Miguel wrote:

I disagree with your notions, they are not self-evident to me at all and actually seem false. The understanding of an essence is *mediated* by a representation, but it is not itself just a representation. When we understand something, we understand its form; the form we have in our minds is one and the same form that is instatiated in matter outside our minds. It just so happens that in our mind this one form is intentional, not informing a material substance. Likewise the essences of mammoths have never disappeared; they are not instantiated as substantial forms anymore, but they still have being "intentionally" and are present in our intellect, this is why if we somehow see a mammoth tomorrow (that e.g. had been cloned) we would be able to recognize it, because the we know the essence of mammoths. Our concept of a mammoth and the substantial form of a mammoth are not two different essences; they are the very same essence that have being in two different manners.

I know that that traditional Thomistic philosophy of mind holds that what there is in the mind is not a representation of the essence, or of the form, but the form itself, as stated e.g. by:

- Feser since the beginning of blogtimes.
- John O'Callaghan in his book "Thomist Realism and the Linguistic Turn: Toward a More Perfect Form of Existence", University of Notre Dame Press, 2003.
- Elena Baltuta in "Aquinas on Intellectual Cognition: The Case of Intelligible Species", in Philosophia, Philosophical Quarterly of Israel, September 2013, Volume 41, Issue 3, pp 589-602.

On the other hand, other authors have argued for a representationalist interpretation of Thomasian (as opposed to Thomistic) thought, e.g.:

- Robert Pasnau 1997 thesis "Theories of Cognition in the Later Middle Ages" and 2002 paper “What is Cognition? A Reply to Some Critics,” American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 76 (2002) 483-90, both available at http://spot.colorado.edu/~pasnau/inprint/
- Claude Panaccio "Aquinas on intellectual representation". In Dominik Perler (ed.) "Ancient and Medieval Theories of Intentionality". Brill, 2001.
- Sandro D'Onofrio 2008 thesis "Aquinas as representationalist: The ontology of the species intelligibilis".

I will show the problem with the traditional Thomistic position using the following hypothetical dialogue between God and a Thomist:

God: So you think the very form, in a hylemorphic sense of course, of the camel resides in your intellect? Well, I will build a camel according to that form. Let's start with DNA. Give Me the aminoacid sequence.

Thomist: I can't, Lord. I know the camel at a macroscopic level only.

God: OK, then give Me the essence at the macroscopic level and I'll figure out the DNA. Let's start with the number and shape of the camel's teeth.

Thomist: Lord, I don't know the camel at such level of detail.

God: Then how can you possibly claim that the very form of the camel has come to reside in your intellect?

Miguel wrote:

Moreover, it is still the case that what-a-stone-is, its essence, is distinct from the existence of the stone itself. If it weren't, then the stone would be a necessary being. The mere fact that a stone was a stone would be sufficient for it to exist. This isn't just a conceptual distinction, it is a real distinction and our conceptual distinction is made possible by the real distinction, not the other way around.

Not necessarily. The situation may be understood as a contingent entity having a contingent essence which implies contingent existence. This understanding obviously implies that what resides in intellects is a representation of the form - a perfect representation (actually pre-presentation) in the divine Intellect, a more or less abridged representation in human intellects - and not the form itself.

This understanding is logically self-consistent: the essence of a stone is actually present only in an actual stone.

- A stone exists (obviously contingently). => An essence of a stone is in that stone.
- No stone exists. => No essence of a stone is anywhere.

It may be useful to summarize in a table the possible combinations of theories of knowledge and real distinction, indicating which combinations are self-consistent and which are inconsistent. Please bear with me since I cannot find out how to make this system use a monospaced font.

