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10/10/2016 4:13 pm  #1


Thomism and God's causality of choices

Given a Thomistic account of God's causality, God is the cause of our choices, albeit not the evil of certain choices (i.e. not the evil of sin). Given this, how can we reconcile God's love with the belief in certain evils? I have two things in mind. First, it seems that God is the cause of certain horrific and sick acts (e.g. rape & torture). Even though God is not the cause of the defect of these acts on Thomism, he nevertheless arranges for the acts to happen, in the way that they happen, with the effects that they have. This strikes me as contradicting any meaningful notion of "love" in God.

Second, how is that God arranges for creatures to act in ways that ensure their damnation? Even a modestly loving human, in fact, I would even say a positively corrupt person (so it seems), barring certain psychological issues, would not arrange it so that certain individuals were damned. Assuming these people deserve damnation on account of their sins does not solve the problem, for on Thomsim, it is God's causality which ensures that the reprobate perform the actions leading to their damnation

What do the Thomists think? Do the non-Thomists find this issue to be sufficient to undermine the Thomistic approach to God's causality and sin?

 

10/11/2016 6:07 am  #2


Re: Thomism and God's causality of choices

I don't know enough about the Thomistic view regarding divine foreknowledge and free will to adequately answer this question but if it does turn out to be inadequate, what would be the alternative option? Surely not the Molinist position since it runs into problems of its own.

 

10/16/2016 12:02 am  #3


Re: Thomism and God's causality of choices

While I don't have the relevant passage on me, Thomas did say that while God is a cause of every effect, that creatures have their own distinct causality as well. This makes me think that we are looking at something like this: We know from the unmoved mover argument that at every moment in time there is transitive causal power coming from the first cause, to the variety of second causes, and from them to the variety of third causes, and etc. The reason why a first cause is needed is because all of those causes cause in way such that they are only causing because something causes them. This last statement I leave vague because there are two ways people understand this, that the cause is causing them to act just the way that they do, or the cause is causing them to be in such a way that they gain the capacity to do it.

We should view the statement " God is the cause of our choices" as God's causation being a necessary condition for us to make those choices, but not the sufficient thing that makes those choices come about. The causal power such that I can make my choice is due to my deriving that actuality from God acting on me( which happens at every single moment), but the way in which I choose to use that power, or sustain from using that power is of my own volition entirely. God is (a) cause of my choices according to the necessary/sufficient divide, and given that all actuality comes from him transitively, God is (the) cause of my choices since from no where else does the actuality required for it actually come from. Nevertheless I have my own causality and chose freely.




 

 

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