- FrenchySkepticalCatholic
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Re: Specified geographical location as a requisite of causation?
John West wrote:
Frenchy:
I've been focusing on surroundx, because I pretty much know how Thomists are going to reply to questions. I can't, however, let you off completely:Nope, no "not at all", you're fueling my own mill here: how can two different things can be "identical" on some quality, respect or anything if they don't share something, e.g. have something in common?
At some point, I'll write more about blob nominalism. Until then, you should look into a variety called resemblance nominalism.
Yeup. I know about it. Though resemblance nominalism calls for resemblance relation, which, being a primer, is not analyzable. Best case I know of is by G. Rodriguez-Pereyra, Resemblance Nominalism : A Solution to the Problem of Universals. We can work with that if you want, JW; I don't mind going down that road, but it has many spikes to drive on. 
(I guess you're also familiar with Jeffrey Grupp, Blob Theory: N-adic Properties Do Not Exist?)
Scholastic philosophy is more or less a common sense philosophy, and Frenchy is a good scholastic. I know what rules he's playing by.
Be careful to not overestimate me, John. I'm not a scholastic per se, I just found that what I read from there appears to be the most coherent, the clearest, the simplest, most beautiful explanation and thus seems to be the right one; but it doesn't make me a philosopher for that. ^^' There are many points of scholasticism I'm ignorant about; and I've only read as far as my skeptical side pushed me to search for questions and sound philosophy. 
Last edited by FrenchySkepticalCatholic (4/17/2018 4:29 am)
- surroundx
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Re: Specified geographical location as a requisite of causation?
I suppose I'm looking for your preferred formulation of the principle of parsimony, and (if it's not obvious) an explanation of how the relevant views are therefore more parsimonious than Thomists like Frenchy's.
For any given explanandum, the explanans is assumed to be the simplest that one can think of, unless/until either:
i One becomes aware of a simpler explanans
ii One changes one's mind as to the relative simplicity of two explanans
iii The explanans is shown to be insufficient
iiii Two (or more) equally simple explanans exist (in which case agnosticism is called for)
The motivation: if two proposed explanans of a single explanandum are differentiated from each other in their simplicity, then the more complex (i.e. less simple) is ad hoc relative to the simpler explanans proportional to its greater complexity.
Frenchy holds to formal causation, whereas I see no reason to invoke formal cause. Which, depending upon what you take to be the relevant views, might not be so much a case of us debating which explanans is simpler, but rather whether there is an explanandum (that calls for an explanans) in the first place.
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Thread Starter- FrenchySkepticalCatholic
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Re: Specified geographical location as a requisite of causation?
Frenchy holds to formal causation, whereas I see no reason to invoke formal cause. Which, depending upon what you take to be the relevant views, might not be so much a case of us debating which explanans is simpler, but rather whether there is an explanandum (that calls for an explanans) in the first place.
Correct. For you, the simplest explanation is going to be the correct one, but for me, you're trimming away too much.
- John West
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Re: Specified geographical location as a requisite of causation?
It's worth introducing the notion of an internal relation. A relation is internal if and only if its relata necessitate it. (A relation is external if and only if its relata don't necessitate it.)
It's also worth defining (a slightly modified version of) Armstrong's reductive principle for internal relations. The reductive principle for internal relations states that if two or more particulars are internally related, then the relation is nothing over and above the relata that necessitate that relation.
Yeup. I know about it. Though resemblance nominalism calls for resemblance relation, which, being a primer, is not analyzable.
So, the by now standard reply to the resemblance regress is (i) resemblance relations are internal relations; (ii), the reductive principle for internal relations holds; therefore (iii), the resemblance relation is nothing more than the relata that necessitate it.
(i) follows from analysis of the nature of resemblance; (ii) is plausible and popular among realists and nominalists, all of who have fundamental relations and would otherwise face similar regresses (e.g. realists and instantiating the instantiation relation); (iii) follows from (i) and (ii).
- John West
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Re: Specified geographical location as a requisite of causation?
iii The explanans is shown to be insufficient
What, for you, constitutes a sufficient explanans?
Frenchy holds to formal causation, whereas I see no reason to invoke formal cause. Which, depending upon what you take to be the relevant views, might not be so much a case of us debating which explanans is simpler, but rather whether there is an explanandum (that calls for an explanans) in the first place.
You see, historically, wielders of principles like Ockham's razor often had corresponding anti-razors (i.e. principles of plurality). Thus Ockham's (full, historical) razor was something like this:
No extra-mental distinction among extra-mental things should be assumed unless the distinction can be proved (a) by arguments from premises that are either self-evident or else come from indubitable experience or, (b) by unquestionable experience of extra-mental things, or (c) by some infallible authority such as the Bible, the Saints, or certain Ecclesiastical pronouncements.
And by removing the negatives, Ockham's anti-razor:
An extra-mental distinction among extra-mental things should be assumed if the distinction can be proved (a) by arguments from premises that are either self-evident or else come from indubitable experience or, (b) by unquestionable experience of extra-mental things, or (c) by some infallible authority such as the Bible, the Saints, or certain Ecclesiastical pronouncements.
Truthmaker theory plays a similar role in a lot of contemporary debates (and is not unlike Ockham's great rival's principle).
- surroundx
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Re: Specified geographical location as a requisite of causation?
What, for you, constitutes a sufficient explanans?
I don't see that there is such a thing. Rather, explanans are culled one by one until you're left with only one. In which case you either hold it to be the actual explanans, accept that there is an explanans you haven't thought of, or you throw out the explanandum.
You see, historically, wielders of principles like Ockham's razor often had corresponding anti-razors (i.e. principles of plurality).
Right. One can specify conditions under which we are committed to a given explananda/entity. Which concerns not merely explicit ontological commitments (e.g. I believe x exists), but also our implicit ones (e.g. I believe x exists).
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Thread Starter- John West
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Re: Specified geographical location as a requisite of causation?
I don't see that there is such a thing. Rather, explanans are culled one by one until you're left with only one. In which case you either hold it to be the actual explanans, accept that there is an explanans you haven't thought of, or you throw out the explanandum.
I see. I asked because I can imagine a scenario where person a and person b disagree over whether explanans Q is sufficient to explain explanandum P, or whether explanans Q&R is needed, and I was wondering whether you had some general criteria for deciding which is right.