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3/30/2018 8:18 am  #121


Re: Specified geographical location as a requisite of causation?

surroundx wrote:

FrenchySkepticalCatholic wrote:

Locomotion implies that the location of a particle changes, correct?

Correct.

And the location of a particle isn't a property because ___________ ?

 

3/30/2018 8:51 pm  #122


Re: Specified geographical location as a requisite of causation?

FrenchySkepticalCatholic wrote:

And the location of a particle isn't a property because ___________ ?

There is no explanatory benefit to saying that it's location is an (extrinsic) property. And it's less parsimonious to do so. Hence, we shouldn't postulate it being a property. I also don't see "extrinsic property" making any sense.

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3/30/2018 10:46 pm  #123


Re: Specified geographical location as a requisite of causation?

surroundx wrote:

FrenchySkepticalCatholic wrote:

And the location of a particle isn't a property because ___________ ?

There is no explanatory benefit to saying that it's location is an (extrinsic) property. And it's less parsimonious to do so. Hence, we shouldn't postulate it being a property. I also don't see "extrinsic property" making any sense.

You're going too fast. I said "property", not "extrinsic property". Second, the fact that "you don't see [it] making any sense" and that "it's less parsimonious" are reasons that I'd qualify as weak - but perhaps it's your wording.

Though, for the sake of the argument, I'll bite.

"Location isn't a property because it's less parsimonious if we postulate it as a property?" Is that what you're saying? If so, what is "location", if it's not a property?

 

3/31/2018 12:32 am  #124


Re: Specified geographical location as a requisite of causation?

FrenchySkepticalCatholic wrote:

You're going too fast. I said "property", not "extrinsic property". Second, the fact that "you don't see [it] making any sense" and that "it's less parsimonious" are reasons that I'd qualify as weak - but perhaps it's your wording.

Though, for the sake of the argument, I'll bite.

"Location isn't a property because it's less parsimonious if we postulate it as a property?" Is that what you're saying? If so, what is "location", if it's not a property?

Do you accept the intrinsic/extrinsic property distinction? If so, surely you'd agree that location is extrinsic since a particular's location can change without any substantial/formal change?

We'll just have to disagree about the strength of parsimony I suppose. I don't see a way of adjudicating on it. Although I'm obviously open to suggestions.

If for the sake of the argument we allow the possibility of infinite extension, then an infinitely extended particular's location just is it's existence (i.e. it is not localized). It is only for finitely extended particulars that a change of location (local motion) is even possible. So that location is simply the proportional inverse of extension.

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3/31/2018 5:06 am  #125


Re: Specified geographical location as a requisite of causation?

surroundx wrote:

Do you accept the intrinsic/extrinsic property distinction? If so, surely you'd agree that location is extrinsic since a particular's location can change without any substantial/formal change?

Alright, I'll bite again. Let's say that the location is extrinsic. It's a property of the particle or something else? To what it is?

surroundx wrote:

We'll just have to disagree about the strength of parsimony I suppose. I don't see a way of adjudicating on it. Although I'm obviously open to suggestions.

Oh no. It's fine. I don't mind accepting it for the sake of the argument.

surroundx wrote:

If for the sake of the argument we allow the possibility of infinite extension, then an infinitely extended particular's location just is it's existence (i.e. it is not localized). It is only for finitely extended particulars that a change of location (local motion) is even possible. So that location is simply the proportional inverse of extension.

I'd use your parsimony argument and say that "infinitely extension" is way opposed to anything parsimonious.

But I'll bite again. Let's assume it's right. How do you go from there to our worldly perceptions?

 

3/31/2018 10:06 pm  #126


Re: Specified geographical location as a requisite of causation?

FrenchySkepticalCatholic wrote:

Alright, I'll bite again. Let's say that the location is extrinsic. It's a property of the particle or something else? To what it is?

Even if there are properties, it doesn't follow that location is a property does it?

FrenchySkepticalCatholic wrote:

I'd use your parsimony argument and say that "infinitely extension" is way opposed to anything parsimonious.

I completely agree. It was just a way of illustrating that locomotion is only possible for finitely extended particulars/entities. And thus location arises as a result of finite extension.

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3/31/2018 10:56 pm  #127


Re: Specified geographical location as a requisite of causation?

surroundx wrote:

Even if there are properties, it doesn't follow that location is a property does it?

I completely agree. It was just a way of illustrating that locomotion is only possible for finitely extended particulars/entities. And thus location arises as a result of finite extension.

Please answer my points before bringing more into the discussion. Otherwise, especially now that you're speaking about locomotion and doing this, it sounds like you're someone I honestly don't want to talk to again.

FrenchySkepticalCatholic wrote:

Alright, I'll bite again. Let's say that the location is extrinsic. It's a property of the particle or something else? To what it is?

