@ficino #89
"I don't know whether this side-topic about the reference of "motion" in Aristotle really matters for Stardusty's thread."
--The view of uniform linear motion, Aristotelian versus modern, is critical to the First Way.

If uniform linear motion required "another" to continuously act upon the object in motion then the First Way would be a powerful argument for he necessity of a hierarchical first mover acting in the present moment, as Feser argues it is.  Clearly this the view Aquinas had as it is the only way the First Way makes any sense.

On the modern view of inertia the core premise of the First Way is false since it is not necessary for there to be "another" to account for uniform linear motion.

Thus, on the modern view of motion, the First Way fails as an argument for necessity, and is merely an idle speculation of an invisible being.

"Since Feser reports that a referee challenged him on this very point in an earlier draft of the paper, I conclude so far that it is controversial and/or questionable to construe the First Way as an argument against existential inertia. "
--I am not surprised Feser argued in such a disjointed manner that even his fellow theists had to correct his conflation of the Fist Way with the Second Way.  Why he attracts such vehement adoration from his admirers here and on his blog is truly puzzling.

Feser never presents complete arguments to support his rather fantastic claims about the supposed first mover.  They are variously arguments against strawmen, or incomplete, or invalid, or otherwise unsound, or simply assertion masquerading as logical argument.

Existential inertia is the manifest fact that is evident to our senses.  Material persists.  What kind of individual denies that this is vastly and abundantly obvious?

"I agree with Wippel, as I said earlier, that the presumption should be that Aquinas understands motus in just the same way in the First Way"
--Aquinas very clearly thought objects would come to rest if they were not acted upon by "another";  that is the only way the Fist Way makes any sense, and it is wrong, so the First Way is wrong.

Feser argues against the strawman that inertia absolutely proves there cannot be an invisible being acting in just the right way to make it appear to us that there is no being acting at all.  One can make up an unbounded number of such non falsifiable speculations.  All Feser demonstrates is that his non falsifiable speculation cannot be falsified.  Apparently that is very impressive to his adamant admirers.  It sells books and articles behind paywalls.  Woo sells.

The modern science of motion and conservation of material scientifically proves the First way is false and the Second Way is false.  The use of the qualifier "scientifically" is key, since science is inherently provisional.

Feser fails to argue against my arguments.  He is incapable of doing so. His only capabilities against my arguments are to delete them.



 

It seems necessary to repeat that in Aristotle and Aquinas, local motion is necessary for alteration and growth/decay, and even for changes that are not motions in a strict sense, like generation and corruption.  No local motion, no alteration or growth/decay. This is right in the texts. 

E.g. Physics VIII.7. E.g. 260a29-b4 "For it is impossible that there should be increase without the previous occurrence of alteration ... But the fact that a thing is altered requires that there should be something that alters it, something that makes the potentially hot actually hot: so it is plain that the mover does not maintain a uniform relation to it but is at one time nearer to and at another farther from that which is altered; and we cannot have this without locomotion." Locomotion is also necessary for generation and corruption to occur: "But condensation and rarefaction are combination and separation, processes in virtue of which substances are said to become and perish; and in being combined and separated things must change in respect of place. And further, when a thing is increased or decreased its magnitude changes in respect of place." 260b7-14 (trans. ROTA).

Is alteration or growth/diminution just locomotion? No. Is locomotion necessary for those other motions? Yes.

Aquinas takes over this scheme. In his commentary on Physics VIII, Aquinas is consistent with what I cited him a while ago as saying about Physics V. He understands Ari to be making locomotion necessary for the other motions. Cf. e.g. C1088 where Aq just summarizes what is quoted above from Ari w/ no disagreements. He continues to accept this picture of motion, e.g. "Moreover, just as local motion is required for alteration, so also is it required for decrease" (C1089).

In other works, Aquinas adopts Ari's view that local motion is primary: e.g. "only local motion is truly continuous, as is made clear in the eighth of the Physics" SCG II.89.10. "Every living body moves in place in some way according to [its] soul ... but the oyster [moves] by expansion and constriction [i.e. even though its foot is fixed to some surface]; plants however by the motion of increase and decrease, which are in a certain way according to place," SCG II.90.9.

What does this matter for SDP's thread? As I understand the issue, it matters because Stardusty proposed that: 1) it is legitimate to reduce what we observe at the macro level as alteration and growth/decay to intricate series of local motions at the micro level, spaced out over time--however small the intervals-- and not instantaneous; 2) local motions do not require actualizers throughout their extent; 3) therefore per se series of movers collapse into series ordered per accidens; 4) but a series ordered per accidens can go to infinity; 5) therefore we need not posit a first mover.

Not sure whether I've got this right.

It seems to me that Feser's distinction between simultaneous and instantaneous causality within a series seeks to allow wiggle room, so that there can be a series of movers ordered per se in which not all movers are moving at the same instant but only together on some macro level, as in his example of a potter fashioning a pot on a wheel. Feser's reply would be, forget about time. All the subordinate movers in a per se chain derive their causality from the first member, not one by one from each other in numerical order except in a trivial way. And Thomas is clear in many places that the first mover/cause of a series is far more the cause of the final effect than is the last mover in the series or than the whole bunch of secondary movers - instruments - put together.

