That's right. If we assume terms like “mind” apply univocally to both God and man, our conception of God turns out to be incoherent. Men's minds are composite (e.g. beliefs, desires, thoughts); God is absolutely simple. Men's minds can change; God is immutable. So classical theists argue that we can't speak univocally of both God and man.

(Thomists say we can still speak in an analogical fashion of both man and God. Others, that we can't even do that.)

Since a huge portion of this forum is Thomist, it's worth going into their views on analogy in more detail before the conversation gets started. (It'll help prevent misunderstandings later.)

Thomists distinguish between analogies of attribution and analogies of proportionality. If the property being attributed two analogates is only intrinsically in one, it's in an analogy of attribution; if it's in both intrinsically, it's in an analogy of proportionality.* (If I predicate healthiness of both George and food, I'm making an analogy of attribution, i.e. the food is healthy because of its extrinsic relation to humans like George (in this case because it causes them to be healthy).)

Thomists also distinguish between analogies of proper proportionality and analogies of improper or metaphorical proportionality. If the property being attributed to two analogates exists intrinsically and formally in them, it's in an analogy of proper proportionality; if the property being attributed to two analogates exists intrinsically in both, but formally in one and figuratively in the other, it's in an analogy of metaphorical proportionality. If I predicate life of humans and plants, I'm making an analogy of proper proportionality; if I predicate lionhood of both George and a lion at a zoo, I'm making an analogy of metaphorical proportionality (i.e. there is something intrinsically in George that leads us to call him a lion, but the substantial form or nature of lionhood is of course only in the zoo animal).*

Now, I agree that there is a huge gap between how we use words when we're talking about men and when we're talking about God, and think this probably does lead to a sort of obscurity in whatever the terms mean when applied to God. (I haven't been able to look into it much, though. I haven't been able to find much on analogy.) So, lately I've been exploring a view people only familiar with the analytic tradition apparently tend to hiss at—the apophatic one.

My guess, though, is that Thomists are going to say that they can make good enough sense of how these terms apply to God as part of analogies of attribution.

*I'm using property in the broadest sense (even blob nominalists could breathe easy), not just to talk about irreducible universals or tropes like I usually do.
*I've taken my examples from section 4.3 of Scholastic Metaphysics.

Last edited by John West (5/17/2017 2:30 pm)

One brief point: 'But then we're just making up fantastical objects because these are not being supplied by any intuition'

This is surely incorrect - if successful various theistic proofs are in themselves successful i.e. they prove that a being with X attributes exists, then they serve as more than an intuition that Mind2 is possible. All the objection then boils down to is the observation that God must be a very unusual being, something the theist will grant given Divine uniqueness. 

Greg wrote:

Marty wrote:

P4. However, to have intentions, beliefs, and desires means to necessarily presuppose that one can fail to intend, desire and belief something. For what is constitutive of these properties is that they are normative.

Can you explain this premise? First, what does it mean to call intentions, desires, and beliefs "normative"? Second, why does a property's being normative imply that every bearer of any of those properties can fail to attain that property's fulfillment conditions? (The defense of this implication obviously has to be sensitive to the fact that intentions, desires, and beliefs evidently do not "fail," when they fail, univocally.)

I don't see why the classical theist should be embarrassed to say that what God wills happens and, on the supposition of his willing it, must happen. One could insist that, in saying this, the classical theist is uttering an incoherence, which he'd appreciate if he acknowledged the meaning of "wills"--but I can't see that the classical theist will be put in anything like an uncomfortable position by denying this.

That's the only way we do understand intentions - them being normative; they can fail to uphold to certain commitments one makes. When one has a commitment, they can inevitably fail to be accordance with such a commitment to which they will then attempt to try to succeed at it again. They are different from mere casual dispositions in the sense that casual events do not have something to be accordance with. Lighting doesn't "intend" to hit a tree, it merely hits a tree - therefore never misses it's mark. If something never missed it's mark, how can we distinguish this from mere casual dispositions? You could say, "it intended to do it, but succeeds it's in intentions each time" but how are we to judge success outside the capacity from failure? Intentions need at least the possibility of failure, but God cannot fail. However, if he does truly have intentions (which presumably the theists holds) he must be able to fail!

 

John West wrote:

Since a huge portion of this forum is Thomist, it's worth going into their views on analogy in more detail before the conversation gets started. (It'll help prevent misunderstandings later.)

Thomists distinguish between analogies of attribution and analogies of proportionality. If the property being attributed two analogates is only intrinsically in one, it's in an analogy of attribution; if it's in both intrinsically, it's in an analogy of proportionality.* (If I predicate healthiness of both George and food, I'm making an analogy of attribution, i.e. the food is healthy because of its extrinsic relation to humans like George (in this case because it causes them to be healthy).)

Thomists also distinguish between analogies of proper proportionality and analogies of improper or metaphorical proportionality. If the property being attributed to two analogates exists intrinsically and formally in them, it's in an analogy of proper proportionality; if the property being attributed to two analogates exists intrinsically in both, but formally in one and figuratively in the other, it's in an analogy of metaphorical proportionality. If I predicate life of humans and plants, I'm making an analogy of proper proportionality; if I predicate lionhood of both George and a lion at a zoo, I'm making an analogy of metaphorical proportionality (i.e. there is something intrinsically in George that leads us to call him a lion, but the substantial form or nature of lionhood is of course only in the zoo animal).*

Now, I agree that there is a huge gap between how we use words when we're talking about men and when we're talking about God, and think this probably does lead to a sort of obscurity in whatever the terms mean when applied to God. (I haven't been able to look into it much, though. I haven't been able to find much on analogy.) So, lately I've been exploring a view people only familiar with the analytic tradition apparently tend to hiss at—the apophatic one.

My guess, though, is that Thomists are going to say that they can make good enough sense of how these terms apply to God as part of analogies of attribution.

*I'm using property in the broadest sense (even blob nominalists could breathe easy), not just to talk about irreducible universals or tropes like I usually do.
*I've taken my examples from section 4.3 of Scholastic Metaphysics.

I agree here that there's an analogy being made - and if I understand you correctl, an analogy of proportionality - but when we say, George is brave like a Lion, we have something in mind by "brave". Admittedly certain brave-like qualities: such as being able to fight well, show unyielding character, etc, which are all demonstrated in the lion. But as you say, the gap between what a God's mind is, and what a man's Mind is seems incommensurably different; that is, to the point of compromising the definition of what it means to be a mind. 

Last edited by Marty (5/17/2017 8:28 pm)