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2/20/2016 11:34 pm  #41


Re: The Abortion issue.

Mattman wrote:

I think what I'm having an issue with is when/how we know when something is deliberate, directly intended. As you said-- Whether and when such defense can involve accidental and/or deliberate killing -- that's the issue.

I would say: There are hard cases, but there are also other cases where the application of these concepts is less vague.

An action is specified (given its object) by its end, what it aims to do. But the means are really a series of proximate ends, so this means that an action is specified also by its means.

It might have effects that are not part of the means. Some effects are intended; others are merely foreseen side effects; others are not even foreseen. The way this is usually spoken of is by noting that actions are intentional under some descriptions but not others. There are some risks associated with this way of talking, since it might suggest (falsely) that I just intend what I tell myself I am doing, or that what I intend/do depends directly on my linguistic competency. It's more of a heuristic that helps one see the the intentional structure of actions and the role that intentions play in moral specification of actions.

Usually it's clear what's intended vs. merely foreseen vs. not even foreseen.

Scott recommends Jensen's book, and I would second that recommendation. He gives a somewhat more fine-grained analysis that one can try to apply to hard cases.

Acting intentionally starts with deliberation; one has an end and uses one's knowledge about the causal structure of the world to determine what means are adequate to the end. When one acts on one's intention, one is aiming to introduce new forms (changes) into a certain matter. When removing a cancerous uterus, one is not even acting on the child, though one foresees that it will die, so the means are only proportionate to the end if the end is saving the mother's life (and not merely attaining some convenience). In craniotomy (or whatever form of cutting or crushing), the matter you are acting on is the child, and it's clear what form you are seeking to impose in it.

Grisez and George think that you might merely intend to resize the child's cranium. You need not intend to harm or kill the child. Indeed, if the child were to survive (by some natural impossibility), you would be rejoice.* Specifically that the child die is not part of your means, they claim.

On the contrary, I think the operation requires killing the child. The question isn't one of which action descriptions one is really happy about. It's rather one of what form or change one is aiming to impose in the child. That one intends to kill the child is manifest from the fact that a doctor performing the operation plans to remove a dead child (or parts of one) from the womb. He must "make the child dead" (by crushing its skull) in order to do this, because he begins acting on one "matter" (the child) and finishes acting on a different matter (the dead child, flesh and bones).

*I conclude by noting that appeals to such counterfactuals cannot be sufficient. For otherwise, the criterion is much to permissive. Suppose that someone kills his uncle in order to get the insurance money. Perhaps it is true that he "regrets" killing the uncle and would rejoice if (per impossibile) after getting the money, his uncle turned out okay; he cannot sculpt his intention in light of that fact. Moreover, to say that one does not intend death or at least harm in the craniotomy etc. cases would be like the life insurance fraud noting that he only intended that his uncle look dead.

 

2/21/2016 6:49 pm  #42


Re: The Abortion issue.

" In craniotomy (or whatever form of cutting or crushing), the matter you are acting on is the child, and it's clear what form you are seeking to impose in it."

I agree, that these procedures do kill the child. I still think that they are justifiable though. It seems to me to be intuitively true that it is better to save the mom than to let them both die.

I'm thinking what I actually have a problem with is the catholic pro life ethic- that abortion is never justifiable.

I think if the argument can be made that one can consistently be against abortion in non life threatening situations but OK with them when it is a life or death matter, i would feel much more comfortable.

I also think this becomes clear to me in the "hard" cases of intended/direct. I would not be able to support the idea that a woman who is carrying a severly infected child at 8 weeks could not have it sucked out to save her life. I mean, I'm understanding that the cancerous uterus if different in ways that u mention. I can see that now. But even so, in these other situations I would hope that there are strong arguments that an abortion would be permitted.

     Thread Starter
 

2/21/2016 6:55 pm  #43


Re: The Abortion issue.

Or maybe I'm confusing the issue in terms of morality and liberty.