But I'll bite again. Let's assume it's right. How do you go from there to our worldly perceptions?

I'll also add : extension appears to be a property in your view. If not, what is it? It appears to be something shared between things.

Though, no offense again, but I'll be honest : the fact you're speaking about extension so far with me is like "well, it's a yellow duck, except that there really isn't a duck, and it's not yellow". It sounds like garbage unless you clarify your position a lot more. Do a drawing or something, or appeal to a concrete example, because this discussion is starting to annoy me, as I feel I'm worming all out of you, speaking in circles about something that I highly doubt is correctly defined. I'm continuing the discussion for the sake of curiosity, but it's really tiring. It's like having a huge Platonic toast of a pure mental representation of a paradox. Sure, it might be "the Ultimate Thing" for you, while "being material" and all, but so far, it sounds like pure idealism to me.

 

3/31/2018 11:25 pm  #128


Re: Specified geographical location as a requisite of causation?

If you feel that your time is being wasted, then please end the discussion.

FrenchySkepticalCatholic wrote:

Please answer my points before bringing more into the discussion. Otherwise, especially now that you're speaking about locomotion and doing this, it sounds like you're someone I honestly don't want to talk to again.

As I've already said, I don't think properties exist. So there's nothing for me to answer regards location as a property. I've already explained my personal position. If you're unclear on what that is, then perhaps the rest of my reply will clarify.

On your view it seems to me that location is extrinsic. But then again you seem to have only granted it for the sake of the argument, so perhaps not.

I discussed locomotion with someone earlier in this thread, so I haven't suddenly raised the notion out of nowhere.

FrenchySkepticalCatholic wrote:

I'll also add : extension appears to be a property in your view. If not, what is it? It appears to be something shared between things.

A particular's extension simply is the thing itself.
 

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4/01/2018 12:38 am  #129


Re: Specified geographical location as a requisite of causation?

surroundx wrote:

As I've already said, I don't think properties exist. So there's nothing for me to answer regards location as a property. I've already explained my personal position. If you're unclear on what that is, then perhaps the rest of my reply will clarify.
On your view it seems to me that location is extrinsic. But then again you seem to have only granted it for the sake of the argument, so perhaps not.
I discussed locomotion with someone earlier in this thread, so I haven't suddenly raised the notion out of nowhere.A particular's extension simply is the thing itself.

Location can be extrinsic. I don't see what would change if we say that it's either intrinsic or not.

My biggest problem is that when you say "a particular's extension simply is the thing itself". You seem to be mixing a kind of monism and pluralism, as if it was a bastardized view of both Parmenides and Democritus. I'm all ears, but when you're saying that "a particular's extension simply is the thing itself", you appear to be saying that "only particulars exist", that "extension is something vital", but nothing more. All I perceive is a "word semantic island", and I can't picture what it is. As I said, give me a concrete example. I tried to give you drawings and questions earlier, but you don't appear to be bothered to do the same : what's a particle to you? How do you move from a particle to a concrete daily life example? What are these particulars you're speaking about?

erhaps I'm harsh, though, yes :

surroundx wrote:

If you feel that your time is being wasted, then please end the discussion.

I may, but a charitable reading of your posts make me think you're perhaps having a defeater for my position.

Last edited by FrenchySkepticalCatholic (4/01/2018 12:45 am)

 

4/01/2018 8:32 am  #130


Re: Specified geographical location as a requisite of causation?

FrenchySkepticalCatholic wrote:

My biggest problem is that when you say "a particular's extension simply is the thing itself". You seem to be mixing a kind of monism and pluralism, as if it was a bastardized view of both Parmenides and Democritus. I'm all ears, but when you're saying that "a particular's extension simply is the thing itself", you appear to be saying that "only particulars exist", that "extension is something vital", but nothing more. All I perceive is a "word semantic island", and I can't picture what it is.

If we take the Divine Simplicity model, then "Omniscience", "Omnipotence" etc. aren't really distinct in God. And yet it is useful to distinguish between them in our mind so that we can understand God's true nature. Likewise, we can talk about a (simple) particulars "existence" or "extension" or "body", even though they aren't really distinct. Ironically, it is easier for us to think about the complex than the truly simple.

FrenchySkepticalCatholic wrote:

As I said, give me a concrete example. I tried to give you drawings and questions earlier, but you don't appear to be bothered to do the same : what's a particle to you? How do you move from a particle to a concrete daily life example? What are these particulars you're speaking about?

There are composites (e.g. us humans), which necessitates the existence of simples/particulars. Which I'll leave as an assertion for now, since I'm still working on perfecting the syllogism. Parsimony demands that we only infer sub-quark particles if quarks are insufficient for the job of simples. At present I'm agnostic about whether the two are synonymous. I simply don't know enough about the physics.

I'm not sure what you mean by a 'daily life example'?

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