Jeremy Taylor wrote:

​But does this rely on possible worlds talk? Would the objection still apply if the theist had some other framework for understanding modality (for example, because possible worlds seem to make contingency problematic by implying the existence of all contingent or possible worlds)? If something could have been different but isn't, then, absent possible worlds talk, does that require a change in an atemporal God's nature?

No, as mention of possible worlds here is only semantic aka a way of spelling out a problem pertaining to modal matters with modern quantified logic. Even when get's into a metaphysical account of what possible worlds are it doesn't much effect it: very few theories of possible worlds hold that a possible world's existing means that there is another 'actual world' like this one - instead worlds can be assayed as platonic entities or, as the classical theist ought to say, ideas in the Divine Mind.

​

Jeremy Taylor wrote:

Interestingly, I believe Ibn Sina and some of the other Masha'iyya seem to believe God did not have knowledge of particulars.

Individuals such as Menzel and Leftow have argued that there are no facts about possible individuals qua individuals only qua instances of a type. This would mean amongst other things that S5 and maybe S4 are restricted to types as opposed to tokens.

"John West" wrote:

Vallicella sidesteps any problems the distinction between God's act of knowing and knowledge might cause by putting his argument entirely in terms of the latter. (I actually had this distinction in mind when I chose Vallicella's version of the argument.)

I'm sorry, but it isn't so clear to me how he sidestepped that objection. I imagine you have premise (3) in mind, when Dr. Vallicella said that whenever God knows something, there is something in God such that He knows it. In other words, premise (3) is that God's act of knowing is constituted by its contents.
But if that's the case, I think I anticipated exactly this rejoinder by pointing out that the content of God's act of knowledge is "in God" in a different sense than we use for His "faculties." Given this distinction, God is not identical to the content of His knowledge (as suggested before), which is exactly where the problem comes from. This is why I think the argument fails.

I'm just going to rephrase the argument I made before.

1. Knowledge of particulars is a relationship to said particulars.
2. God is not identical to His relationships to other things.
3. So God is not identical to His knowledge of particulars.

This also explains why I'm not sure whether this forces us to concede that God has accidental properties (in which case, I will have to either abandon this solution, or find some way to accommodate), as I find it unclear whether these relationships can plausibly count as Cambridge properties.

This also explains why I'm not sure whether this forces us to concede that God has accidental properties (in which case, I will have to either abandon this solution, or find some way to accommodate), as I find it unclear whether these relationships can plausibly count as Cambridge properties.

Let G be the Divine Essence, R be God's knowledge relation (suggested in your 1), and + be the symbol for mereological addition. If we identify God with G + R, he's complex and we've abandoned Simplicity. If we don't, then God's knowledge relation is external to him (so that, if you're identifying God's knowledge with a relation or aggregate of relations, it's external to him).*

I'm well aware of Miller's reply to the accidental property objection (of which yours seems to be at least a close cousin). It, however, requires an externalist conception of knowledge.

*If you identify G and R, then since God has different knowledge relations in different worlds he's mutable.

Grace and Rust wrote:

My reason is, whereas the term "intrinsic" usually means "essential," it seemed to me that Dr. Vallicella didn't want to commit himself to saying that God's knowledge of any particular contingent truth is somehow essential to Him; else that fact would be modally necessary (given simplicity), rather than contingent.

It's worth making the distinction between intrinsic properties and essential properties explicit. If Vallicella says that a has an intrinsic property, he's saying a has a non-relational property; if he says that a has an essential property, he's saying a has a property constitutive of its identity. (In other words, in Vallicella's jargon (which is just standard analytic jargon), intrinsic doesn't mean essential (the two are at least conceptually distinct).)

It's also worth distinguishing between the “in” of constituency, the “in” of identity, the “in” of partial but not whole identity, and the “in” of dependency. If God has knowledge as a constituent not identical to him, he's not absolutely simple; if he's identical with his knowledge, then all that tells us is that Vallicella's argument's first premise is right; if he's partially but not wholly identical with his knowledge, he's not absolutely simple; if his knowledge is merely dependent on him, then it's not “in” him in any sufficiently relevant sense (my shirt is also dependent on him).

Now, these are all the different senses of “in” I can think of*, and they're all either insufficient or lead to absurdities.*

*The two identity options also cover essential properties.
*It's not enough to say that God's knowledge is “in” him in some obscure way that just happens to avoid the accidental property objection, either. That would amount to little more than a foot-stomping declaration that the objection “just fails”.

I'm just commenting on this “option” for the sake of thoroughness (and, I suppose, anyone who thinks I'm just being an infuriating pedant). I know you [Grace and Rust] aren't saying this.

if God just sees His effects in Himself as their cause would that not be constituted as His Knowledge. 

Last edited by Jason (6/19/2017 4:29 pm)