The skeptic may reply, but why bring in the notion of a per se series at all? As long as each mover is actualized enough by the previous mover in the chain, can't it move the next member of the chain (the time question is irrelevant here, I think)? So couldn't an infinite series or a cycle, as with Aristotle's cycle from earth to water to air to fire and back down again, be enough to explain any instance of motion? 

I think Feser's reply to that would be to go back to the act-potency distinction. Something has to be pure act, since something partly potential cannot be a self-mover in any ultimate sense, only under a restricted description. So causal chains must ultimately be ordered per se. Which entails an unmoved mover/uncaused cause.

I have not worked things out beyond this point. 





 

Last edited by ficino (12/02/2017 9:44 am)

@ficino #94
"Is alteration or growth/diminution just locomotion? No. Is locomotion necessary for those other motions? Yes."
--As you clearly support with your quotes Aristotle and Aquinas were brilliant men with great powers of analysis.  They clearly saw that changes of various perceived sorts require motion. 

Their key error was that notion that sublunary motion tends to come to rest unless acted upon by "another".

Do you have a favorite English language translation for the Five Ways?  If so I would appreciate a link to it.

"What does this matter for SDP's thread? As I understand the issue, it matters because Stardusty proposed that:

1) it is legitimate to reduce what we observe at the macro level as alteration and growth/decay to intricate series of local motions at the micro level, spaced out over time--however small the intervals-- and not instantaneous;
2) local motions do not require actualizers throughout their extent;
3) therefore per se series of movers collapse into series ordered per accidens;
4) but a series ordered per accidens can go to infinity;
5) therefore we need not posit a first mover."
--That is a well laid out argument that I agree with except the 2) is a special case of a more general temporal process description.

Number 2) would apply if, say, in billiards the 1 ball hits the 2 ball, time passes, the 2 ball rolls independently of the 1 ball, then later the 2 ball hits the 3 ball, time passes, the 3 ball rolls independently of the 2 ball, later the 3 ball hits the 4 ball, time passes, the 4 ball rolls independently of the 3 ball, later the 4 ball falls in the pocket.

In a gas the propagation of sound, for example, follows this model of 2).

Further, Feser allows that the designation of "first" in such a series could be pointed out to be arbitrary, yet he fails to make the connection that by allowing for propagation delay and by allowing our temporal regress analysis to ask what came before the arbitrarily designated first member one inevitably must employ a temporal causal regress analysis that goes back at least to the big bang and conceivably to a past eternity.


But, returning to my statement that your wording of 2) is a special case.  The more general case is temporal mutual causation multibody process.  In truth, reality is a buzzing beehive of activity with a humanly uncountable number of entities mutually interacting with each other over time.

Consider our solar system.  The sun is not actually a stationary anchor, nor are the planets orbiting in perfect ellipses.  Everything in our solar system interacts with everything else gravitationally.  This takes time.  Classically, causal influences propagate no faster than c;.

Each atom is a temporal system of mutual causation, in continuous motion, interacting in ways described by the equations of the 4 forces of nature..

So, ficino, you have begun to capture my point that there is no such thing as an "essential"series.  I would add further that besides the cases in 2) of objects in uniform linear motion between interactions there is the more general case of temporal mutually interacting causal multibody processes.

Further, by allowing that the arbitrarily designated first member of the series is not truly first, and by allowing for propagation delay, Feser unwittingly destroyed his own argument for a hierarchical first mover acting in the present moment, because on consideration of prior causal members acting over time every causal series becomes a causal regress extending back at least to the big bang and conceivably to a past eternity, making a first mover unnecessary.

 

Last edited by StardustyPsyche (12/02/2017 12:01 am)

@Calhoun
I said "material alteration all require locomotion".
You just keep saying that is false, yet you provide no counter examples.  There cannot be a change in quantity unless there is a change in location of material..  If material does not undergo motion there is no change in the quantity of material.  Simply repeating the word "false" does not change this plainly apparent fact.

" it is because material changes in quality and quantity"
--Motion is caused by a change in quantity?  Quantity of what?  The quantity of objects inside a boundary is the number of such objects inside that boundary.  When objects move across the boundary the quantity of objects inside the boundary changes.  Somehow the number of objects inside the boundary is causing motion across the boundary?  How does that make any sense?

"Which is clearly false, because objects posses all sorts of temporary properties"
--Such as?  If that property changes material moved.  If no material moved no property changes.  You have yet to offer a specific counterexample.

"plus duration of their existence"
--The passage of time for an object by itself does not result in a material alteration of that object.

 "like I said any kind of locomotion (even under principle of inertia) already presupposes passage of time "
--Time passes.  The passage of time is manifest and evident to the senses.  All change occurs over time, thus the notion of an "essential" series is false.

" And again no requirement of locomotion, so again clear counterexample which you don't rebut. "
--What counterexample?  You did not name any counterexample.

