Posted by Miguel  3/12/2018 11:32 am | #1 |
Lonergan has a complex case for the thesis that the first cause must be an unrestricted act of understanding, in that it would have to answer all questions one can pose: therefore providi not only an efficient cause, but also a final and an exemplary one.
But there's a simple argument he appears to make, too, in defending the free action of the first cause. I quote from Hugo Meynell's Introduction to the Philosophy of Bernard Lonergan:
"Moreover, the ground of the universe cannot be necessitated in founding a contingent universe, for what follows necessarily from the necessary is itself necessary. But it cannot be arbitrary either, since what resulted arbitrarily from the necessary would be mere matter of fact without explanation. 'But what is neither necessary nor arbitrary yet intelligible and a value, is what proceeds freely from the choice of a rational consciousness.' "
What do you think?
The first part (no contingent from a necessary) has featured in some arguments before. But I wonder if it would even be necessary for the second part. Basically, if the existence of the universe followed necessarily from a cause (or at least an impersonal cause), wouldn't this also be a "mere matter of fact" and not fully explain the universe (and thus not satisfy PSR)? If, ultimately, the existence of everything had no *purpose* and, in this sense, no *value*, wouldn't it be mere matter of fact, wouldn't there remain an unanswered question? What exactly would be explanatory about the idea that the universe was necessitated by an impersonal necessary being which didn't choose anything, but merely "had in its nature" to create the universe?
This is not an appeal to teleological considerations of the universe (which I think is a good way to argue for the personhood/intelligence of the first cause anyway). It's an appeal to the idea that it seems like something is left unexplained when we say the universe was created with no rational ends in mind; that it was simply the product of a mindless necessary being - well, wouldn't that be perilously similar to Bertrand Russell's "the universe is just there"?
(Maybe one could add axiological considerations, such as Rescher's and Leslie's, which I always found to make more sense under theism...)
(Another possibility would be to argue from the goodness of the first cause, which may come close to rationality as well... Aquinas answered that the universe was created because good is difusive, God though not forced would want to share His goodness, etc. The point is that a "naturalist first cause" would really not be able to explain why things exist in the first place)
Last edited by Miguel (3/12/2018 11:38 am)
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Posted by DanielCC 3/12/2018 12:06 pm | #2 |
Miguel wrote:
Lonergan has a complex case for the thesis that the first cause must be an unrestricted act of understanding, in that it would have to answer all questions one can pose: therefore providi not only an efficient cause, but also a final and an exemplary one.
But there's a simple argument he appears to make, too, in defending the free action of the first cause. I quote from Hugo Meynell's Introduction to the Philosophy of Bernard Lonergan:
"Moreover, the ground of the universe cannot be necessitated in founding a contingent universe, for what follows necessarily from the necessary is itself necessary. But it cannot be arbitrary either, since what resulted arbitrarily from the necessary would be mere matter of fact without explanation. 'But what is neither necessary nor arbitrary yet intelligible and a value, is what proceeds freely from the choice of a rational consciousness.' "
What do you think?
The first part (no contingent from a necessary) has featured in some arguments before. But I wonder if it would even be necessary for the second part. Basically, if the existence of the universe followed necessarily from a cause (or at least an impersonal cause), wouldn't this also be a "mere matter of fact" and not fully explain the universe (and thus not satisfy PSR)? If, ultimately, the existence of everything had no *purpose* and, in this sense, no *value*, wouldn't it be mere matter of fact, wouldn't there remain an unanswered question? What exactly would be explanatory about the idea that the universe was necessitated by an impersonal necessary being which didn't choose anything, but merely "had in its nature" to create the universe?
This is not an appeal to teleological considerations of the universe (which I think is a good way to argue for the personhood/intelligence of the first cause anyway). It's an appeal to the idea that it seems like something is left unexplained when we say the universe was created with no rational ends in mind; that it was simply the product of a mindless necessary being - well, wouldn't that be perilously similar to Bertrand Russell's "the universe is just there"?
I am not convinced. The impersonal cause that explains everything is a necessary being, thus satisfying PSR* requirements, whereas the universe just being there is an admission of a bare brute fact, thus incompatible with the PSR. I don't see how you can go from beings having no axiological value to their coming into existence being a brute fact.
Also: how would you understand purpose in that quote? It cannot be purpose in the sense of instrumental value assigned by an agent? But if we are talking about inherent purpose then all we get is a kind of immanent teleology.
*Of course we have the modal collapse problem - if the being is not a free agent and its actualising this world follows from its nature, then it's hard to avoid the conclusion that its actualizing the world is also necessary. If we take contrastive explanations to be required then the defender of such a being is in a tight spot.
Last edited by DanielCC (3/12/2018 12:07 pm)
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Posted by Proclus 3/12/2018 12:12 pm | #3 |
I think it depends on the kind of explanation that is required to satisfy PSR. If I ask for an explanation of a necessary state of affairs and you explain that this state of affairs follows necessarily from another necessary state of affairs, then it is not as though you have failed to provide an explanation. Your idea that something is still left out seems to me to suppose that the explanandum is something we already understand to be valuable, meaningful, teleologically ordered etc.
