I may have this wrong, but Kant's position, as given in this thread, seems to me to be incoherent. It seems to trying to deny us any sort of trans-subjective knowledge, but to avoid complete subjective idealism or radical scepticism.

If one does think we can never get past our concepts (a claim that needs expanding upon), why would we subscribe to Kant's position rather than these other ones?

Marty wrote:

Miguel wrote:

Marty wrote:

Considering there is no sense of time w.r.t to noumenon - if I were to even consider it in the positive sense which Kant rejects - then where's the contradiction that that something is both the same thing and not the same thing at the same time? Since time again isn't noumenal? 

 
The "at the same time" in most formulations of PNC is not actually what we call time. In fact, you may drop it from the proposition if you will. It is enough that "it is impossible for the same thing to be and not be"m just like God can't both be and not be (even though God is not in time; the "at the same time" is just a rejoinder commonly used for PNC). PNC is obviously not limited to time and never has been thought so, either by Aristotle, Aquinas, Leibniz, or whoever. So we can drop all references to what seems like time and formulate it as I did. I ask again: after all, can you affirm that of the noumenon? Can you say that there aren't and can be no contradictions, no violations of PNC, in the noumenon? Can you say that without saying anything positive about it? Can you say it's true even in the noumenon that "it is impossible for a thing to be and not be"? If you can't, then transcendental idealism is false.

That's fine. I wasn't the one who brought it up.

I don't see how the latter follows at all without begging the question.

 
It's not begging the question. The Kantian may have no problem with allowing for contradictions in the noumenon, but for me PNC -- as a completely universal principle, extending beyond our minds and experience, being the very fabric of being -- is something I take to be true with 100% certainty, so for me it completely overrides and refutes transcendental idealism.

Just as my argument from experience can be accepted by the Kantian; he may accept that it lowers the plausibility of transcendental idealism because, all things being equal (on both sides) experience is best explained by positing a PSR incompatible with transcendental idealism. The Kantian may accept this but still hold on to TI because he thinks TI is still more plausible even despite that. There is question-begging if he refuses to accept that experience is best explained by PSR and ~TI without offering any reason other than that of TI being true. But he can, as I said, bite the bullet and still accept TI, which is different from begging the question. But I can't, and lots of people can't. Likewise, I can't deny my understanding of PNC, and in fact I can't even fathom denying it, so my conclusion is that transcendental idealism is false.

So if you take TI to establish the falsity of a PNC which applies absolutely, even in the noumenon, I take it as a "moorean shift" against TI.

Last edited by Miguel (3/11/2018 12:20 pm)

Marty wrote:

I mean, I don't see what the PNC has to do with anything, though.

 

 
If someone accepts PNC as I said and as you said transcendental idealism means that PNC may not hold in the noumenon, then transcendental idealism will be false for that someone. If transcendental idealism is false, there will be no reason to even worry about Kantian objections discussed in the OP since they can't get off the ground.

Last edited by Miguel (3/11/2018 9:52 pm)

Marty wrote:

It is true that there is a nounemon. As for something being "in" the noumenon I just don't know what that even would mean. 

 
Sure, and it would have to be true that the noumenon is bound by the principle of non-contradiction, the noumenon must be logically coherent and subjected to PNC, and likewise that whatever could go on in the noumenon would have to be logically coherent and not contradictory in any way. We have to be able to affirm a true fact of the matter about the noumenon regarding the principle of non-contradiction.

None of this would be acceptable for a transcendental idealist to say, I'm aware. That's why I (and many) take transcendental idealism to be demonstrably false.

Marty wrote:

Miguel wrote:

Marty wrote:

It is true that there is a nounemon. As for something being "in" the noumenon I just don't know what that even would mean. 

 
Sure, and it would have to be true that the noumenon is bound by the principle of non-contradiction, the noumenon must be logically coherent and subjected to PNC, and likewise that whatever could go on in the noumenon would have to be logically coherent and not contradictory in any way. We have to be able to affirm a true fact of the matter about the noumenon regarding the principle of non-contradiction.

None of this would be acceptable for a transcendental idealist to say, I'm aware. That's why I (and many) take transcendental idealism to be demonstrably false.

You think Immanuel Kant wouldn't affirm that the noumenon exists, and that we can't apply its existence as oppose to its nonexistence? 

Exactly where does Kant say this? That we can't apply the PNC in the sense that the noumenon is, as opposed to it not existing? I'm bewildered at your background in Kant. 

 
No, and I am bewildered at your repeated incapacity to understand what I'm saying. Traditional accptance of PNC would necessarily imply that PNC holds *in* what would be the "noumenon" and way beyond our experience, being far more than just a principle of how our mind interprets the world. Which doesn't make any sense for the transcendental idealist. Which is why people reject transcendental idealism. Jeremy in this same thread expressed worry about TI being incoherent and you didn't reply.

I have repeatedly asked you to answer my question, first you talked about how it was question-begging, then I explained it doesn't, then you revert to talking about there BEING a noumenon when that is not what my question was about and is not what I'm saying. I am saying that PNC must hold of and IN the noumenon, but for the Kantian this is unintelligible, it wouldn't even make sense of speaking of what must be the case in the noumenon. Yet PNC as traditionally understood requires that, as so does PSR, which is why this topic even exists in the first place with OP talking about Kantian objections to PC.

Do you understand it now and can you answer my question, or shall we keep going back and forth?

If you wish to make it quicker, write down your own understanding of the principle of non-contradiction and how it relates to the world (anything) and the noumenon, and what the noumenon is. If you can preserve Kant's transcendental idealism AND the traditional understanding of PNC then you'll have refuted the argument. If you can't, that's what I'm saying.

To be clear, my view is that PNC reigns supreme over anything we can know and not know; it applies to our experience, applies to all that would or could be beyond our experience, applies to our understanding of the world and to anything that could lie beyond our understanding, applies to God - is in fact a way to understand God -, is not a way we interpret things but rather a direct insight we can have into the very fabric of being and reality. If Kant is okay with all of that, then my objection doesn't work. If he isn't, there you have it.

Last edited by Miguel (3/12/2018 5:40 pm)