Miguel, is there not a sense in which you're failing to distinguish between PNC and other truths w.r.t. the analytic / synthetic distinction?

Truths about spatio-temporal reality, or categorical relations e.g. substance / accident and cause / effect, are synthetic. Kant's whole project was concerned with showing how synthetic a priori knowledge of this sort was possible, in answer of which he argued that the the forms of sensibility and understanding must be the case w.r.t. the phenomena, which goes a long way in explaining why he thinks they cannot be predicated of the noumena.

But this says nothing of analytic truths, i.e. it seems to me Kant could happily accept that they apply everywhere and always, while noting this is irrelevant as it regards the more synthetic truths, of which PSR would be one example.

So I'm not seeing any contradiction.

Miguel wrote:

UGADawg wrote:

Miguel, is there not a sense in which you're failing to distinguish between PNC and other truths w.r.t. the analytic / synthetic distinction?

Truths about spatio-temporal reality, or categorical relations e.g. substance / accident and cause / effect, are synthetic. Kant's whole project was concerned with showing how synthetic a priori knowledge of this sort was possible, in answer of which he argued that the the forms of sensibility and understanding must be the case w.r.t. the phenomena, which goes a long way in explaining why he thinks they cannot be predicated of the noumena.

But this says nothing of analytic truths, i.e. it seems to me Kant could happily accept that they apply everywhere and always, while noting this is irrelevant as it regards the more synthetic truths, of which PSR would be one example.

So I'm not seeing any contradiction.

 
Are you replying to my PSR argument or my PNC argument?

What I'm saying about PNC is because AFAIK Kant denies that the first principles of thought by themselves can give us knowledge about things; for us to know anything about an object it must be given in experience, thus he goes on to talk about the transcendental conditions of experience. But to me this is in contradiction with the fact that PNC gives us real knowledge about real objects even if we never experience them; PNC is a direct insight into being and its nature as such, and therefore PNC by itself gives us a knowledge of objects.

As I said, if Kant would be okay with what I said, then my objection would be blocked, but that's not something he can be okay with AFAIK.

I was waiting for it. 

Since Marty doesn't answer my question, I went ahead and did some research in case I was gettng Kant's positions confused. This is from the SEP:

Despite the fact that Kant devotes an entirely new section of the Critique to the branches of special metaphysics, his criticisms reiterate some of the claims already defended in both the Transcendental Aesthetic and the Transcendental Analytic. Indeed, two central teachings from these earlier portions of the Critique — the transcendental ideality of space and time, and the critical limitation of all application of the concepts of the understanding to “appearances” — already carry with them Kant's rejection of “ontology (metaphysica generalis).”  Accordingly, in the Transcendental Analytic Kant argues against any attempt to acquire knowledge of “objects in general” through the formal concepts and principles of the understanding, taken by themselves alone. In this connection, Kant denies that the principles or rules of either general logic (e.g., the principle of contradiction), or those of his own “transcendental logic” (the pure concepts of the understanding) by themselves yield knowledge of objects. These claims follow from Kant's well-known “kind distinction” between the understanding and sensibility, together with the view that knowledge requires the cooperation of both faculties. This position, articulated throughout the Analytic, entails that independently of their application to intuitions, the concepts and principles of the understanding are mere forms of thought which cannot yield knowledge of objects.

For if no intuition could be given corresponding to the concept, the concept would still be a thought, so far as its form is concerned, but would be without any object, and no knowledge of anything would be possible by means of it. So far as I could know, there would be nothing, and could be nothing, to which my thought could be applied. B147
We thus find one general complaint about efforts to acquire metaphysical knowledge: the use of formal concepts and principles, in abstraction from the sensible conditions under which objects can be given, cannot yield knowledge. Hence, the “transcendental” use of the understanding (its use independently of the conditions of sensibility) is considered by Kant to be dialectical, to involve erroneous applications of concepts in order to acquire knowledge of things independently of sensibility/experience. Throughout the Analytic Kant elaborates on this general view, noting that the transcendental employment of the understanding, which aims towards knowledge of things independently of experience (and thus knowledge of “noumena”), is illicit (cf. A246/B303). It is in this connection that Kant states, famously, in the Analytic, that “…the proud name of ontology, which presumes to offer synthetic a priori cognitions of things in general… must give way to the more modest title of a transcendental analytic” (cf. A247/B304). Filling this out, Kant suggests that to take ourselves to have unmediated intellectual access to objects (to have “non-sensible” knowledge) correlates with the assumption that there are non-sensible objects that we can know. To assume this, however, is to conflate “phenomena” (or appearances) with “noumena” (or things in themselves). The failure to draw the distinction between appearances and things in themselves is the hallmark of all those pernicious systems of thought that stand under the title of “transcendental realism.”  Kant's transcendental idealism is the remedy for these.

2. The Rejection of Special Metaphysics and the Transcendental Dialectic
Kant's rejection of the more specialized branches of metaphysics is in part grounded in this earlier claim, to wit, that any attempt to apply the concepts and principles of the understanding independently of the conditions of sensibility (i.e., any transcendental use of the understanding) is illicit. Thus, one of Kant's main complaints is that metaphysicians seek to deduce a priori synthetic knowledge simply from the unschematized (pure) concepts of the understanding. The effort to acquire metaphysical knowledge through concepts alone, however, is doomed to fail, according to Kant, because (in its simplest formulation) “concepts without intuitions are empty” (A52/B76).

