1 of 1- RBrad
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Thoughts on the PSR / PoC and entailment
In Scholastic Metaphysics, one of the things Feser discusses is the simultaneity of essentially ordered causal series (pg 146):
Cause and effect are not two events, but two elements of one event. The basic idea is that to cause is just to produce an effect, and it makes no sense to think of a cause producing without its effect being produced, or an effect being produced without its cause producing it. As Clarke puts it, “the cutting-of-the-orange-by-the-knife must be identical with the-orange-being-cut; otherwise the knife is not cutting anything at the moment of its cutting, nor is the orange being cut by anything at the later moment of its being cut” (2001, p. 191).
Yet, when discussing arguments against PSR, Feser says the following (pg 141):
From a Scholastic point of view this sort of argument is a non-starter, since on the Scholastic understanding of PSR, propositions are not among the things requiring explanation in the first place, and explanation does not require logical entailment.
And (pg 142):
We have already noted that objections to PSR that assume that a sufficient reason for something must logically entail it misfire, since the defender of PSR need not make that assumption. Nor is the assumption plausible in any case.
If "it makes no sense" to think of the cause without its effect, then what is this but logical entailment? One of the criticisms Feser has made against Humean analyses of causation in other writings is that if cause and effect are thought to be simultaneous, it makes no sense to think of them as "loose and separate," and therefore no sense to think of, say, a brick pushing through glass without the glass shattering. Yet if this is the case, it seems the brick pushing through the glass entails that the glass breaks. Or, in other words, if cause / effect are two elements of the same event, how is it even possible not to have the effect if the cause is given?
If the relationship isn't entailment, then how is it the case that you cannot have the cause without the effect?
Just curious if there's a genuine tension here or if I'm misunderstanding something.
Last edited by RBrad (7/08/2016 1:11 am)
- John West
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Re: Thoughts on the PSR / PoC and entailment
Propositions are the meanings of sentences. They're the primary bearers of truth-value, and what feature in arguments. Most scholastics thought them mind-dependent objects. (If propositions are abstracta like some people think now, change the distinction to that between causal mind-independent objects and acausal (abstract) objects.)
The distinction you're looking for is between mind-independent objects and propositions. Thomists' PSR is restricted to mind-independent objects. The antecedents and consequents in entailments are propositions. There can be no entailment between mind-independent objects, only propositions. (To suppose there can be is what's called a category mistake.)
From a Scholastic point of view this sort of argument is a non-starter, since on the Scholastic understanding of PSR, propositions are not among the things requiring explanation in the first place, and explanation does not require logical entailment.
Ed is just saying that scholastics' PSR applies to mind-independent objects, not mind-dependent objects like propositions.
If the relationship isn't entailment, then how is it the case that you cannot have the cause without the effect?
Suppose causes necessitate their effects (for the sake of argument). Since necessitation can hold between kinds of entities entailment can't, necessitation and entailment are distinct kinds of relations. And since necessitation and entailment are distinct kinds of relations, it's still not the case that causes entail their effects. (They necessitate them, but they don't entail them.)
Last edited by John West (7/08/2016 10:32 am)
- Greg
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Re: Thoughts on the PSR / PoC and entailment
It's right that scholastics understand causation and explanation to be relations between things, so there would strictly be a category mistake in seeking causes and explanations of propositions. But I think that he is more interested in the further point of denying that causation is necessitation (to avoid modal fatalism, to carve out space for some sort of libertarian free will, and to argue that indeterministic processes may still be explicable).
Suppose that causation is necessitation, so that whenever you have this thing, you also get that thing, its effect. Even if it's strictly a category mistake to say that causation is a matter of entailment, does not this model suggest that the obtaining of this thing is logically sufficient for the obtaining of that? Feser wants to say that (say) an atom explains a recently emitted beta particle, even if in some cases, a "qualitatively identical" atom does not emit a beta particle.
That view (expressed in the second and third quotes), at least, is consistent with the one expressed in the first. In the first he is saying that the cause's producing is sufficient for the effect's being produced. There will be no such thing as the atom's causing the beta particle unless the beta particle is being caused. If in some other circumstances, a qualitatively identical atom does not cause a beta particle, then--yes--there is no beta particle's being caused, but there is also no atom's causing a beta particle.
- RBrad
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Re: Thoughts on the PSR / PoC and entailment
Meant to reply earlier but thanks for the replies. Very helpful.
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