- Johannes
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Re: Toward a new kalām cosmological argument
Ben wrote:
what's really doing the philosophical work is the argument against a countably infinite series of consecutive finite temporal intervals that recede into the past
The argument is actually against a specific algorithm-executing entity whose existence recedes infinitely into the past. The universe is no such entity.
Mind also that you do not need the multiverse for a universe receding infinitely into the past: a cyclical universe will also do, which is what I was implying in my previous post when I said that the decisive observations to discard such a universe were not those of Big Bang but those on the acceleration of the expansion of the universe. Because there are two viable (in principle) generalizations of General Relativity (Loop Quantum Gravity and Einstein-Cartan) that predict that a Big Crunch would be followed by a Big Bang, so that they allow for a universe undergoing indefinitely this cycle:
Big Bang - decelerating expansion - stop - accelerating contraction - Big Crunch - Big Bang - ...
The Big Crunch-Big Bang event produces a "reset", so that in each instance of the universe there is an initial t=0. To note, this fits right with the cyclical cosmology of Hinduism and Buddhism.
That's why the observations since 1998 of the acceleration of the expansion of the universe are so useful: because we now know for certain that the expansion of "this" instance of the universe (speaking that way to allow for the hypothetical possibility of previous instances) will not decelerate to a stop and reverse into contraction, but rather will accelerate until becoming exponential and continue for ever. Now, what could be so special about "this" instance of the universe that sets it apart from the hypothetical previous instances, causing it to expand for ever instead of stopping and reversing into contraction? The only logical answer is: nothing at all, there were just no such previous instances.
- DanielCC
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Re: Toward a new kalām cosmological argument
I have at last managed to get some time, sit down, and properly read through the paper. More thoughts to follow:
An interesting feature of the essential premise of the Kalam Argument, that is Point 2, is that if successful it rules out the possibility of a Necessary Universe, a scenario I think ultimately the intellectual atheist might have to bite the bullet and argue for if they want to give something approaching an explanation.This aspect of the KA isn't remarked on enough and should commend it to theist philosophers of the religion who accept the universe as having a temporal beginning for other reasons.
The account you give of temporal beginnings in the Methuselah section is interesting since as far as I know it looks quite B Theory friendly.
Out of interest how would you answer the ‘Gaps’ problem (though I don’t think it’s a problem so much as an insufficiency)? Scholastics would just appeal to the Principle of Proportionate Causality – since you mentioned Thomist arguments I take it you would do similar?
Secondly as to arguments from modern cosmology surely one would give as support the application of Vilenkin’s theorem to multiverse scenarios?
But even if the BGV theorem can be used to show that the multiverse had a beginning, one could always speculate that, perhaps, this multiverse arose out of some other multiverse with possibly different laws of physics that are not incompatible with an infinite past, etc.
I was thinking about this response the other night. I agree - though see below - that it's prima facia possible, however the critic giving it would be in the awkward position of a priori baring the natural sciences from exploring beyond an infinitesimally narrow area (the period during which the current Laws have held), and, arguably passing any judgement on the base levels of physical reality (since there are no base levels - an infinite number of differant physical laws have arisen and fallen away), something I think ‘scientifically minded’ Analytical philosophy would be rather embarrassed about.
However there is maybe a further move we could make here. Might not the applicability of this defence depend in part on what ontological account we give of the laws of physics? If we take them to be 'cosmic coincidences', to use J.C. Smart's phrase, as expressed in a Regularity theory then it might well be the case; however it might be less plausible if we endorse a more metaphysically robust account of said laws e.g. taking them to be the essential and dispositional properties of Natural Kinds a la Mumford, Ellis and Oderberg, or relations between universals a la Armstrong, Tooley and Evan Fales (true this latter group like to try to avoid modal notions but it’s unlikely they succeed at doing so). So in short if the necessity pertaining to these laws is anything above Nomic necessity then it.
A caveat: one could perhaps introduce a new Natural Kind, the properties of which could frustrate the physics i.e. the powers of the entities we already know about, in question.
Last edited by DanielCC (7/12/2015 6:23 am)
- Ben
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Re: Toward a new kalām cosmological argument
Hello again DanielCC! My apologies for the delay in this response.
Out of interest how would you answer the ‘Gaps’ problem (though I don’t think it’s a problem so much as an insufficiency)? Scholastics would just appeal to the Principle of Proportionate Causality – since you mentioned Thomist arguments I take it you would do similar?
Thomistic arguments conclude to the existence of God as the source of all causal power who, at bottom, conserves the temporal world in existence by continuously conjoining the essence of things with an "act" of existence, and is also the one entity whose essence is identical with such an "act" of existence (from which the goodness of God follows, I think, since there can just be no distinction between how God "ought to act" in accordance with his essence and the "act" of his existence). Now, I take it as obvious that if such a being exists then he is ultimately responsible for the origination of the universe, provided that the kalam argument is sound and that the universe did have a beginning in need of such a causal explanation. Hence, what the kalam argument tells us is that God (as revealed by these Thomistic arguments) is not only the sustainer of the universe in this very peculiar/technical sense, but is also (ultimately) the transcendent timeless creator of the universe; which is important since I don't think the foregoing Thomistic conception of God is necessarily transcendent or timeless. Hence, it seems to me that these different arguments for God's existence naturally complement each other in telling us different things about the same entity.
