice. These problems clearly arise with counting goods. If A has 2 goods and B has 4 goods, should I necessarily pursue B, if it is possible? I think that on any natural law theory this isn't necessarily decided by the number of goods (and "goods" might not be a count noun, like "things" is not a count noun without qualification). The new natural lawyers make the even stronger claim that it is senseless to attempt to compare the values of goods prior to choice.

It's often difficult to figure out what classical natural lawyers think about incommensurability. Some (Oderberg and Stephen Brock, for instance) endorse it but find it consistent with there being a hierarchy of goods (certain goods, like life and contemplation, are better than others, even if you cannot "commensurate" goods). Others (Robert Koons, I think) reject incommensurability. I don't think Feser has ever said anything about the issue. I tend to lean toward the Oderberg-Brock side.

 

2/04/2016 5:15 pm  #27


Re: Thomistic Natural Law

iwpoe wrote:

darthbarracuda wrote:

Perhaps it is troublesome, though, to call one's ethical theory natural law, then, if one isn't implying that there is any kind of justice applied.

There are an infinite number of reasons why a moral imperative might not become a political one. The most usual one is resources. How, for instance, would it even be possible to police all lies?

Perhaps if you're omniscient and omnipotent...

iwpoe wrote:

If health is not normative in character- if it is not a concept of the proper function of the body, or mind, or what have you -then what is it? Your general talk about it does very much seem to be a preference account, which I think is absurd, but I want you to commit to some view or another before I bother to criticize it.

Health is an adjective we use to describe a state of being that many of us commonly share a desire to want to be. I am skeptical of any "oughts" at all.


Learn to trim your sail, not curse the wind. -Epictetus

Linguam latinam est molestiae et ambitiosior
     Thread Starter
 

2/04/2016 5:25 pm  #28


Re: Thomistic Natural Law

darthbarracuda wrote:

Perhaps if you're omniscient and omnipotent...

Which the state isn't? You do understand that religious people don't think themselves God, correct?

darthbarracuda wrote:

Health is an adjective we use to describe a state of being that many of us commonly share a desire to want to be.

Health itself, not the mere word. 'Blue' and 'circular' are also adjectives...

Anyway, what sort of "state of being"? Just any state or a particular one?

darthbarracuda wrote:

I am skeptical of any "oughts" at all.

No you're not, or you'd be unable to even argue. You're simply skeptical of anything that would contradict your secular intuitions. That is to say, this is a mere matter of political correctness for you, which is consistent with those areas upon which you've placed an emphasis.

A man who would bother to haurang a classical forum about gay marriage is skeptical of oughts....

Last edited by iwpoe (2/04/2016 6:29 pm)


Fighting to the death "the noonday demon" of Acedia.
My Books
It is precisely “values” that are the powerless and threadbare mask of the objectification of beings, an objectification that has become flat and devoid of background. No one dies for mere values.
~Martin Heidegger
 

2/04/2016 6:36 pm  #29


Re: Thomistic Natural Law

iwpoe wrote:

darthbarracuda wrote:

Perhaps if you're omniscient and omnipotent...

Which the state isn't? You do understand that religious people don't think themselves God, correct?

I understand this, and yet you see religious people condemning homosexuals, for example, for sodomy, or religious people picketing abortion clinics.

If natural law is such an important thing to follow, one would think that god would make a little more effort in laying down exactly what laws are what.

iwpoe wrote:

darthbarracuda wrote:

Health is an adjective we use to describe a state of being that many of us commonly share a desire to want to be.

Health itself, not the mere word. 'Blue' and 'circular' are also adjectives...

I do not think there is a property of "health". There are properties of a liver functioning "normally" with a certain pH and what have you, and a nervous system operating "normally" without "excessive" neurotransmitters and what have you which lead you to feel happy and desire to stay in this state of being. But someone can lose a kidney and still be "healthy". Someone can be paralyzed and still be "healthy" even though in other definitions we might say they aren't "healthy" because they can't walk or operate "properly". All of these adjectives are placed within quotations marks because they are referencing the majority, the ones who survived. This does not mean it is moral. If we were on a desert island filled with paraplegics, it may be that we would be the ones who would be outside of the norm.

Simply because it is the norm, simply because it has worked in the past and helped people survive, does not make it moral.

iwpoe wrote:

darthbarracuda wrote:

I am skeptical of any "oughts" at all.

No you're not, or you'd be unable to even argue. You're simply skeptical of anything that would contradict your secular intuitions.

Do not put words in my mouth.
 


Learn to trim your sail, not curse the wind. -Epictetus

Linguam latinam est molestiae et ambitiosior
     Thread Starter
 

2/04/2016 8:20 pm  #30


Re: Thomistic Natural Law

darthbarracuda wrote:

I understand this, and yet you see religious people condemning homosexuals, for example, for sodomy, or religious people picketing abortion clinics.

So? While I don't necessarily agree with the political value of either fight, it is entirely understandable why one might conclude abortion a grave moral failure (indeed considering the gravity of abortion if they're right, picketing is a rather civil and upstanding response) and while less obvious I agree with Roger Scruton that the traditional prohibition against homosexuality has been dismissed in a foolish and jejune way on the back of typical and equally foolish modern ideas about how to conduct one's life- as if it were just obvious that we should encourage others to act in any way they might be inclined sexually.

darthbarracuda wrote:

If natural law is such an important thing to follow, one would think that god would make a little more effort in laying down exactly what laws are what.

Whether you think the core aspects of natural law obscure- and I don't think they are -it's by no means obvious that they even require special effort on the part of God to be known. That is, natural law is not ecclesiastical law: is not revealed.

darthbarracuda wrote:

I do not think there is a property of "health".

Then it manifestly couldn't be a state of being as you claimed it was.

darthbarracuda wrote:

There are properties of a liver functioning "normally" with a certain pH and what have you, and a nervous system operating "normally" without "excessive" neurotransmitters and what have you which lead you to feel happy and desire to stay in this state of being. But someone can lose a kidney and still be "healthy". Someone can be paralyzed and still be "healthy" even though in other definitions we might say they aren't "healthy" because they can't walk or operate "properly". All of these adjectives are placed within quotations marks because they are referencing the majority, the ones who survived. This does not mean it is moral. If we were on a desert island filled with paraplegics, it may be that we would be the ones who would be outside of the norm.

One, go review the argument I made and see whether or not I claim that health is moral. Although I do consider health constitutive of human flourishing, ill health is not a moral failure, so it is a normative failure.

Two, what you mean by the word normal manifestly will not adequately account for notions of health. You are supposing a strictly quantitative notion of normal when you talk about health. This would be as if to pretend that in a population where everyone has cancer, cancer is normal, and therefore healthy. You are relying upon an ambiguity in the word normal to make your account sound plausible. It is however entirely implausible and fails to make sense of anything like medicine.

darthbarracuda wrote:

Simply because it is the norm, simply because it has worked in the past and helped people survive, does not make it moral.

Good thing nobody is making that argument.

darthbarracuda wrote:

Do not put words in my mouth

Why? *Oughtn't* I do so?

Last edited by iwpoe (2/04/2016 9:13 pm)


Fighting to the death "the noonday demon" of Acedia.
My Books
It is precisely “values” that are the powerless and threadbare mask of the objectification of beings, an objectification that has become flat and devoid of background. No one dies for mere values.
~Martin Heidegger
 

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