Im not sure that I can say that crushing a babies skull to get it out is moral-- ever. It's horrible. But I still think she should have the liberty to do it. Especially if she was doing it to herself.

     Thread Starter
 

2/21/2016 7:01 pm  #44


Re: The Abortion issue.

Mattman wrote:

I agree, that these procedures do kill the child. I still think that they are justifiable though. It seems to me to be intuitively true that it is better to save the mom than to let them both die.

Well, that might be your intuition, but ethics is not merely a matter of fitting theory to preexisting intuitions. The theory should have some critical power.

I can see why you would have that intuition. But then the question is what licenses it. I don't think it's generally defensible (or intuitive) that intentional killing of the innocent is permissible when enough (or the relevant) lives are at stake. So why in this case?

 

2/21/2016 7:02 pm  #45


Re: The Abortion issue.

Mattman wrote:

I'm thinking what I actually have a problem with is the catholic pro life ethic- that abortion is never justifiable.

Well if we accept that said fetus is a person then abortion cannot be permissible in the direct sense any more than the killing of an innocent can be. In the cases were we act to minimize damage as in the one you mention I'd still say we can appeal to some Principle of Intention to justify our undertaking an operation which leads to the child's death in order to save the mother (this is on the assumption the child is doomed anyway - if it's a case of the child or the mother then other primary issues may come into play).

There's that issue of the ACPQ I mentioned. At least a couple of the articles within are relevant to our conversation 

American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 89 > Issue: 3

Mattman wrote:

Or maybe I'm confusing the issue in terms of morality and liberty.

Im not sure that I can say that crushing a babies skull to get it out is moral-- ever. It's horrible. But I still think she should have the liberty to do it. Especially if she was doing it to herself.

Why so? If we admit it's never moral then why should she have the liberty to do so and not, say, the liberty of putting a bullet in a passer-by's skull? It seems if we admit the immorality then we de facto lose the case.

Last edited by DanielCC (2/21/2016 7:06 pm)

 

2/21/2016 7:47 pm  #46


Re: The Abortion issue.

Mattman wrote:

I'm thinking what I actually have a problem with is the catholic pro life ethic- that abortion is never justifiable.

I do too, but I'm willing to admit that the consequences of my rejection of the view are going to be reprehensible to most moral intuitions. Even the best alternatives to life as the limit (higher cognition captures a lot of what people want as a limit on killing) are likely to be able to permit infanticide and the killing of the disabled.

Your own view is even more troubling to average moral intuitions, because it's a expedient view of some sort: you basically think that if the stakes are high enough for my life I should be able to kill people.

I'm willing to bite a lot of bullets to deal with an alternative moral theory, but I'm not sure that you are.

Last edited by iwpoe (2/21/2016 7:47 pm)


Fighting to the death "the noonday demon" of Acedia.
My Books
It is precisely “values” that are the powerless and threadbare mask of the objectification of beings, an objectification that has become flat and devoid of background. No one dies for mere values.
~Martin Heidegger
 

2/21/2016 8:10 pm  #47


Re: The Abortion issue.

@dan

"In the cases were we act to minimize damage as in the one you mention I'd still say we can appeal to some Principle of Intention to justify our undertaking an operation which leads to the child's death in order to save the mother (this is on the assumption the child is doomed anyway - if it's a case of the child or the mother then other primary issues may come into play)."

Ok, I agree with this. But I would call this "abortion to the life of the mother". The case that I mentioned that you agree a termintion would probably be ok would in fact be an abortion. A suctioning out of the fetus in the uterus is an abortion, full stop. so that's why I say abortion can not be said straight off the bat to ALWAYS be wrong.

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2/21/2016 8:28 pm  #48


Re: The Abortion issue.

Also, I'm not quite sure what you focus on the special cases is even motivated by. You are aware that in the United States the vast majority of abortions are fully elective and motivated by things like money and personal preference, not life and death of the mother? The political side that aims to always preserve "life of the mother" exceptions for abortion is not doing so out of genuine medical concern, but in the event of new abortion laws merely aims to do the same sort of things that happen in parts of Europe, where a woman can claim psychological stress as a "threat to her life", and essentially get abortions elective anyway.