The intellect holds: the form of the known entity | a representation of the form
Essence & esse really distinct: Self-consistent (TT) | Self-consistent (J)
Essence & esse not really distinct: Inconsistent | Self-consistent

TT = Traditional Thomism
J = My position
 

Last edited by Johannes (12/21/2017 2:47 pm)

Johannes wrote:

Miguel wrote:

I disagree with your notions, they are not self-evident to me at all and actually seem false. The understanding of an essence is *mediated* by a representation, but it is not itself just a representation. When we understand something, we understand its form; the form we have in our minds is one and the same form that is instatiated in matter outside our minds. It just so happens that in our mind this one form is intentional, not informing a material substance. Likewise the essences of mammoths have never disappeared; they are not instantiated as substantial forms anymore, but they still have being "intentionally" and are present in our intellect, this is why if we somehow see a mammoth tomorrow (that e.g. had been cloned) we would be able to recognize it, because the we know the essence of mammoths. Our concept of a mammoth and the substantial form of a mammoth are not two different essences; they are the very same essence that have being in two different manners.

I know that that traditional Thomistic philosophy of mind holds that what there is in the mind is not a representation of the essence, or of the form, but the form itself, as stated e.g. by:

- Feser since the beginning of blogtimes.
- John O'Callaghan in his book "Thomist Realism and the Linguistic Turn: Toward a More Perfect Form of Existence", University of Notre Dame Press, 2003.
- Elena Baltuta in "Aquinas on Intellectual Cognition: The Case of Intelligible Species", in Philosophia, Philosophical Quarterly of Israel, September 2013, Volume 41, Issue 3, pp 589-602.

On the other hand, other authors have argued for a representationalist interpretation of Thomasian (as opposed to Thomistic) thought, e.g.:

- Robert Pasnau 1997 thesis "Theories of Cognition in the Later Middle Ages" and 2002 paper “What is Cognition? A Reply to Some Critics,” American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 76 (2002) 483-90, both available at http://spot.colorado.edu/~pasnau/inprint/
- Claude Panaccio "Aquinas on intellectual representation". In Dominik Perler (ed.) "Ancient and Medieval Theories of Intentionality". Brill, 2001.
- Sandro D'Onofrio 2008 thesis "Aquinas as representationalist: The ontology of the species intelligibilis".

I will show the problem with the traditional Thomistic position using the following hypothetical dialogue between God and a Thomist:

God: So you think the very form, in a hylemorphic sense of course, of the camel resides in your intellect? Well, I will build a camel according to that form. Let's start with DNA. Give Me the aminoacid sequence.

Thomist: I can't, Lord. I know the camel at a macroscopic level only.

God: OK, then give Me the essence at the macroscopic level and I'll figure out the DNA. Let's start with the number and shape of the camel's teeth.

Thomist: Lord, I don't know the camel at such level of detail.

God: Then how can you possibly claim that the very form of the camel has come to reside in your intellect?

Miguel wrote:

Moreover, it is still the case that what-a-stone-is, its essence, is distinct from the existence of the stone itself. If it weren't, then the stone would be a necessary being. The mere fact that a stone was a stone would be sufficient for it to exist. This isn't just a conceptual distinction, it is a real distinction and our conceptual distinction is made possible by the real distinction, not the other way around.

Not necessarily. The situation may be understood as a contingent entity having a contingent essence which implies contingent existence. This understanding obviously implies that what resides in intellects is a representation of the form - a perfect representation (actually pre-presentation) in the divine Intellect, a more or less abridged representation in human intellects - and not the form itself.

This understanding is logically self-consistent: the essence of a stone is actually present only in an actual stone.

- A stone exists (obviously contingently). => An essence of a stone is in that stone.
- No stone exists. => No essence of a stone is anywhere.

 

There are numerous problems with representationalism, so I don't think it's an open road at all. I don't wanna turn this thread into a discussion of representationalism however, but I'll just say that denying we know the same essence in different modes seems to me to make us liable to absolute skepticism.

Your dialogue does not establish that we really don't know the form of the camel, only that we do not fully comprehend all of it. This is to be expected since our knowledge of the form is mediated by representations -- which is different from saying that we only have access to representations; we don't have an immediate intuition of everything contained in the nature "camel", but we have the nature in our minds understood universally. The form of the camel is one and the same form both in the camel and in our intellect, which does not mean that we grasp the entirety of what that form implies or can give a perfect definition for it.

