Camoden wrote:

I mean it isn't a good argument even on Univocity, because you could say the intellect being in the intrinsic mode of infinity simply cannot fail to actualize any state of affairs. In addition, since this intellect has no principle of limit, and since God's proper object is Himself (which Aquinas gives arguments for due to God's proper beatitude), anything God would do would be governed by knowledge of His perfect self. Hence while the possibility in human agents being able to fail would be in the misjudgement of the goodness of a primary object, God simply is able to grasp the primary object of His intellect (the object being Himself) perfectly, which clearly does not necessitate a ability to fail. So even treating this univocally seems to not entail the potency to fail!
  
So, God having an intellect in the intrinsic mode of infinity, would have a mental world present in a very real sense even on a non analogical understanding of God's nature. Being able to fail doesn't seem to be a necessary, or even remotely strong definition of a mind and willing. Anselm's definition of freedom (which ties into an argument such as this), is arguably also factorable into this, which would simply say God is intellectual and free due to the fact God possesses  the "ability to keep rectitude of the will for its own sake". Anselm thinks is the same essential defintion no matter where you stand on the hierarchy of being. More importantly, I see no reason, after coming to the conclusion God is the First Being (which these arguments seek to show), we cannot move into a exercise in perfect being theology and simply remove the principles of limitation from the concept of an intellect, which in and of itself does not imply an imperfection, and predicate it of God.

For example, it is not like the perfection of having ears, which implies being a matter form composite, and hence limitation by being posterior/dependent. The argument, which seems at the very least plausible, will show that God possesses an intellect, however in the mode of infinity. I do not think the fact that intellect's within our experience necessarily have a disposition for potential failure necessitates its an essential fact. I would say the ability to have a primary object (which my first argument sought to show, even if this proof is derivataive), the ability to possess forms imminently (which Augustine's arguments show), the ability to concur with intellectual causes plus move them in a way fitting with their respective natures, and arguments from proportionate causality (which show God would possess an intellect by being the cause of creaturely ones) all would be things fitting of an intellectual being, and a infinite one would simply have the sorts of limitations you mentioned removed. If you accept a moral element to this freedom like Anselm did, then this limitation will be less obviously a key feature of an account of freedom, hence showing all of these criticisms to simply fail. Limitations from not being able to preserve goodness (proclivities to do evil, which Anselm argues is impotence) will also be limits that need to be removed, which is the primary governing law in human experience. The difference between God and humans would merely be that one goodness is essential and one is placed upon it exteriorly, constituted by obeying a moral law. Nothing about someone like Anselm's defintion necessitates an ability to fail, and to move from our human failures to a divine failure seems quite fallacious. You of course can argue against these sorts of definitions, and I agree they are very dubious, but challenge the classical theist on their own terms. Anselm does give arguments for his defintion, as do Aquinas, Scotus, Bonaventure, and the others within the Classical Theist position justify their respective positions. Even granting your defintions however, nothing about your argument follows from looking at the concept of an intellect and will. 

Lastly, I am not convinced this sort of intentionality mentioned is the mark of the mental. Brentano was simply mistaken since all causal powers for example incorporate this sort of intrinsic directedness. 

God bless you, and have a great day. 

I don't believe I'm describing the same type of intentionality Brentano is talking about; that is, I'm not talking about consciousness that is directed at something. I'm just saying that people have intentions (commitments). Some of these commitments are beliefs and desires, and unfortunately the English word "belief" is ambiguous to what it means. For it could be viewed in the English language as a passive casual disposition. Here I'm talking about the intentional normativity of beliefs, and normativity is constitutive of intentional beliefs. If we're going on to talk about "God's minds" then I'm not sure what makes it a mind at all, right? We're just making up words up at that point.

Last edited by Marty (5/20/2017 11:27 am)

Brian wrote:

Marty,

It seems like your problem is just with analogical reasoning. If we are being very strict, I think the Thomist would agree that "God does not have a mind", if by 'mind' you mean a human mind. He does possess something like the power that the human mind displays though.

As someone said earlier, God is strange to us, because he is completely unique.

I guess I am failing to see the force of your argument. Perhaps I am misunderstanding you. Are you criticizing the idea that Yahweh is being being superimposed on the Aristotle's prime mover?

Well, I guess the argument is that we're anthropomorphizing God with a mind. Presumably, if, say, the Thomistic wants to define God negatively (as what he's not), then I'm not sure why they're defining God with a positive description: that he has anything like a human-like mind. 

Last edited by Marty (5/20/2017 12:39 pm)

Marty wrote:

Look, what stops me from saying that God is a spatial-temporal being, but just redefine spatial-temporal to mean spatial-temporal², where spatial now means a really all-powerful spatiality that cannot be divisible, or composite? Or saying a really all-powerful temporalness that exists always but temporally. I can evoke a every-present moment. But we'd say, "Well no, because that's just a contradiction given that spatial means something that's composite and divisible, and temporal meaning something that flows through time." Likewise, beliefs (any that we know of at least) can all fail due to their intentional and normative nature. 

If you were speaking analogically, nothing would stop you from saying those things.  It wouldn't  be clear or precise but it would be a good first attempt at defining what it means to be omnipresent and eternal.

If you were speaking literally, what would stop you from saying that God is spatio-temporal would be the meanings of those words (or perhaps you're a Mormon!)

It seems you just don't like/want to accept analogical reasoning, which, to be fair, is an interesting criticism.   I just don't see any particular problem with God's "beliefs".

Marty wrote:

Perhaps an interesting question is where the demarcation point between reworking a definition completely, and having analogical differences?

I don't think that reasoning analogically requires us to change any definitions, rather we use a word knowing that we use in it in a way that really only grabs one aspect of the definition and applies it to a new situation.  For example when we mention the mind of God, we are not saying that God has a mind that is like ours, nor are we taking poetic license in describing something the we have no knowledge of.  We are saying that God exhibits powers or effects that are in some essential way similar to the power that humans display when using the mind.

Fate or Providence seem plan-like, meaning they seem like the result of some deliberation or planning, which are both activities done by human minds.  We can speak of Providence as being the plan of the mind of God analogically, but this neither requires us to change our definition of mind, nor does it require us to say God is a copy posited being who has a mind just like us.  I think it merely entails that we believe Providence is similar to human planning in some way and that the thing that "does" Providence is in some fundamental similar to the effect of a minc.  God's mind is unlike a human mind in that it does not ever fail to attain its goals, it is not insufficiently rational, it does not forget about some variable, etc,  but it is is still similar to a mind.

I don't understand why you can fail to believe 2+2=4. You could think 2+2=4, and incidentally have another belief that contradicts that (2+2=5). It'd be certainly odd, but not impossible. It's true that the second belief is wrong assuming we know the meaning of addition, but I don't see why that matters. And the proposition 2+2=4 is surely necessarily true, but I'm not sure we can consider such a proposition outside of our own beliefs to be a belief. Even a-priori analytic statements can fail. I can even fail to believe that I believe.