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Posted by Miguel 3/12/2018 12:28 pm | #4 |
Lonergan has a complex case for the thesis that the first cause must be an unrestricted act of understanding, in that it would have to answer all questions one can pose: therefore providi not only an efficient cause, but also a final and an exemplary one.
But there's a simple argument he appears to make, too, in defending the free action of the first cause. I quote from Hugo Meynell's Introduction to the Philosophy of Bernard Lonergan:
"Moreover, the ground of the universe cannot be necessitated in founding a contingent universe, for what follows necessarily from the necessary is itself necessary. But it cannot be arbitrary either, since what resulted arbitrarily from the necessary would be mere matter of fact without explanation. 'But what is neither necessary nor arbitrary yet intelligible and a value, is what proceeds freely from the choice of a rational consciousness.' "
What do you think?
The first part (no contingent from a necessary) has featured in some arguments before. But I wonder if it would even be necessary for the second part. Basically, if the existence of the universe followed necessarily from a cause (or at least an impersonal cause), wouldn't this also be a "mere matter of fact" and not fully explain the universe (and thus not satisfy PSR)? If, ultimately, the existence of everything had no *purpose* and, in this sense, no *value*, wouldn't it be mere matter of fact, wouldn't there remain an unanswered question? What exactly would be explanatory about the idea that the universe was necessitated by an impersonal necessary being which didn't choose anything, but merely "had in its nature" to create the universe?
This is not an appeal to teleological considerations of the universe (which I think is a good way to argue for the personhood/intelligence of the first cause anyway). It's an appeal to the idea that it seems like something is left unexplained when we say the universe was created with no rational ends in mind; that it was simply the product of a mindless necessary being - well, wouldn't that be perilously similar to Bertrand Russell's "the universe is just there"?I am not convinced. The impersonal cause that explains everything is a necessary being, thus satisfying PSR* requirements, whereas the universe just being there is an admission of a bare brute fact, thus incompatible with the PSR. I don't see how you can go from beings having no axiological value to their coming into existence being a brute fact.
Also: how would you understand purpose in that quote? It cannot be purpose in the sense of instrumental value assigned by an agent? But if we are talking about inherent purpose then all we get is a kind of immanent teleology.
*Of course we have the modal collapse problem - if the being is not a free agent and its actualising this world follows from its nature, then it's hard to avoid the conclusion that its actualizing the world is also necessary. If we take contrastive explanations to be required then the defender of such a being is in a tight spot.
The issue is that there must be a reason why the necessary being creates the universe. If it is a personal being, then we can explain it in terms of personal, purposive explanations. But if it is not a personal being, how can we explain it? Saying "it was in its nature to produce the universe" comes across as a mere matter of fact - how can that explain anything? Aquinas (and the ancients) answer to why God created the universe would be found in the idea that the good is difusive. This is how I'd understand purpose there -- there would be a purpose in creation in that it's a way to difuse God's goodness, which is natural. But we can't use that for an impersonal necessary cause, or at least one which is not good. And merely stating something is modally necessary does not get rid of all brute facts.
Why does the universe exist? Because an impersonal, necessary being had in its nature to cause it. How does that fully satisfy PSR? How is that different from merely stating as a matter of fact that "it's just there; something impersonal had to cause it, for no particular purpose other than it had to create this universe"? We get to a modal necessity, but not to a self-explanatory one.
There must not only be an explanation for why a necessary being caused the universe, but there must also be an explanation for WHY the necessary being caused it. Merely stating that it was modally necessary for it to cause the universe seems to merely avoid the question. It's almost as if we're trying to explain things by positing a metaphysical principle that everything is just as it is - that's not explanatory!
If you will, take this as an additional argument for Gale and Pruss's assertion that the explanation of the universe can't be either scientific or conceptual, but personal. There's nothing illuminating or explanatory about stating that dependent beings had to be caused just as they are by an impersonal independent being whose nature is to produce the dependent beings we see just as they are.
Last edited by Miguel (3/12/2018 12:30 pm)
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Posted by Miguel 3/12/2018 1:09 pm | #5 |
I think it depends on the kind of explanation that is required to satisfy PSR. If I ask for an explanation of a necessary state of affairs and you explain that this state of affairs follows necessarily from another necessary state of affairs, then it is not as though you have failed to provide an explanation. Your idea that something is still left out seems to me to suppose that the explanandum is something we already understand to be valuable, meaningful, teleologically ordered etc.
An explanation needn't be valuable or anything like that, but in the case of explaining the existence of everything, it's hard to see how the explanation could fail to be purposeful in the sense I mentioned. Modal necessity is not an automatic explanation for things -- which is why Pruss's version of PSR is somewhat problematic, though even he acknowledges that "odd necessities need an explanation", saying for instance that if a necessary being had parts it would be sensible to ask for what puts them together. And which is also how the Augustinian argument proceeds, to give an example; saying that numbers exist in every possible world doesn't automatically explain how they exist.
