John West wrote:

You see, I have no idea how to square this explanation with divine simplicity. 

Aquinas often says that God is "omnino simplex," "entirely simple." He seeks to square that doctrine with the doctrine of the Trinity by defining "simple" as "lacking parts," as not being composite. So within God Aquinas says that there are real distinctions, not mere distinctions in name or "de ratione." But distinctions are not parts. Lack of composition is not lack of distinction. So God is entirely simple because He consists of no parts, and is really Triune because He has three real distinctions, such that properties of one distinction or "person" are not predicated of the other two.

I think the question is, if some x has real internal distinctions, does it have parts? I suspect the answer will depend on how one defines terms, and that will depend on other commitments one has made.

Last edited by ficino (9/28/2018 8:35 am)

John West wrote:

Very quickly: What does “is” mean here? It's obviously not the “is” of predication. Is it the “is” of identity? The first part of the quote and your comment about the paternity property, the common essence, and strict identity at the start of your post both suggest it is, but then the logical problem of the Trinity is back. (I won't insult you by showing how the transitivity of identity yields that subsistent paternity both is and isn't identical to subsistent filiation, subsistent procession both is and isn't identical to subsistent filiation, and so on.)

St. Thomas replies to the transitivity objection in ST I, q. 28, a. 3, ad 1. Very briefly, the identity of two things which are in turn identical to a third holds only if the latter identities are both in reality (secundum rem) and conceptually (secundum rationem). Since each Person is the same as the essence in reality but not conceptually, then the Persons can be really distinct from one another.

After writing the above, I found Dale Tuggy's "History of trinitarian doctrines" supplement to his article "Trinity" in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, where he provides an almost identical summary of Aquinas' answer to the transitivity objection:

Dale Tuggy wrote:

But how may these relations be, constitute, or somehow give rise to three divine hypostaseis when each just is the divine essence? For if each is the divine essence, won't it follow that each just is (i.e. is identical to) both of the others as well? Aquinas holds that it does not follow—that would amount to modalism, not orthodox trinitarianism. To show why it doesn't follow, he distinguishes between identitas secundum rem et rationem (sameness of thing and of concepts) and mere identitas secundum rem (sameness of thing). To the preceding objection, then, Aquinas says that the alleged consequence would follow only if the persons were the same both in thing and in concept. But they are not; they are merely the same thing.

For reference, I will quote most of ST1, q. 28, a. 3:

St. Thomas Aquinas wrote:

Whether the relations in God are really distinguished from each other?

Objection 1: It would seem that the divine relations are not really distinguished from each other. For things which are identified with the same, are identified with each other. But every relation in God is really the same as the divine essence. Therefore the relations are not really distinguished from each other.

On the contrary, Boethius says (De Trin.) that in God "the substance contains the unity; and relation multiplies the trinity." Therefore, if the relations were not really distinguished from each other, there would be no real trinity in God, but only an ideal trinity [non erit in divinis Trinitas realis, sed rationis tantum], which is the error of Sabellius.

I answer that, [...] The idea of relation, however, necessarily means regard of one to another, according as one is relatively opposed to another. So as in God there is a real relation (Article [1]), there must also be a real opposition. The very nature of relative opposition includes distinction. Hence, there must be real distinction in God, not, indeed, according to that which is absolute—namely, essence, wherein there is supreme unity and simplicity—but according to that which is relative.

Reply to Objection 1: According to the Philosopher (Phys. iii), this argument holds, that whatever things are identified with the same thing are identified with each other, if the identity be real and logical [in his quae sunt idem re et ratione]; as, for instance, a tunic and a garment; but not if they differ logically [non autem in his quae differunt ratione]. Hence in the same place he says that although action is the same as motion, and likewise passion; still it does not follow that action and passion are the same; because action implies reference as of something "from which" there is motion in the thing moved; whereas passion implies reference as of something "which is from" another. Likewise, although Paternity, just as Filiation, is really the same as [sit idem secundum rem cum] the divine essence; nevertheless these two in their own proper idea and definitions [in suis propriis rationibus] import opposite respects. Hence they are distinguished from each other.

Just to check, Fredosso's translation of objection 1 and the reply to it:

Aquinas, as translated by Fredosso, wrote:

Objection 1: It seems that the relations that exist in God are not distinct in reality from one another. For things that are the same as one and the same thing are the same as one another. But every relation that exists in God is the same in reality as God's essence. Therefore, the relations are not distinct in reality from one another.

Reply to objection 1: According to the Philosopher in Physics 3, the claim in question - viz., that things that are the same as one and the same thing are the same as one another - holds for those things that are the same both in reality and conceptually [in his quae sunt idem re et ratione], e.g., a tunic and a garment, but not for those things that differ conceptually [non autem in his quae differunt ratione]. Hence, in the same place he claims that even though [in any given case] the action is the same as the movement, and likewise for the passion, it nonetheless does not follow that the action is the same as the passion. For "action" implies the status of being that from which there is a movement in the moveable thing, whereas "passion" imples the status of being something that comes from another. Similarly, even though the Paternity and the Filiation are the same in reality as [sit idem secundum rem cum] the divine essence, nonetheless in their proper concepts [in suis propriis rationibus] they imply opposite relations. Hence, they are distinct from one another.

