Just to add something to the discussion. UDawg, what do you think of this?

"Here’s what I am trying to maintain. The Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) states that there is no contingent fact for which there is nothing we can say by way of explanation of it’s being true. I believe that the PSR is correct. I also believe that having something to say by way of explaining a contingent fact’s truth can, in some cases (at least one case) be the very same thing as having something to say by way of explaining it’s being true rather than not. Thus, I claim that the contrastive question adds absolutely nothing to the original question in some cases or at least one case. Why do we think it does? I suspect that we think we’re asking a deeper question when we ask the contrastive question because what we are looking for is a causal explanation. By a causal explanation, I’ll say that what we mean is an explanation of the following variety: that identifying all the relevant antecedents will of necessity give us the consequent(s). I think that this very question is antithetical to Libertarian Free Will (LFW) – it is literally question-begging."

https://thirdmillennialtemplar.wordpress.com/2013/06/20/the-psr-and-libertarian-freedom-contrastive-questions-and-causal-stories/

Definitely. Go for it

Gentlemen, since the issue of quantum indeterminism vs PSR has surfaced on this thread, I'd like to point out a brief coverage thereof that I posted in 2016:

http://classicaltheism.boardhost.com/viewtopic.php?id=528

Personally, I agree with the quoted position of Alexander Pruss. Note that the hypothesis that Bohmian mechanics is true and reality is nonlocally deterministic has no practical use whatsoever, as its application would require quasi-infinite observational and computational capabilities.