Even if I accept, for the sake of argument, that something is at least intuitively wrong with the pro-life treatment of the special cases you mention, that doesn't seem troubling for the pro-life view in general, which seeks to stop the vast majority of abortions which occur as a matter of caprice. I'm not sure why I should think that your moral intuition against the pro-life view at best doesn't indicate some lack of nuance (metaphydically or practically) in application in these particular weird cases rather than a general logical error in the argument, which you have no respect demonstrated.

If you look at Scott's argument, all you basically done is rejected premise 1. You don't need to focus on these odd cases to reject that premise.

Last edited by iwpoe (2/21/2016 8:31 pm)


Fighting to the death "the noonday demon" of Acedia.
My Books
It is precisely “values” that are the powerless and threadbare mask of the objectification of beings, an objectification that has become flat and devoid of background. No one dies for mere values.
~Martin Heidegger
 

2/21/2016 8:48 pm  #49


Re: The Abortion issue.

iwpoe wrote:

Also, I'm not quite sure what you focus on the special cases is even motivated by. You are aware that in the United States the vast majority of abortions are fully elective and motivated by things like money and personal preference, not life and death of the mother? The political side that aims to always preserve "life of the mother" exceptions for abortion is not doing so out of genuine medical concern, but in the event of new abortion laws merely aims to do the same sort of things that happen in parts of Europe, where a woman can claim psychological stress as a "threat to her life", and essentially get abortions elective anyway.

Even if I accept, for the sake of argument, that something is at least intuitively wrong with the pro-life treatment of the special cases you mention, that doesn't seem troubling for the pro-life view in general, which seeks to stop the vast majority of abortions which occur as a matter of caprice. I'm not sure why I should think that your moral intuition against the pro-life view at best doesn't indicate some lack of nuance (metaphydically or practically) in application in these particular weird cases rather than a general logical error in the argument, which you have no respect demonstrated.

If you look at Scott's argument, all you basically done is rejected premise 1. You don't need to focus on these odd cases to reject that premise.

I am against abortion for elective reasons. Was just having trouble with the absolutist view and how it relates to the actual reality of severe situations. I don't see how someone can say- " I am against all abortions- even when it is to save the life of mom, but if she has a d&c due to medical necessity, that seems to be OK." This is just another way of saying you aren't absolutely against abortion.

But I was wondering.. Are you familiar with both the potentiality argument and substance view arguments against abortion. If so, do you know which one you find more persuasive?

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2/21/2016 9:27 pm  #50


Re: The Abortion issue.

Mattman wrote:

Are you familiar with both the potentiality argument and substance view arguments against abortion. If so, do you know which one you find more persuasive?

I have never found the potentiality argument against abortion persuasive. I do not think that you are a potential person; I think you are an actual person. Likewise I think that fetuses and even the conceptus are actual persons.

However that may have to do with differing conceptions of personhood. See these two posts by Bill Vallicella. If one holds with most post-Lockeans that personhood is a forensic concept that depends primarily on occurrent psychological ability, then it probably turns out that even infants are not persons. Thus one might want to argue against the killing of infants because they are potential persons. And thus one might hold with Don Marquis and Vallicella that there is no morally relevant difference between fetuses and infants; they are both non-persons but potential persons.

I think there are difficulties with psychological accounts of personhood of that sort. In particular, I think they preclude use of "person" as a substance concept; that is, if it's right that personhood is a matter of certain occurrent psychological traits, then when you persist, it is not as a person. For it seems that you were once an infant and once a fetus, but if your diachronic identity depends on psychological conditions this is impossible.

I think "person" is a substance concept, that someone who is a person is and remains who he is by virtue of being a person, in particular by being a substance of rational nature. This is a "psychological" criterion in one sense, but it does not require an occurrent psychological ability; one need not be able to do math or speak any language right now in order to be a person.

 

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