There would be major costs to hold to the reply that irreflexive relations can in some sense indeed occur, given that things can have disparate existence. 

What I mean to say is, so red is a foot away-from-itself, and being-a-foot-away from itself, holds always. Redness is not the same thing as a particular having a shade of red. Redness is something that is disparate, as such, red might not have irreflexive relations. Particulars that instantiate red would have relations with other particulars, "This red cup is a foot away from that red cup." I would go on to say that the nature of universals is such that when we are not talking about particulars, what would be wrong in saying that we should not assume what is possible and what is not—for universals to be on par with what is possible or not for objects which instantiate it.

The nature of universals is incredibly distinct from the nature of particulars. It is different because although the same particular object cannot be in two places at once, a universal has the special feature of doing just that. This is because a universal, unlike a particular, cannot change (if they change, they cease to exist). If I destroy all instances of red, red will still be possible and remains stagnant throughout the carpet of space.

If there are two instantiations of me, I can freely raise my hand without physically motivating my second instantiation. I can be discouraged without my counter-part being discouraged. Universals, however, are not like so. They are causally dependent on Gods Idea. If one instance of red causes a phenomenological effect, it will always do that unceasing. Universals always exert one specific causal power throughout their existence and cannot do anything otherwise. They are entirely static and incapable of changing their causal attitude. And their causal attitude is dependent upon God thinking about them, and how they are.

This would leave us with how we can sensibly talk about one thing being in two different places at once. A universal has one numerical identity. I would argue that numerical identity for properties can be retained even if they are multiply-instantiated. So this red and that red are the same red because of attribute agreement and qualitative identity. A particular object1 which instantiates red and another one (object2) which instantiates something which is perceptibly qualitatively-identical with what we identified in object1, red, the universal is wholly present in both objects.

It is not the case that universals are unchangeable because they transcend space-time and thus immune to causal affection, but because even if they are present in space-time, they cannot be causally impressed upon because they are a different category of being—properties, I maintain, are unchangeable, only objects which have properties are afflict-able. I will take this to be a primitive for my theory which is justified to hold because of attribute-agreement between different particulars.

Space is concrete particular in my ontology, as such anything that which inheres in this the substance of space— a concrete particular has a spatial relation. If an object inheres in space, it has spatial relations. Properties as such defined, while though occurring in particulars, due to the particulars being in space time— are present in the fabric or rug of space-time.

The term "red" refers to two things in my ontology. The idea "red" in the mind of God since universals have a causal priority or a logical one or both before particulars, and the diversely unchanging contingent qualitative instantiations there are in the carpet of space-time.

I am assuming that if a property inheres in an object, it doesn't necessarily exclude it from have a spatial relation.

John West wrote:

They're tropes. Replacing universals with tropes is definitely one way out of the problems, but is it the one you meant to take?

I understand that, but no. I do not want to. The red is strictly identical. This and that red are mere talks of particular objects. The particular objects are numerically distinct but share some qualitatively-identical features. The particular objects have one strictly identical redness in each of its instantiations.

 

The motivation I have to deny tropes is because bundles of tropes is still a live option. Obviously accepting tropes doesn't commit oneself to bundles of tropes, but if one can totally deny tropes their reality; it would be much easier, and it's a cleaner ontology. So if I can deny them, I will. However, as you point out, this doesn't seem to a possible task, if possible at all, it seems incredibly hard.