Just a quick reply from me as well:

musiclover wrote:

Perhaps Tom's objection is something like this: God's knowledge of contingent truths seems to imply that God has contingent beliefs, since knowledge involves belief. But if God has contingent beliefs, then there is contingency in God, which conflicts with his simplicity - i.e. some parts of him are contingent, some parts aren't.)

I'm sure he has something like that in mind. The underlying idea, I take it, is that if God is identical to His will and His intellect, then He would be different if His will or His intellect were different, which TomD thinks would be the case if either had different objects. In particular God would be different (and perhaps nonexistent) if He didn't will the creation of this particular cosmos.

I don't think he's taken sufficient account of John West's remarks about Cambridge properties. There weren't two different subjects in John's post; both were all part of one overarching point, namely that (to put it in perhaps not quite the same way that John might but, I think, equivalently) God's will isn't itself "changed" by having different (or multiple) objects any more than His intellect is.

John West wrote:

What would be absurd would be to say that God has the Ideas or that the Ideas are grounded in God, but that there are some possible worlds where God has those ideas and other possible worlds where he does not. That is to say, God has them, but sometimes doesn't. This is what Scott replied to in his first reply to Tom.

Yes. And more generally, it doesn't make sense to think of a range of "possible worlds" with a "possible God" in each one, if by "God" we mean the God of classical theism, according to which (as John says) the very ideas of those "possible worlds" are themselves grounded in God.

I'm not denying the occasional usefulness of talking about "possible worlds," but whatever other usefulness it might have, this is an instance in which such talk creates new confusion without clearing up any old confusion.

That will have to do from me for the time being; I have things to do this afternoon. 

Last edited by Scott (7/10/2015 12:39 pm)

Now, here is why I think the Stump/Kretzmann solution doesn't work:

In order for them to preserve simplicity, they argue that the difference between what God wills by necessity (i.e. His self love) and what He wills necessarily by supposition (i.e. creation) is not a real distinction. They discuss this at length in the body of their paper, but I'll just quote from the abstract:

"[T]he difference between absolutely and conditionallynecessitated acts of will is not a real distinction in God" 

In any case, suppose they are correct. It follows then that God really wills His own nature and creation with the same kind of necessity, even if, quoad nos there is a distinction. But since God cannot fail to will His own goodness, then it would follow that God could not fail to will creation. And this remains true even if to us it is worth distinguishing between God willing things necessarily and by supposition. 

 

TomD wrote:

[W]ith [regard] to Cambridge properties, I think they can probably go a long way in solving this particular problem and reconciling divine simplicity with divine freedom. That said, more work needs to be done in my view in order to show that is the case.

What makes you think it hasn't been done? These questions aren't in any way new; the Scholastics in particular were all over this stuff. For a modern-day Scholastic-and-mostly-Thomistic treatment of natural theology to get you started, try here (especially here). And take it as the first word, not the last; it's an introduction (albeit an excellent one).

If you've already read and digested it (or something equivalent), I hope you'll forgive me for not knowing that -- and for observing that you haven't displayed any conspicuous evidence of it in your posts so far.

Last edited by Scott (7/10/2015 2:53 pm)

Scott wrote:

TomD wrote:

[W]ith [regard] to Cambridge properties, I think they can probably go a long way in solving this particular problem and reconciling divine simplicity with divine freedom. That said, more work needs to be done in my view in order to show that is the case.

What makes you think it hasn't been done? These questions aren't in any way new; the Scholastics in particular were all over this stuff. For a modern-day Scholastic-and-mostly-Thomistic treatment of natural theology to get you started, try here (especially here). And take it as the first word, not the last; it's an introduction (albeit an excellent one).

If you've already read and digested it (or something equivalent), I hope you'll forgive me for not knowing that -- and for observing that you haven't displayed any conspicuous evidence of it in your posts so far.

The reason that I think it hasn't been done sufficiently is that in what I have read, it seems that the problems of contingent divine knowing and willing don't have adequate responses. I have read a wide range of authors on this point, and I see a lot of good ideas, but I think more could be said. 

And taking a look at the links, I do think there are some good points in there regarding God's freedom. However, even the portion on divine freedom admits:
"The point with which we are here occupied is one of the most mysterious in the whole of Natural Theology."


 

John West wrote:

TomD wrote:

[...] that if God didn't will this world to be, it would seem as though His will would be different. Likewise with His knowledge.

The that entire statement seems to presume change in God. 

How can this be so? As Brian Davies points out in his chapter on divine simplicity in An Introduction to Philosophy of Religion (3rd edition), what is essential to acting is the bringing about of an effect in another thing, not undergoing change oneself as one does so. What is essential to teaching, for example, is that one cause someone else to learn, and not that one lecture, write books, or the like. Of course, in created things, bringing about an effect is typically associated with undergoing change oneself (e.g. for us to cause another to learn typically requires lecturing, writing, or the like as a means). But that is accidental to agency per se, something true of us only because of our status as finite, created things. We should not expect the same thing to be true of a purely actual uncaused cause of the world. Hence there is no reason to suppose that God’s creation of the world entails a change in God Himself.

(1) I am unclear how what I said assumes anything about whether or not God can change. God is outside of time and cannot change, I can't see how simplicity denies that. God's will is eternal and unchanging, including His will to create this world. The fact that it is eternal however is different than it being necessary or contingent. 

(2) I agree with Feser here. There is no reason to suppose that willing the world to exist involves a change in God. God willing the universe to be is first of all outside of time, so it doesn't change in any respect. Second of all, I agree that bringing about an effect involves change in us because of our status as contingent, finite, temporal things. However, it is not essential to agency per se. I agree wholeheartedly. 

That said, my problem is not that divine freedom is incompatible with divine immutability or eternity. Rather, I am arguing that there seems to be a problem for reconciling divine freedom and divine simplicity because the simplicity of God would render the divine will necessary absolutely. 
For example, if God had chosen to not create, on the face of it, it seems as though God's will would have been different. I am not saying anything about God's will changing. If God had willed not to create, then eternally and changelessly, God would will not to create. On the other hand, since God has willed to create, then eternally and changelessly, God wills to create. That said, it seems as though God being able to do other than He actually does (timelessly), entails that God could be other than He is. The reason is that God is His act of will (which is changeless). 

I think even Stump held (although I could be wrong*) that God could have modal accidents although not temporal accidents. This would essentially be conceding that if God hadn't created, He would've been accidentally different (albeit, still intrinsically different), than He actually is. But this poses problems as we are both aware. 

*I believe she argues this in her book Aquinas but I haven't read the book, I just remember it being cited in a paper regarding divine freedom and God as pure act.