This is where I have a problem with Kant. This is why I kept repeating that PNC is an insight into the nature of being that gives us knowledge of objects; PNC by itself gives us knowledge of objects. Which is why someone who holds to the traditional understanding of PNC can make a moorean shift here. It's what I keep saying. As I repeated for like, 3 or 4 times, if Kant would be okay with what I said then the argument would be blocked. But it doesn't seem to me to be the case. If it isn't, let me know - UGADawg, at least, since Marty keeps avoiding the question for whatever reason. I am not trying to just refute Kant at all costs, I am playing with arguments and I'm not trying to misrepresent his position or anything like that, and I've said numerous times that if Kant's view could be reconciled with what I said about PNC then the arg would be blocked. But still, from the looks of it, it doesn't seem to me that my position would be acceptable for Kant. And it still seems to me that Kant's view of the first principles and knowledge is completely incoherent.

Last edited by Miguel (3/14/2018 8:01 pm)

Miguel wrote:

Since Marty doesn't answer my question, I went ahead and did some research in case I was gettng Kant's positions confused. This is from the SEP:

Despite the fact that Kant devotes an entirely new section of the Critique to the branches of special metaphysics, his criticisms reiterate some of the claims already defended in both the Transcendental Aesthetic and the Transcendental Analytic. Indeed, two central teachings from these earlier portions of the Critique — the transcendental ideality of space and time, and the critical limitation of all application of the concepts of the understanding to “appearances” — already carry with them Kant's rejection of “ontology (metaphysica generalis).” Accordingly, in the Transcendental Analytic Kant argues against any attempt to acquire knowledge of “objects in general” through the formal concepts and principles of the understanding, taken by themselves alone. In this connection, Kant denies that the principles or rules of either general logic (e.g., the principle of contradiction), or those of his own “transcendental logic” (the pure concepts of the understanding) by themselves yield knowledge of objects. These claims follow from Kant's well-known “kind distinction” between the understanding and sensibility, together with the view that knowledge requires the cooperation of both faculties. This position, articulated throughout the Analytic, entails that independently of their application to intuitions, the concepts and principles of the understanding are mere forms of thought which cannot yield knowledge of objects.

For if no intuition could be given corresponding to the concept, the concept would still be a thought, so far as its form is concerned, but would be without any object, and no knowledge of anything would be possible by means of it. So far as I could know, there would be nothing, and could be nothing, to which my thought could be applied. B147
We thus find one general complaint about efforts to acquire metaphysical knowledge: the use of formal concepts and principles, in abstraction from the sensible conditions under which objects can be given, cannot yield knowledge. Hence, the “transcendental” use of the understanding (its use independently of the conditions of sensibility) is considered by Kant to be dialectical, to involve erroneous applications of concepts in order to acquire knowledge of things independently of sensibility/experience. Throughout the Analytic Kant elaborates on this general view, noting that the transcendental employment of the understanding, which aims towards knowledge of things independently of experience (and thus knowledge of “noumena”), is illicit (cf. A246/B303). It is in this connection that Kant states, famously, in the Analytic, that “…the proud name of ontology, which presumes to offer synthetic a priori cognitions of things in general… must give way to the more modest title of a transcendental analytic” (cf. A247/B304). Filling this out, Kant suggests that to take ourselves to have unmediated intellectual access to objects (to have “non-sensible” knowledge) correlates with the assumption that there are non-sensible objects that we can know. To assume this, however, is to conflate “phenomena” (or appearances) with “noumena” (or things in themselves). The failure to draw the distinction between appearances and things in themselves is the hallmark of all those pernicious systems of thought that stand under the title of “transcendental realism.” Kant's transcendental idealism is the remedy for these.

2. The Rejection of Special Metaphysics and the Transcendental Dialectic
Kant's rejection of the more specialized branches of metaphysics is in part grounded in this earlier claim, to wit, that any attempt to apply the concepts and principles of the understanding independently of the conditions of sensibility (i.e., any transcendental use of the understanding) is illicit. Thus, one of Kant's main complaints is that metaphysicians seek to deduce a priori synthetic knowledge simply from the unschematized (pure) concepts of the understanding. The effort to acquire metaphysical knowledge through concepts alone, however, is doomed to fail, according to Kant, because (in its simplest formulation) “concepts without intuitions are empty” (A52/B76).

This is where I have a problem with Kant. This is why I kept repeating that PNC is an insight into the nature of being that gives us knowledge of objects; PNC by itself gives us knowledge of objects. Which is why someone who holds to the traditional understanding of PNC can make a moorean shift here. It's what I keep saying. As I repeated for like, 3 or 4 times, if Kant would be okay with what I said then the argument would be blocked. But it doesn't seem to me to be the case. If it isn't, let me know - UGADawg, at least, since Marty keeps avoiding the question for whatever reason. I am not trying to just refute Kant at all costs, I am playing with arguments and I'm not trying to misrepresent his position or anything like that, and I've said numerous times that if Kant's view could be reconciled with what I said about PNC then the arg would be blocked. But still, from the looks of it, it doesn't seem to me that my position would be acceptable for Kant. And it still seems to me that Kant's view of the first principles and knowledge is completely incoherent.

Moorean criticisms don't work on any form of Idealism outside of Berekely for the obvious fact that it misses the point that the hand isn't a mere thought, but require both intutions and concepts. Hence Kant never speaks of experience as being mere mental content. 

Marty wrote:

And I've already answered to you that we can know the noumenon exists, in the negative sense. When Kant mentions we can't know the noumenon, he means it in the positive sense. All the noumenon becomes is merely an epistemic limit - hence the appeal to dual-aspect views. But you seem to be dealing with ontological differences between phenomenon and noumenon, which I don't think is tenable. 

 
I didn't doubt that Kant could say the noumenon exists in the negative sense. My argument is based around what PNC tells us as a first principle of thought; I think it is a direct insight into being which gives us direct knowledge of being as such. It is my understanding that for Kant this could not be the case -- as seems implied by the quote in my last post. The relevance is that AFAIK this position of Kant is relevant to the objections he might raise against PSR per the OP.