" the main distinction is between accidental and hierarchical regress , not between temporal regress and hierarchical regress. "
--An accidental regress is a temporal regress.  A temporal regress is an accidental regress.

There is no physical realization for a hierarchical causal series.  Every material causal series is temporal and accidental.

A hierarchical series is an abstraction with no physical realization.

As ficino showed with various quotes Feser contradicts himself on this point.  He has sometimes said that in a hierarchical series the causality is simultaneous throughout the series, yet in other writings he allows not only that there can be a propagation delay but that the designation of the first member is arbitrary.  Somehow Feser, in his deep state of confusion, imagines some notion of instrumentality is related to this ancient notion of an essential causal series.

In #96 I expand upon ficino's listing on this issue.  All causation occurs over time.  Each member in a series can be thought of as an instrument between the prior member and the subsequent member.  Since the selection of a first member is arbitrary the designated first member is equally an instrument.

In multibody systems of gravitation, for example, there is no linear chain of cause and effect, rather, all the members are mutually and continuously causes and effects of each other, for example our solar system.

"What does it even mean to be fully actualized in motion or alternatively, already fully actualized in its particular kinetic energy. How does that refute any part of the argument?"
--Aquinas said "For motion is nothing else than the reduction of something from potentiality to actuality."
This is taken to mean that an object must be continuously actualized to remain in motion.  Aquinas said that because he thought the natural state of sublunary matter is rest, such that an object in motion naturally tends to stop.  He was wrong.

Motion does not require a continuous actualization, because the object in uniform linear motion is already fully actualized in that motion.  Thus the First Way collapses and with it the whole of A-T.

There is no hierarchical causal series called for to account for uniform linear motion because there is no changer called for at all because the object in motion is already fully actualized in motion and is not being reduced from potential to actual.  Thus, there is no necessity for a first mover.

"But again That only applies to locomotion, not to change in general"
--The first way is an argument from motion.  Aquinas tells us so.  When we observe any sort of material change that change requires a locomotion.  If no material locomotion occurs then no material change occurs. 

The error of Aquinas is perhaps easiest to visualize in the case of uniform linear motion, but he fails equally in the analysis of all sorts of change.  All change occurs over time.  Every causal regress analysis is necessarily a temporal regress analysis, with the designation of a first member being arbitrary, thus leading every causal regress analysis back at least as far as the big bang and perhaps to an eternal past with no first cause at all.

No real material change of any sort occurs hierarchically and thus the First Way fails in application to all sorts of real material change.

You just keep saying that is false, yet you provide no counter examples.  There cannot be a change in quantity unless there is a change in location of material..  If material does not undergo motion there is no change in the quantity of material.  Simply repeating the word "false" does not change this plainly apparent fact.

This is pure assertion on your part , I provides clear counterexamples to you , I didn't simply repeat the word false as you assert. 

--Motion is caused by a change in quantity?  Quantity of what?  The quantity of objects inside a boundary is the number of such objects inside that boundary.  When objects move across the boundary the quantity of objects inside the boundary changes.  Somehow the number of objects inside the boundary is causing motion across the boundary?  How does that make any sense?

Here again you don't engage with particular argument that I provided, Instead resort to quote-mining, particularly I've said none of the things you attribute to me. 
Take any example of quantitative change, say increase in size of the object, is the fact that it has different size from before is that identical to to any change of location it has gone through? clearly not, can you have latter without the former? clearly not . similar is the case with qualitative change as explained before.

--Such as?  If that property changes material moved.  If no material moved no property changes.  You have yet to offer a specific counterexample.

Like Pastness, Presentness , being earlier than, later than. It makes no sense to say that change in any of them would require locomotion, and It certainly wouldn't to say that they are identical or reducible to it. 

--The passage of time for an object by itself does not result in a material alteration of that object.

See here what I mean? this was your earlier passage to which I was replying "The only supposed examples were actually just statements that time changes without locomotion.  But a change in time does not result in a material alteration, and is thus not a counterexample.  So again, no counterexamples have been provided." 
Your response is simply repeat of that without clearly engaging the point. 

--An accidental regress is a temporal regress.  A temporal regress is an accidental regress.

No, thats not necessarily the case , because even if regress is temporal the fact that members in it are instrumental renders it hierarchical not accidental.

There is no physical realization for a hierarchical causal series.  Every material causal series is temporal and accidental.

A hierarchical series is an abstraction with no physical realization.

This is your own assertion for which no reason is given, Further we have good reason for believing that not "every" cause is an accidental cause, because if that was the case then there would be no necessary connection between "any" cause at all. every member of any series would would become "independent"  , its hard to see how any intelligible notion of causation we would have left then if everything is so lose and separate. 

<i> All causation occurs over time.  Each member in a series can be thought of as an instrument between the prior member and the subsequent member. </i>

But this creates a serious problem for anyone denying the first cause, because this would mean that all causal series are essential causal series, if each member is instrument then then it means that no member has any independent causal power , so unless their is first cause that can impart causal power to them , nothing in such a series can cause anything. 

Oh, and you keep using this word "material" can you explain what you mean by that, it certainly would be helpful.