I don't think your answer to what I said about the stone solves the problem, either. The stone is a contingent being, sure, and it exists contingently, but if the essence of a stone included its contingent existence, then there is no sense in which a stone is a *possible existent* instead of an actual one; the stone would just have to pop up completely ex nihilo since there could never be an essence of the stone that is not already existing; it wouldn't be the case that matter takes on the form of the stone; rather there would be no form of the stone whatsoever without its actual existence. Things would not really change, it would not be the case that there is a substratum that remains in change (matter) as new forms take over matter, because these forms already would ontologically be actual from the start, things would have to be caused ex nihilo all the time. It seems like a mess to me. And when we get God into the picture it seems to me even worse, because I don't see how we can make any sense of the idea of a "perfect representation". What is a "perfect representation" of an essence if not the essence itself? There would have to be something in the essence that makes it different from a "perfect representation", but if that's the case then the perfect representation is not perfect at all. Moreover, if the stone we were just discussing had existence as part of its essence, then the "perfect representation" of the stone would already include the existence of the stone.

Last edited by Miguel (12/21/2017 2:29 pm)

Miguel wrote:

I don't think your answer to what I said about the stone solves the problem, either. The stone is a contingent being, sure, and it exists contingently, but if the essence of a stone included its contingent existence, then there is no sense in which a stone is a *possible existent* instead of an actual one; the stone would just have to pop up completely ex nihilo since there could never be an essence of the stone that is not already existing; it wouldn't be the case that matter takes on the form of the stone; rather there would be no form of the stone whatsoever without its actual existence. Things would not really change, it would not be the case that there is a substratum that remains in change (matter) as new forms take over matter, because these forms already would ontologically be actual from the start, things would have to be caused ex nihilo all the time. It seems like a mess to me.

You are seeing a problem where there is none. At the beginning of the universe, when there were no stars, stars were *possible existents*, and it was precisely the case that masses of gas collapsed by way of gravitational attraction and formed stars. If you want to apply the hylemorphic framework to stars (of which I see no use whatsoever, but I will play along), the case was that there was a substratum that remained (matter) as the new form (initially of Population III, or extremely metal-poor, stars) took over matter.

Last edited by Johannes (12/21/2017 3:26 pm)

ficino wrote:

Johannes, thank you for linking Twetten's article. What is your view of his conclusion, that (if I read him right), despite the Question-Begging Objection, the Real Distinction must be affirmed as a first principle and defended dialectically?

I agree that, if one wants to hold the RD, it must be held as a first principle. The situation is analogous as that of the continuum hypothesis (CH) versus Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory with the axiom of choice  (ZFC): the truth of falsehood of CH is independent of ZFC, so that both (ZFC + CH) and (ZFC + ¬CH) are consistent theories (if and only if ZFC is consistent, which it is).

Personally I do hold the RD, since, as I said, I see it as the only way to provide a satisfactory explanation at the philosophical level for the Incarnation/hypostatic union.

Now, I do not think that it is wise to build demonstrations of the existence of God that are based on the RD. IMV, increasing the burden of prerequirements decreases the likelihood of success.

Last edited by Johannes (12/21/2017 5:25 pm)

Miguel wrote:

I'll reply to nojoum later.

joewaked wrote:

Johannes wrote:

God is required as a metaphysical explanation, irrespective of whether the universe started in time or existed from an infinite past. In both cases the universe is a contingent entity, it does not exist by necessity, therefore its existence either is a brute fact or is explained by the creative action of the Subsistent Being, whose essence is existence itself.

 
 
I’m sorry for being dense here, but I don’t follow why the stone is remaining in existence.   I can understand that it needed a creative action because it’s contingent.  But, to me, that does not account for why it remains in existence.

 
The stone's essence is distinct from its existence. Not only does this mean that the stone is a contingent being which needs an explanation for why it exists instead of not existing (since it doesn't have to exist), from which we can give a leibnizian cosmological argument, but it is also the case that it needs to be kept in existence at all times.... The whole series of conditioned existents must terminate in a being whose existence is not conditioned by anything else; a self-sufficient being.

Would this be Thomas’ Second Way?