Fr. Garrigou-Lagrange's comment on ST I, q. 28, a. 3, ad 1 may answer the questions in your last post, if you can follow scholastispeak.

Fr. Garrigou-Lagrange wrote:

Reply to the first and second difficulties. "Those things which are equal to a third are equal to each other," I distinguish: if they are equal to the third actually and mentally and there is no mutual opposition, I concede; if they are equal to a third actually and not mentally and there exists relative opposition, I deny.

 But the divine relations are equal to a third, the divine essence, this I distinguish: they are equal actually but not mentally, and some of the relations are mutually opposed, although they are not opposed to the third, this I concede. Otherwise, I deny.

 To put it analogically, according to St. Thomas, transitive action, taken at least terminatively, and passion are really the same as movement, but they are really distinct from each other because of the opposition of relation, since action is the movement as coming from the agent and passion is the movement as received in the recipient.

Last edited by Johannes (10/02/2018 5:43 am)

Now, to be frank, I posted Aquinas' answer to the transitivity objection only for your sake, because for me the issue of transitivity of identity raised e.g. by Vallicella in his blog and by Paasch in this paper is nonexistent. As I already said, in trinitarian theology I am not in the Dominican/Thomistic line but in the Franciscan/Bonaventuran, which actually began with an Augustinian, Richard of St Victor. In this line's emanation account of the Trinity, the divine Persons are distinguished by their different ways of originating/modes of proceeding, which entail different ways of Existence/modes of Being [1].

Therefore, Vallicella's version of points 2 to 4 is incorrect, the correct version being:

- The Father is the divine essence as First and therefore begetting and spirating.
- The Son is the divine essence as Begotten and therefore spirating (RC only).
- The Holy Spirit is the divine essence as Spirated.

Thus, in both the Dominican relation-based and the Franciscan emanation-based accounts of the Trinity:

1. Each Person is absolutely simple. It is not possible to "unpack" the divine essence in reality (as opposed to as an abstraction) from the 3 modes of origin and of Being (emanation account) or the 3 relations (relation account). "The divine essence" apart from "as First"/"as Paternity", "as Begotten"/"as Filiation" or "as Spirated"/"as Procession" is not a real subject, it does not "have hypostasis" in the original meaning of the term in Greek philosophical discourse [2].

Thus, it is not valid to say just "the divine essence generates", in compliance with Lateran IV.

2. "The divine essence" in the definition of each Person is numerically the same and is a particular, not a universal [3], which answers Vallicella's objection to the version of the septad suggested by Fr. Matthew Kirby.

3. Clearly the divine essence as First/Paternity is not the divine essence as Begotten/Filiation. Therefore the Persons are really distinct from one another.

Notably, the above implies that the Trinity, i.e. the 3 Persons altogether, is also absolutely simple. This is seen more easily in the Franciscan account: provided that the First divine Person generates (and loves) a consubstantial Son, it is impossible that there not Be a Son (and a Holy Spirit).

Thus, denying the Trinity in principle  - as opposed to in fact, i.e. as a result of denying the historicity of Jesus' resurrection - amounts to telling the First divine Person, i.e. God for both trinitarians [4] and non-trinitarians: "Look, I find it wholly unacceptable that You generate a consubstantial Son!"

Reference and notes

[1] Russell L. Friedman, "Intellectual Traditions at the Medieval University: The Use of Philosophical Psychology in Trinitarian Theology among the Franciscans and Dominicans, 1250-1350", Brill, 2012. Pp. 16-21.
https://books.google.com/books?id=YhrBIzyHWmUC
https://books.google.com/books?id=uRkyAQAAQBAJ

[2] The term may have been introduced in the philosophical discourse either by the Stoic Poseidonius (c. 135 BC - c. 51 BC) according to some, or by the Epicurean Demetrius Lacon (fl. late 2nd century BC) according to others, in both cases with the meaning of objective or concrete existence or reality. Thus, real entities were said to "have hypostasis", whereas merely apparent or imaginary entities did not.

[3] Understanding {essence | substance | ousía} as a particular, two horses are not {of the same substance | consubstantial | homoousios} but {of equal substances | equisubstantial | isoousios}. The respective universal, the species, is just a mental abstraction.

[4] In the NT, "ho Theos", literally "the God", without qualification refers always to God the Father, while unarthrous "Theos", "God", without qualification refers either to God the Father or to the divine essence.

 

Last edited by Johannes (10/02/2018 6:13 am)

Johannes wrote:

2. "The divine essence" in the definition of each Person is numerically the same and is a particular, not a universal [3], which answers Vallicella's objection to the version of the septad suggested by Fr. Matthew Kirby.

The reason Vallicella does that, I assume, is that the persons, as substances, aren't instantiable by the divine essence, but the divine essence, if it's a particular, isn't multiply realizable by the persons.

You seem to want to make the persons each absolute accidents of the one divine essence (or I'm going to need you to unpack what you mean by the "as" in "the divine essence 'as' paternity"). This, along with divine simplicity, runs into the earlier problem I was worried about. (I assume that now you're backing off the claim that the paternity property is strictly identical to the common essence and moving to the claim that they're merely numerically identical and that the persons are distinguished from each other in some non-numerical way—qualitatively, perhaps.)