KevinScharp wrote:

On Aquinas' Five Ways
5. Design

I've already talked a bit about fine tuning. Are the people on this forum interested in discussing other kinds of design arguments?

Sure. Modern design arguments are considerably different from classical (scholastic) design arguments and decisively weaker.

Can you give your opinion on the following one? http://philosophy.lander.edu/intro/governance.shtml Point I. C

I don't know if I'll get to writing a comprehensive rebuttal on every one of your points but I do need to respond to this.

KevinScharp wrote:

I don't know what you mean that the laws don't make reference to concrete physical objects -- that's just false on the most obvious interpretation. The standard model of particle physics refers to all kinds of physical objects.

According to the Standard Model, all that we are allowed to say about the electron is that it is a group element of the unitary symmetry group SU(3) × SU(2) × U(1). But as for the ultimate ontological status of electrons, one can view them as miniature black holes (as John Archibald Wheeler did) or as a vibrating string (as Brian Greene does) or even as one single electron going back and forth in time throughout the universe (as Richard Feynman once entertained) and be equally consistent, but all of these go beyond the standard model. There is absolutely nothing in the standard model that demands the assignment of a concrete physical object to any of its particles. Concrete physical objects are just as absent in the standard model as causality is in F = ma.

However, we know that it's stupid to entertain that all of the particles are just abstract group elements, because abstract objects require concrete objects to instantiate them. So even though the standard model can be formulated in terms of abstract group elements, it's obvious that the reader is supposed to understand that they're referring to concrete physical objects, and that these abstract group elements do have some ultimate correspondence to physical objects (even if the precise nature of their ultimate ontological status has been debated among Wheeler, Greene, and Feynman, to give three previously named examples). Likewise, even though causality isn't a variable in kinematic equations such as F = ma, it is understood that kinematics is meant to describe the evolution of motion given a cause supplied.
 

Last edited by Tomislav Ostojich (5/03/2016 5:32 pm)

Alexander wrote:

I will add that your concern about self-moving things from interesting areas of physics is one I share, and the reason I don't like the first way as much as the second, fourth, fifth (in some interpretations), and the argument from De Ente et Essentia. I do think the concern could be overcome with a more rigorously metaphysical interpretation of the first way, but I suspect that this interpretation essentially collapses the argument into the second way.

Ah, I'm glad that's a point of agreement. I also had the same suspicion about tightening up the first way. If that's right, do you think then that the first way is just a species of the second?

DanielCC wrote:

Point III coupled with Kevin's earlier remark on the Fine Tuning Argument to the effect that 'it would have to be the case that God WOULD create the universe.' is more interesting. Are you saying that God must have a reason to actualise exactly this world (here I'm using the possible world sense) over any other - in which case we have modal collapse problems anyway - and that us theists need to show you what that reason is*? Or are you going for a weaker claim as in God must have a reason to create this kind of universe (used in the non-possible world sense) and that us theists should show you what that reason is*?

* In both cases why should not it be sufficient to claim that there is a reason even if we don't have access to it?
 

On what basis can one claim that if God were to exist, that God would have a reason to finely tune a universe for life, and the probability of God deciding to do this would be greater than the probability of the fine tuning occurring by some other means?

You go on to say that for all we know God could have equally good reason not to fine tune a universe. Indeed God might not have any reason to create anything at all (perhaps a perfect being would have no desire to create anything), making the probability less than the other options. So what makes God having a reason not to fine tune the universe any less improbable than the fine tuning occurring by chance?

Tomislav Ostojich wrote:

I don't know if I'll get to writing a comprehensive rebuttal on every one of your points but I do need to respond to this.

KevinScharp wrote:

I don't know what you mean that the laws don't make reference to concrete physical objects -- that's just false on the most obvious interpretation. The standard model of particle physics refers to all kinds of physical objects.

According to the Standard Model, all that we are allowed to say about the electron is that it is a group element of the unitary symmetry group SU(3) × SU(2) × U(1). But as for the ultimate ontological status of electrons, one can view them as miniature black holes (as John Archibald Wheeler did) or as a vibrating string (as Brian Greene does) or even as one single electron going back and forth in time throughout the universe (as Richard Feynman once entertained) and be equally consistent, but all of these go beyond the standard model. There is absolutely nothing in the standard model that demands the assignment of a concrete physical object to any of its particles. Concrete physical objects are just as absent in the standard model as causality is in F = ma. 

Well, this a strong response -- I like that. It probably sounds pretty impressive to people who don't know anything about it, so kudos for that. Unfortunately, it isn't right.

For those who need some background:

Standard Model
The standard model of particle physics acknowledges four fundamental forces that govern the development of physical systems: gravity, electromagnetism, the weak force (responsible for radioactive decay), and the strong force (responsible for holding atomic nuclei together).  The standard model offers a unified theory of the latter three forces.  It also posits twenty-four types of fundamental particles: six types of quarks (up down, strange, charmed, top and bottom), six types of leptons (electron, electron neutrino, muon, muon neutrino, tau, and tau neutrino), twelve types of bosons (photon, three kinds of weak bosons, and eight kinds of strong bosons—gluons), and all their antiparticles.
 
The standard model is complex combination of three separate gauge theories: one for the electromagnetic force (quantum electrodynamics), one for the strong force (quantum chromodynamics), and one for the weak force.  Quantum electrodynamics is based on the symmetry group U(1), quantum chromodynamics is based on the symmetry group SU(3), and the theory of the weak force is based on the symmetry group SU(2).  U(1) is the group comprised of all the points 1 unit from the origin in the complex plane together with complex multiplication.  SU(2) is the group of all 2x2 unitary matrices with determinate 1 together with matrix multiplication.  SU(3) is the group of all 3x3 unitary matrices with determinate 1 together with matrix multiplication. 
 
There is a difference between mathematical theories and scientific theories. Often scientific theories use mathematical theories in all sorts of ways. But they are different. For example, mathematical theories make no predictions about the universe at all. However, scientific theories do make predictions. And good scientific theories make predictions we can test. The standard model is a scientific theory and as such it makes predictions -- for example it predicts the Higgs boson which was found not long ago. However the symmetry groups that are the basis for the standard model are mathematical theories -- they make no predictions at all. So, your claim that the symmetry groups are the entirety of the standard model is obviously wrong. In addition to the symmetry groups, the standard model specifies classes of particles (e.g., electrons are leptons), it links these classes to the symmetry groups, and it specifies all sorts of measurable properties for these particles (e.g., the standard model predicts a certain mass for the Z boson, and that prediction was confirmed experimentally).

Your presentation has two blatant errors as well. The unitary symmetry group is U(1) alone, not the product of the three as you state. Also, electrons are not elements of any symmetry group. The elements of U(1) are points, the elements of S(2) are matrices and the elements of S(3) are matrices as well. None of these are electrons.

Tomislav Ostojich wrote:

However, we know that it's stupid to entertain that all of the particles are just abstract group elements, because abstract objects require concrete objects to instantiate them. So even though the standard model can be formulated in terms of abstract group elements, it's obvious that the reader is supposed to understand that they're referring to concrete physical objects, and that these abstract group elements do have some ultimate correspondence to physical objects (even if the precise nature of their ultimate ontological status has been debated among Wheeler, Greene, and Feynman, to give three previously named examples). Likewise, even though causality isn't a variable in kinematic equations such as F = ma, it is understood that kinematics is meant to describe the evolution of motion given a cause supplied.
 

Abstract objects require concrete objects to instantiate them? Why would you think that? The rest of this is based on your misunderstanding of the standard model and should be cleared up now.