Likewise, just saying that the universe exists because it was necessarily caused by an impersonal necessary being is not particularly explanatory. It's like stating a matter of fact, albeit a modally necessary one. It's like saying "everything is exactly as it is, because it had to be exactly as it is". Is that an explanation?
Aquinas, following Pseudo-Dyonisius, wrote about why God created the universe. See John Wippel's "the ultimate why question". I can't help but feel that even if we were to grant that the universe was necessarily caused by a necessary impersonal being, this would not really be particularly explanatory or satisfy PSR.
Last edited by Miguel (3/12/2018 1:22 pm)
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Posted by Proclus 3/16/2018 8:47 am | #6 |
Modal necessity is not an automatic explanation for things -- which is why Pruss's version of PSR is somewhat problematic, though even he acknowledges that "odd necessities need an explanation", saying for instance that if a necessary being had parts it would be sensible to ask for what puts them together. And which is also how the Augustinian argument proceeds, to give an example; saying that numbers exist in every possible world doesn't automatically explain how they exist.
Point taken. I wonder if we can generalize and specify what exactly it is about these kinds of necessities that requires further explanation without being obviously normative or teleological.
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Posted by DanielCC 3/16/2018 9:32 am | #7 |
I think it depends on the kind of explanation that is required to satisfy PSR. If I ask for an explanation of a necessary state of affairs and you explain that this state of affairs follows necessarily from another necessary state of affairs, then it is not as though you have failed to provide an explanation. Your idea that something is still left out seems to me to suppose that the explanandum is something we already understand to be valuable, meaningful, teleologically ordered etc.
An explanation needn't be valuable or anything like that, but in the case of explaining the existence of everything, it's hard to see how the explanation could fail to be purposeful in the sense I mentioned. Modal necessity is not an automatic explanation for things -- which is why Pruss's version of PSR is somewhat problematic, though even he acknowledges that "odd necessities need an explanation", saying for instance that if a necessary being had parts it would be sensible to ask for what puts them together. And which is also how the Augustinian argument proceeds, to give an example; saying that numbers exist in every possible world doesn't automatically explain how they exist.
I disagree with this (and have done so in the context of Pruss 'explanation for parts' argument for Divine Simplicity). In asking for this kind of explanation, which even if legitimate is not immediately legitimate*, the theist is significantly moving the goal post with the PSR. The atheist could justly point out that the theist is implicitly assuming a variant of the thesis they so adamantly denied when put forward by Hume - that is that there are no direct necessary connections between parts and properties (this is the problem I have with Ed's formulation of the Neo-Platonic proof, that the connection between some parts can't be necessary - a necessity which is phenomenologicaly apparent).
*As Pruss himself admitted when he claimed that developing a PSR for necessary truths would be a far more controversial task than one for contingent truths. One could try to develop such an account but just assuming it will lead us into dangerus waters. One reason problem is that it will appeal heavily to per impossible reasoning if one asks for contrastive explaination - how does one answer 'Why does 5 follow 4 in the integer series instead of 7?' or 'Why is Red closer to Yellow than Blue?' ? I can see the door opening to a kind of Cartesian modal volunterarism where every question about a modal fact is answered in reference to God's will.
There is a kind of explanatory virtue to a transparent as opposed to oblique account of necessity, whether it be for relations or for beings, but I am not convinced this should be collapsed into the PSR.
Last edited by DanielCC (3/16/2018 9:51 am)
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Posted by Ouros 3/16/2018 10:06 am | #8 |
But, doesn't necessity simply means, in the broad sense, that its opposite is impossible?
So, why can't we simply explain necessary propositions by saying that its contrary is not possible?
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Posted by DanielCC 3/16/2018 10:48 am | #9 |
But, doesn't necessity simply means, in the broad sense, that its opposite is impossible?
So, why can't we simply explain necessary propositions by saying that its contrary is not possible?
Because that would be explain necessary combinations of parts or necessary actions, precisely in virtue of their being necessary, something Miquel’s account seeks to rule out.
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Posted by Miguel 3/16/2018 11:13 am | #10 |
But, doesn't necessity simply means, in the broad sense, that its opposite is impossible?
So, why can't we simply explain necessary propositions by saying that its contrary is not possible?Because that would be explain necessary combinations of parts or necessary actions, precisely in virtue of their being necessary, something Miquel’s account seeks to rule out.
Yeah, because I don't think all necessary facts have the same type of explanation. Some may be fully explained by their nature and meaning, but some - like those involving parts - have to be explained by reference to somehing else which holds them together.
Even if we didn't have a good grasp on what the explanations are for many necessary facts, this shouldn't lead us to posit necessaryfacts as *brute facts*. Or any of them. I think that would be just as preposterous as contingent brute facts, if not more so (for instance my deductive argument against brute facts). With that in mind, and considering odd necessities which Pruss himself admits, it is perfectly sensible to demand an explanation for, say, a necessary being that somehow is composed of parts. Any ontological analysis of that without reference to an external explanation would be severely problematic.
Incidentally, the neo-platonic proof is one of my favorites. And the manner Plotinus attributes will and freedom to the One may also be relevant to this thread.
