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AKG wrote:
If there can exist immaterial concrete objects then how come in modern day platonism they are immaterial but abstract and thus acasual. I'm primarily focused on platonism because for me people like Frege have shown that philosophy can tell us that the immaterial exist such as in the form of abstract objects, and if this is established then for I think that philosophy can also tell about the existence of other immaterial things such as God, but the abstract/concrete immaterial distinction is something I'm having trouble understanding as at what point does philosophy tell that this immaterial object is abstract/concrete?
Because immaterial concreta are by definition particulars (as opposed to universals). It would be more helpful for you to look at the abstract/concrete divide in terms of universals, with abstracta being one variant on the transcendent universal.
As to the last question ('at what point does philosophy tell that this immaterial object is abstract/concrete?') it depends on the proofs for said entity e.g. cosmological arguments point to a being which is not material and posses casual powers (what is omnipotence if not possession of casual powers) ergo said being is concrete. Likewise for proofs of the Mind's immateriality.
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AKG wrote:
@Timocrates,
So are you saying that if philosophy can already establish the existence of one immaterial thing(abstract objects) then it can also establish the existence of others(God) and the abstract/concrete distinction depends on what situation the existence of the immaterial is in.
Well, I would think philosophy can investigate the possibility of the existence of immaterial things or beings; that being established (that there is nothing impossible about them), it may then inquire whether or not such things really do or can exist, and whether or not they are in any sense necessary and, if so, in what way or to what extent.