And that, in brief, is the approach I might take to closing the gap in the Gap Problem. To me, these different arguments for God's existence are not in some sort of competition with each other, but should ideally be complementing each other as part of the development of a mature and robust philosophical theology.
However there is maybe a further move we could make here. Might not the applicability of this defence depend in part on what ontological account we give of the laws of physics? If we take them to be 'cosmic coincidences', to use J.C. Smart's phrase, as expressed in a Regularity theory then it might well be the case; however it might be less plausible if we endorse a more metaphysically robust account of said laws e.g. taking them to be the essential and dispositional properties of Natural Kinds a la Mumford, Ellis and Oderberg, or relations between universals a la Armstrong, Tooley and Evan Fales (true this latter group like to try to avoid modal notions but it’s unlikely they succeed at doing so). So in short if the necessity pertaining to these laws is anything above Nomic necessity then it.
Sorry for the confusion, but I don't think how we understand the laws of physics is really all that important in this context since I can restate the problem somewhat more generally as follows: Even if it can be shown that the multiverse had a beginning, one could always speculate that, perhaps, this multiverse arose out of some other temporal world governed by possibly different principles (however we understand them) that might not even be incompatible with an infinite past. In other words, the real problem here for the kalam argument is that the beginning of the physical multiverse is not necessarily the beginning of time itself, hence the inability of modern physical cosmology to effectively address the kalam's Regress Problem apart from other purely philosophical considerations (or so I argue).
Last edited by Ben (7/13/2015 8:50 pm)
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Thread Starter- DanielCC
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Re: Toward a new kalām cosmological argument
Sorry for the confusion, but I don't think how we understand the laws of physics is really all that important in this context since I can restate the problem somewhat more generally as follows: Even if it can be shown that the multiverse had a beginning, one could always speculate that, perhaps, this multiverse arose out of some other temporal world governed by possibly different principles (however we understand them) that might not even be incompatible with an infinite past. In other words, the real problem here for the kalam argument is that the beginning of the physical multiverse is not necessarily the beginning of time itself, hence the inability of modern physical cosmology to effectively address the kalam's Regress Problem apart from other purely philosophical considerations (or so I argue).
Ultimately I agree that the merits of the Kalam Argument likely fall on its purely philosophical aspects; I just don’t think one should let critics get off to easy appealing to dubious counter-examples like that. If correct some of the accounts I was referring to would serve as a way short-circuit that highlighted premise i.e. to argue that there could not have been a world governed by said different principles.
(Brief message as my internet connection doesn’t want to cooperate this morning)
- Ben
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Re: Toward a new kalām cosmological argument
DanielCC,
It seems to me that the price scientific naturalists/materialists pay for speculating in this fashion (whether in the context of cosmic fine-tuning or a cosmic beginning) is that it is contrary to the whole epistemological spirit of their position. Traditionally, one would not expect hard-nosed scientific naturalists/materialists to be engaged in this sort of thing. To wit, if scientific naturalists/materialists are prepared to accept the legitimacy of such speculation in the context of their most beloved sciences, then on what basis can they continue to eschew something like Aristotelian-Thomistic metaphysics?
Alexander,
I agree that there are certainly good reasons for thinking/suspecting that a Thomistic conception of God would also be transcendent, timeless. But I am afraid that something like the kalam argument is needed to really argue for this properly, and I recognize that I am probably in the minority about this.
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Thread Starter- John West
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Re: Toward a new kalām cosmological argument
I think it's fairly plain that the Thomistic conception of God is unrestricted by time. Brian Davies has argued that, as Pure Act, God cannot change, making the idea of a temporal God meaningless. As Unparticipated Esse, God cannot be dependent on a reality beyond himself - if God were temporal, his being would (in some sense) be dependent on, or conditioned by, time. The idea that God is "the fullness of Being" seems to me to imply that God must not possess his being "successively", as we do. The kalam argument gives a quicker, more direct, way of inferring the timelessness of God, but I don't think it is necessary for such knowledge, and neither would most Thomists (as I understand it).
Right. Since the First Way gives a Being of Pure Act, it gives immutability and simplicity.
On a Thomistic conception of time, time is a measure of change and not the other way around. Since God is immutable, He doesn't change. Since time is a measure of change and God doesn't change, God cannot be analyzed or measured in terms of time. This seems to me to give timelessness, especially if we look at the word as is without presuming that it means “'outside' of time”, which itself seems to suggest time is a dimension like space.